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ABSTRACT 
In the late 1980s, Tehran municipality became financially independent from central 
government. As a result, the municipality utilised innovative tools to finance the city, 
such as granting excess construction density to developers, which enabled them to 
construct taller buildings in exchange for a fee. This financing tool has generated a 
significant amount of money for the municipality and boosted the housing 
construction sector but it was the first step towards relaxing planning regulations and 
giving power to developers to pursue their agendas. The aim of this research is to 
investigate the impacts of municipal fiscal decentralisation on the development 
process and planning system of Tehran. 
The general orientation of this research is qualitative strategy. Primary data was 
collected by conducting 47 semi-structured interviews with housing developers and 
planners within both the public and private sectors in Tehran. In order to understand 
the interest and strategies of housing developers, interviews were conducted with 
developers working as individual developers or as construction companies. To collect 
data on various aspects of planning and financing the city, interviews were carried 
out with key informants who are, or used to be, members or officers of relevant 
departments in the government or other institutions.  
By careful analysis of the collected data on the behind the scenes of development 
and planning process in Tehran, this study argues that the financial dependence of 
Tehran Municipality on incomes generated from construction density charges, 
payable by housing construction developers, has resulted in the occurrence of a 
certain type of market-led growth in specific areas of the city. Although attempts have 
been made to harness this market-led growth by introducing a new plan for the city 
this has led to massive alterations and interventions intended to secure the benefit of 
developers and the municipality’s income. Without providing an alternative source of 
income for the Tehran Municipality it is unlikely to have much success in planning for 
Tehran. 
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IMPACT STATEMENT  
By using empirical evidence from Tehran, this thesis has looked at how the excess 
construction density charge, which is a revenue-raising tool used by the Tehran 
Municipality, has influenced the urban planning system of Tehran through its effects 
on the development process and its impact on the development of the city. Findings 
of this research inform the institutions currently involved in the planning policy and 
practice of Tehran. More specifically, the findings of this research could impact the 
performance and strategies of the following organisations: 
• Deputy of Urban Development and Architecture of Ministry of Roads and 
Urban Development 
• Urban Planning and Architecture High Council 
• Islamic City Council of Tehran  
• Architecture and Urbanism Department of Tehran Municipality  
• Tehran Urban Planning and Research Centre of Tehran Municipality  
It is intended to translate the analysis and findings of this research to Farsi in order to 
disseminate those finding in Iran.  Dissemination will be done through publishing in 
Iranian academic journals as well as sending a summary of the findings and 
recommendations to the mentioned institutions. It is also intended to publish the 
findings of this thesis in English in international journals which address urban 
planning and development process.  
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1-1 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Since the late 1970s and the 1980s, for reasons such as increasing inflation 
rates and unemployment, many states around the world have turned towards 
neoliberal policies (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism, which is about deregulation, 
liberalisation and state retrenchment (Brenner & Theodore, 2008), has pushed 
local governments towards ‘entrepreneurial governance’ and the 
decentralisation of central government (Harvey, 1989). As a result, local 
governments have been put under pressure to find ways to fund their 
expenditures through private capital. This process of neoliberalisation and the 
pressure on local governments, reinforced after the Wall Street crash of 2008, 
has resulted in even stricter austerity measures (Peck, 2012).  
Central governments are reducing their financial assistance to local 
governments in the name of fiscal decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation is 
presented as passing budgetary authority from a central government to local 
governments through devolving the power to make taxing and spending 
decisions (Bahl, 2008). As a result, many local governments are under pressure 
to reduce their budget deficit. For example, in the US context, because of 
austerity budgeting measures, the expenditures of local governments have to 
be reduced by 12.7% per year (GAO, 2012 citied in Peck, 2012, p. 627). Or, in 
the context of Britain, since 2010 a fiscal squeeze put local authorities under 
pressure to reduce the budget deficit from 10% to 4% of GDP and it is forecast 
that the budget deficit should be almost eliminated by 2020 (The Economist, 
2017). To achieve this goal, government has reduced its spending and is 
planning to make the finance of local governments more independent. As The 
Economist (2017) reports, Whitehall ‘plans by 2020 to phase out the main grant 
by which it supports local authorities, thus leaving them more reliant on 
financing themselves out of council tax and business rates’.  
As a result, many municipalities and local governments are looking for new 
methods to generate funding. Impact fees, transferable development rights and 
development charges in some states of the USA and Canada, selling additional 
construction bonds in Brazil, valorisation taxes in Colombia and developer 
contributions (planning gains) in Britain are examples of alternative ways that 
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city municipalities have recently employed to finance their costs or deliver local 
services. In other words, to implement public planning policies, municipalities 
are increasingly relying on the financial resources of property developers and 
investors (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014).  
There have been a number of studies devoted to the analysis of the different 
techniques to charge developers in order to fund the expenses of municipalities 
and to deliver local services (e.g. Bahl & Linn, 1992; Bird & Slack, 2007; Ingram 
& Hong, 2010; Slack, 2009). Also there have been studies carried out on the 
impact of these charges on the property market (e.g. Huffman, Nelson, Smith, & 
Stegman, 1988; Ihlanfeldt & Shaughnessy, 2004; Singell & Lillydahl, 1990; 
Skaburskis & Qadeer, 1992). However, there have been few studies conducted 
(Jou, Lund Hansen, & Wu, 2012; Needham, 2000; Slack, 2002) on the 
implications that these municipal revenue-raising regimes have on planning 
objectives and their potential impact on the future development of the city. 
Following the critique of Robinson (Robinson, 2002, 2003, 2006) and Roy 
(2009) of the focus of urban theories on US and European cities which limits the 
scope of urban theory, this research has chosen Tehran as its focus. To 
address the dichotomy between First World cities which are seen as models to 
generate theory and policy, and Third World cities which are perceived as 
followers and imitators of those First World cities, Robinson (2006) proposes 
the concept of ‘ordinary cities’. Based on this concept cities ‘are all dynamic and 
diverse, …, [and are] arenas for social and economic life’ (Robinson, 2006, p. 
1). In a similar way to Robinson, Roy (2009, p. 820) argues for ‘new 
geographies’ of urban theory. She says achieving that ‘requires “dislocating” the 
EuroAmerican centre of theoretical production; for it is not enough simply to 
study the cities of the global South as interesting, anomalous, different, and 
esoteric empirical cases (Roy, 2009, p. 820).’ 
Despite the recent resurgence of interest in studying ‘ordinary cities’ in 
comparative studies, Goodfellow (2018) found that the number of studies which 
are explicitly looking at cities outside the global North is very limited. He 
mentions that ‘of the 30 articles included in a 2014 Virtual Issue of the 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research on comparative 
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urbanism, few explicitly compare specific cities and only three involve direct 
comparisons where one or more of the cities is outside the global North’ 
(Goodfellow, 2018, p. 200). Roy (2009, p. 820) also says that, even in the cases 
where cities of the global South are visible in urban theory, they ‘are usually 
assembled under the sign of underdevelopment, that last and compulsory 
chapter on “Third World Urbanization” in the urban studies textbook’. 
To address the deficiency of empirical studies on the implications of the reliance 
of local governments to private capital on urban planning objectives (Tasan-Kok 
& Baeten, 2012) and also to follow the post-colonial approach of urban study 
(Goodfellow, 2018; Robinson, 2002, 2003, 2006; Roy, 2009) this study uses 
empirical evidence from Tehran to explore the implications of the reliance of the 
Tehran Municipality on private capital for the urban planning system of Tehran. 
Since 1968 when the Urban Development and Redevelopment Act was 
approved, Iran has been searching for tools and strategies (e.g. value capture 
tax) to push municipalities towards self-sufficiency. It has been more than three 
decades since the Tehran Municipality received any money from central 
government and it is now financially independent. Hence, studying the case of 
Tehran could shed some light on the consequences of relying on private capital 
to provide public services.  
According to Article 52 of the Budget Bill of 1983 (IPI [Islamic Parliament of 
Iran], 1983a), Iran’s Government had started to phase out its financial 
assistance to the municipalities of the country. As a result, they began to look 
for innovative ways and tools to generate income in order to manage cities 
(Azizi, 2005). Changing the land-use, selling land, increasing property taxes and 
privatising some services and sectors of municipalities are some of the ways 
used by the Tehran Municipality to generate income (Izadi, 2008, p. 86). 
However, the major source of revenue became the fees obtained from 
developers to allow them to increase the construction density (Floor Area Ratio) 
of the buildings they were constructing. 
Since the 1990s, the Tehran Municipality has been granting developers 
permission to increase the construction density (Floor Area Ratio) by allowing 
them to build taller constructions than the permitted height suggested in 
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Tehran’s official plans. Granting extra construction density in exchange for a 
fee1 was initially proposed to finance part of the municipal operating and capital 
budget in order to assist the municipality in becoming financially self-reliant. By 
using empirical evidence from Tehran, this thesis studies how the excess 
construction density charge tool, as an example of a revenue-raising tool of 
municipalities, has influenced the urban planning system of Tehran through its 
effects on the development process and its impact on the future pattern of the 
city. This has resulted in the modification of official plans and the revision of 
them to accommodate the financial needs of the municipality. 
1-2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This research investigates the impacts of the fiscal decentralisation programme 
on the development process and the planning system of Tehran by studying the 
implications of the excess construction density charge tool on the Government’s 
urban planning agendas and the development pattern of the city of Tehran. In 
particular, this research addresses: 
1. How the construction density charge in Tehran has affected the 
decisions of housing developers 
2. How, as a result of using the construction density charge tool, the 
decisions of housing developers have shaped the city of Tehran 
3. How, in turn, this market-led growth has affected the way in which the 
city is planned. 
In the first instance, development decisions refer to all the elements contributing 
to the decision of the developers on the location, type and density of the 
housing developments they construct. In the second, the research is concerned 
with the impact of the developers’ decisions on the way the city is evolving. The 
last focuses on how market-led growth has affected the planning system of 
Tehran by altering the urban plans in preparation, revision and implementation 
phases. 
                                                
1 Known as ‘excess construction density charge’ or ‘construction density bonus’ or more 
informally known as ‘selling density’ or ‘selling the excess construction density’.  
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The principal hypothesis of this research is that the development of the city is 
not controlled by official plans but by responding to spontaneous growth, which 
is partially the result of the application of the density bonus tool. Although 
Tehran has a Structural-Strategic (Comprehensive) Plan and District Plans for 
each region, this research argues that the city has grown and been managed 
spontaneously rather than in a planned way. 
This analysis creates three propositions. Firstly, the construction density bonus 
has created a market that did not previously exist, or was not of a considerable 
size. By adopting the policy, the tendency to build taller than that permitted in 
official plans increased the economic benefits for developers. The construction 
industry became very profitable and attracted many people from other 
professions to invest and work in the sector. Prime locations became under 
more pressure for construction. As a result, the spatial development of the city 
was handed over to the vagaries of housing developers’ interests. 
Secondly, the decisions of developers have affected the spatial order of the city; 
market trends have shaped the city of Tehran to a great extent. In many parts of 
the city, the spatial development has been shaped by the developers’ ability to, 
and interest in, buying the right to build more densely in the areas that they 
thought would be more profitable. The financial dependency of the Tehran 
Municipality on the construction sector boosted the power of developers to 
construct what benefitted them financially. Thirdly, this market-led growth has 
affected the way the city is planned. The plans are not driving the growth; 
instead these have been adjusted to meet the requirements of spontaneous, 
market-led growth. 
Although the excess construction density charge tool has assisted Tehran in 
obtaining the financial independence of the municipality from central 
government and helped it to achieve some degree of autonomy, this has made 
the municipality become dependent on the construction sector, and its agents 
such as developers. As the contribution of fees gained from the excess 
construction density charge to Tehran’s municipal budget is high, this budget is 
very sensitive to the amount of construction density sold and is therefore not 
stable. 
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1-3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters. The first is the introductory chapter in 
which the context of the research and an overall view of the problem and of 
relevant research questions is described. The main hypothesis is followed by an 
overview of the structure of the rest of the thesis. In addition, at the end of this 
chapter, conventions that are used to translate interviews and other materials 
from Farsi to English and convert dates from the solar calendar to the Gregorian 
will be clarified. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical background of the research. Chapter 2 
is devoted to reviewing the relevant literature to provide a better understanding 
of how local governments, in the era of neoliberalisam and decentralisation, 
fund their own expenditures and why these funding tools would affect the 
development process and urban planning. In this review the process of 
neoliberalisation and the changing role of governments in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century are discussed. The thesis then focuses on the ways in which 
local governments fund their expenditure as a result of the decentralisation 
process. In the third part of the review, discussions around the development 
process and its conceptual models and urban planning in the market economy 
are explored. Chapter 2 concludes that planning practices are moving towards 
symbiotic planning which means that for financial and implementing reasons 
urban planning and the market need to work together. This kind of planning and 
the financial need of local authorities has had implications for urban planning. In 
some cases to secure income, urban plans have faced changes to meet market 
needs and more flexible and negotiable approaches are in demand. 
Chapter 3 addresses the research methodology in detail. It starts by providing 
the theoretical framework of the research which is based on the institutional 
model of the development process. Based on this model, the research aims to 
investigate the dynamics between structures and agencies. Then, based on this 
framework, the overall design of the research is explained. The research design 
section includes the formulation of research questions, their related sub-
questions and the strategy to approach these questions. The data collection 
strategies and techniques that are used to generate primary and secondary 
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data are then presented. The data collection section is followed by an 
elaboration of the factors such as the power hierarchy in interviews that have 
influenced the data collection process. At the end of this chapter, the strategy 
that is used to analyse data to answer the research questions is presented. This 
section explains that relying on theoretical proposition strategy, an explanation-
building technique is used to analyse data.  
Chapters 4 and 5 connect the two theoretical chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) to the 
empirical and analytical Chapters of 6 and 7. While Chapter 4 focuses on 
providing necessary information about Tehran in general by using secondary 
evidence, Chapter 5 goes into more specific details of a few selected regions of 
Tehran. Chapter 4, firstly, briefly presents the formation of the city which shows 
that in a short period of time Tehran has grown from an insignificant village to a 
metropolitan city. This chapter then discusses the spatial structure of the city 
which is divided and polarised between rich and poor. Following that, the 
sectoral and fragmented governance system of the city is presented, then the 
urban planning system and the evolution from comprehensive plans to strategic 
and structural plans are considered. Next, the municipal organisation and its 
budgeting issues are explored showing how a planning tool has become a 
source of funding. Finally, Chapter 4 overviews the housing construction 
industry which is mostly in the hands of small private construction firms and 
individual developers.  
Chapter 5 presents necessary details about the 22 regions of Tehran and will 
explain why the research focuses on Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to explore the 
answers of research questions. This chapter begins by discussing how the city 
is divided into regions and continues by describing and comparing the 
characteristics of the 22 regions. In this section, by looking at construction 
permits, population growth, the housing price and Commission No. 5’s 
decisions regarding the 22 regions it concludes that specific areas of the city 
are greatly affected by the subject of this thesis. Then it takes a closer look at 
Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Tehran to provide some necessary context before 
moving to empirical and analytical chapters. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 contain an analysis of empirical data collected during 
fieldwork. Chapter 6 first focuses on the Tehran Municipality’s financing 
mechanism and its dependence on the excess construction density charge. 
This section discusses that the Tehran Municipality is under pressure to 
accommodate the economic interests of developers which has resulted in an 
increase in the bargaining power of developers. This chapter then explores 
housing developers’ characteristics and decisions on how they choose where, 
when and what to construct. At the end, this chapter highlights how the financial 
agendas of the Tehran Municipality are matched with housing developers’ 
agendas.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the implications that the Tehran Municipality’s financial 
dependence on developers have had on the urban planning system of Tehran. 
Firstly, this chapter discusses the process of the preparation of Tehran and its 
regions’ plans. This section delineates how the plan has changed throughout 
preparation, approval and implementation phases. Then, this chapter discusses 
the fact that Tehran’s development is not happening based on plans as they are 
under pressure to accommodate the financial needs of the Tehran Municipality. 
The chapter will finish by discussing the spatial manifestations of the dynamic 
that exists between Tehran Municipality’s financial needs, the developers’ 
interests and those of the planning system of Tehran. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions drawn from the research. It begins 
by discussing the main conclusions drawn from the thesis which show how a 
change in structure (in this case a change in the municipality’s financing 
system) would result in a change in agencies’ performance (in this case 
decisions of housing developers) and how this has implications for the planning 
system. Then, initial research questions and hypotheses are reconsidered. After 
that, it presents findings that were not originally within the scope of the thesis 
but were added during the research process. The last section of the chapter 
contains suggestions for further research in the field and possibilities for future 
studies on the subject. 
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1-4 PROTOCOLS 
Before proceeding to the main body of the thesis, two main protocols that are 
used in the preparation of this document should be clarified. The first is 
concerned with the way interviews, technical words and institutions’ names are 
translated from Farsi to English and the second addresses the convention used 
to convert dates from Iran’s official calendar to the Gregorian calendar. 
1-4-1 TRANSLATIONS 
As it will be explained in Chapter 3, the main source of primary data for this 
research is generated from interviews with relevant public and private sources 
in Tehran. All the interviews carried out are in Farsi. After transcribing all of the 
interviews, the parts of the interviews which are used as direct speech are 
translated from Farsi to English. Instead of using a verbatim translation, the 
sense and meaning of the interviewees have been conveyed keeping the 
original tone of the discussions and retaining the use of certain words.  
In the translation of technical terms and jargon from Farsi to English an 
appropriate literal equivalence in English has been used. If possible, efforts are 
made to mention the approximate UK equivalent term in the footnotes to help 
the reader to relate to the term. For example, the term ‘construction permit’ is 
the literal translation of ‘Parvaneh Sakht’ in Farsi and its approximate equivalent 
in the UK is planning permission. This is mentioned in the footnote when the 
term is used for the first time. However, some terms used in the Iranian urban 
planning and construction industry do not have an equivalent in the UK system. 
When this is the case, the term is explained at length to, hopefully, clarify its 
meaning. 
Translating the names of institutions and organisations was more 
straightforward as, in most cases, the English translation of the name of the 
institution was available on the official website of that institution. However, in 
cases where the English name was not available, literal translations were used 
and the Farsi name is mentioned in the footnote. For example, the title 
Agreements Commission is used for the commission that exists in the 
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municipality called ‘comesion-e tavafoghat’ which makes agreements with the 
potential developers.  
1-4-2 DATE CONVERSION  
The official calendar in Iran is the Solar Hijri calendar which begins on about the 
21st March of each Gregorian year. To convert the Solar Hijri year into the 
equivalent Gregorian year, 621 or 622 years should be added. In this research, 
in order to be accurate, an online converter2 promoted by the Iran Chamber 
Society is used to convert dates from the Solar Hijri calendar to the Gregorian 
calendar.
                                                
2 The link to the year conversion tool is: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/calendar/converter/iranian_calendar_converter.php 
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2-1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a review of the literature which provides the theoretical 
basis for the research. According to the proposed research questions set out in 
the previous chapter, which are concerned with the effect of the municipality’s 
funding mechanism on the development process and planning system of 
Tehran, this chapter tries to provide a better understanding of how local 
governments, in the era of neoliberalisation, fund their own expenditures and 
how these funding tools affect the development process and urban planning 
system.  
Firstly, the process of neoliberalisation which has resulted in a change in the 
role of central governments during the 1970s and 1980s is discussed in this 
review. Then, the decentralisation (administrative, political and fiscal) process 
as an important part of neoliberalisation is delineated with more emphasis on 
fiscal decentralisation, to better understand the rationalities behind them and 
their benefits and costs.  Designing the process of decentralisation is also 
elaborated in this section.  
In the second part of the review, the focus is on the ways in which local 
governments/municipalities fund their operating and capital expenditures as a 
result of the decentralisation process and retrenchment of public finance. This 
part also investigates why local governments are looking for alternative ways of 
funding and have a tendency to rely more on the private sector to generate 
income. At the end of this section, is a discussion of why funding mechanisms 
should or should not affect planning objectives. 
The third section elaborates on the development process, its conceptual models 
and agents, and then looks at the changing role of urban planning and urban 
planners on the development process in the market economy. It shows that 
planning is shifting towards a symbiotic relationship with the market as it relies 
on private capital to provide infrastructure and services. However, as discussed 
in the last part of this section, reliance on money from the private sector has 
had some implications for the planning system. 
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2-2 THE NEOLIBERALISM AND DECENTRALISATION 
PROCESS 
2-2-1 NEOLIBERAL TURN  
After experimenting with the idea of the formation of a neoliberal state in Chile 
in the early 1970s, Britain, under Thatcher’s government, and the US, under 
Reagan, turned to neoliberalism in the 1980s (Harvey, 2005). The reason 
behind this was to harness burgeoning unemployment and inflation which had 
begun at the end of the 1960s. It was believed that Keynesian policies which 
were prominent in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression were no 
longer working (Harvey, 2005). As a result neoliberal policies were adopted as 
‘a strategic political response to the sustained global recession of the preceding 
decade’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2008, p. 2). Austerity budgeting measures 
which took place after the Wall Street crash of 2008 in the US and later in other 
countries such as Britain, continued and reinforced neoliberal policies to 
transfer risks, responsibilities, debts and deficits to the local state ‘with renewed 
systematic intensity’ (Peck, 2012, p. 626). 
Generally speaking, neoliberal doctrine is opposed to state interventionist 
theories (Harvey, 2005) and is about governmental downsizing in order to 
reinvigorate ‘private enterprise, free markets and individual liberty’ (Peck, 2012, 
p. 629). As Brenner and Theodore (2008, pp. 2, 3) say ‘states throughout the 
older industrialised world began … to dismantle the basic institutional 
components of the post-war settlement and to mobilise a range of policies 
intended to extend market discipline, competition, and commodification 
throughout all sectors of society’. Harvey (2005, p. 19) notes that neoliberalism 
emerged as a utopian project ‘to realize a theoretical design for the 
reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish 
the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic 
elites’.  
Although, in theory, a neoliberal state has a specific character, in practice, 
states with neoliberal agendas have taken various routes which are not entirely 
in line with the theory of the neoliberal state. In theory the neoliberal state 
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should guarantee individual freedoms by favouring ‘strong individual private 
property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets 
and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 64). Also, the privatisation of state assets 
should happen through deregulation and the private sphere should take over 
sectors run by the state. In a neoliberal state, each individual is accountable for 
his/her own action and wellbeing and this extends into the realms of welfare, 
education, healthcare, and even pensions. Moreover, the free mobility of capital 
between sectors, regions, and countries should be ensured and the state 
should reduce barriers to the movement of capital (Harvey, 2005, pp. 64–67). 
However, in practice it is hard to describe the general character of the neoliberal 
state as ‘systematic divergences from the template of neoliberal theory’ and the 
dynamics of neoliberalisation have evolved in a different manner from place to 
place as well as over time (Harvey, 2005, p. 70). In different countries 
neoliberalism took different paths and created ‘extraordinary variations’ of 
neoliberal initiatives which are contextually specific because of the inherited 
regulatory landscapes of each country (Brenner & Theodore, 2008, p. 6). For 
example, some developmental states who are interventionist in nature adopted 
those neoliberal policies which enabled them to be part of free trade and open 
markets (Harvey, 2005, p. 72).  
Iran had adopted some of the neoliberal policies in the late 1980s. Despite the 
initial aim of Iran’s government after the revolution to address ‘the decadence of 
unbridled market individualism’, it had not abandoned its market-based 
practices (Harvey, 2005, p. 85). In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran was 
under economic pressure which resulted in a restructuring of the economy. 
Rafsanjani, president at the time, ‘pushed for changes to labour, banking, and 
property laws to attract foreign investment’. He and his allies argued that 
‘deregulation, privatisation, and cuts in subsidies and public services’ were 
necessary to achieve economic growth (Pourzal, 2008, p. 20).  
2-2-2 THE DECENTRALISATION PROGRAMME  
In most of the countries which adopted neoliberal policies, the role of central 
government evolved from the centralised state that was in place after the 
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Second World War to the more decentralised state of today. This changing 
pattern of the state in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is 
understood as shifting from government to governance or from rowing to 
steering (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 25). Decentralisation is seen as an 
important part of the reform package to shift towards local governance. 
Decentralisation, which encompasses administrative, political and fiscal 
decentralisation, is understood as a process of devolving power and 
responsibilities from central government to local government(s).  
Although decentralisation is understood as transferring central government’s 
power to local government or, in other words, broadening the role of local 
government, the truthfulness of the central government’s intention in handing 
over real power to local government is under question (The Economist, 2017). 
In this respect, Foucault’s (1991) concept of governmentality has been used to 
re-address concerns of government in the ‘conduct of conduct’ through 
‘controlling at a distance’. This means that central government, through the 
creation of governance structures, seeks to control ‘through broader systems or 
networks’ (Rydin, 2007, p. 611) rather than direct control. By creating ‘locales, 
entities and persons able to operate a regulated autonomy’ (Rose & Miller, 
1992, p. 173) the aim of control at a distance would be achieved. This implies 
that governance is not about handing over power to local government but using 
it as a network to control at a distance. 
Dividing decentralisation into administrative, political and fiscal decentralisations 
would be problematic as they are overlapping concepts, however, an attempt is 
made here to define them separately. Administrative decentralisation attempts 
to redistribute ‘authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing 
public services among different levels of government’ (World Bank, n.d.-a). It is 
about the ‘transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and management 
of certain public functions from central government and its agencies to field 
units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-
autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or 
functional authorities’ (World Bank, n.d.-a).  
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Political decentralisation is about giving more power to citizens or their elected 
representatives in public decision making in order to give them more influence 
in the formulation and implementation of policies. It is widely assumed that 
decisions made ‘with greater participation will be better informed and more 
relevant to diverse interests in society than those made only by national political 
authorities’ (World Bank, n.d.-b). By selecting representatives from local 
electoral jurisdictions, citizens will be better able to know their political 
representatives and this, in turn, will allow elected officials to be more aware of 
the demands and requirements of their constituents.  
Fiscal decentralisation is the passing of budgetary authority from a central 
government to local governments by devolving the power to make taxing and 
spending decisions (Bahl, 2008). Although the justification of fiscal 
decentralisation varies from country to country depending on the problems 
faced by that country (Bahl, 2008), improving the public sector’s efficiency, 
reducing budgeting issues, and promoting economic growth are the main 
motivations for countries to implement decentralisation programmes (Bahl and 
Linn, 1992; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984; Oates, 1972). 
2-2-3 THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FISCAL 
DECENTRALISATION 
Economic efficiency is the first benefit assumed from fiscal decentralisation. 
This is based on the assumption that local governments are better positioned 
than national government to deliver public services because of their information 
advantage, so they can respond to people’s preferences to make decisions 
about their budget (Bahl, 2008; Davoodi and Zou, 1998). Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2003) assert that fiscal decentralisation indirectly influences economic 
development as it affects technical efficiency, income inequality and corruption, 
all of which can, in turn, affect economic efficiency. 
In addition to economic justifications, in some cases governments move 
towards decentralisation because centralisation does not work there. For 
example, in large countries such as Brazil or China, fiscal management from the 
centre can be costly, or in a country with different ethnic groups or many 
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religions, centralisation may not bring about the desirable public service 
outcomes for its people (Bahl, 2008). Moreover, centralisation, by its very 
nature, implies a uniformity that creates resentment and this resentment means 
that various regions cannot choose a package of services that fits their 
requirements (ibid). 
To capture the benefits of fiscal decentralisation, Bahl (2008) believes that there 
are five conditions that must be met. The first two conditions relate to the 
accountability of the process. The first one is the accountability of local 
legislatures to the local people and the second is the accountability of chief 
officers to local legislatures. The third condition concerns the powers of sub-
national governments to determine some independent taxing regimes. The 
fourth condition addresses the ability of local government to take some 
responsibility for the provision of services. The last condition is the adequate 
discretion of local government to make decisions about expenditure. 
In developing countries and transition economies, capturing the benefits of 
decentralisation can be flawed. Davoodi and Zou (1998) indicate that in 
developing countries including Iran, contrary to developed countries, the 
relationship between decentralisation and economic growth is negative. They 
explain that these negative effects of decentralisation on economic growth may 
be because of:  
1. The spending composition of local government, e.g. inappropriate 
allocation of funds between current expenditures and capital spending  
2. Incorrect revenue assignment among different levels of government, e.g. 
local government using a funding tool to raise revenue that should have 
been used by central government  
3. Constraints to raise revenue and make decisions about the expenditures, 
and  
4. A lack of responsiveness of local governments to people, e.g. they are 
not able to reflect the needs and preferences of the local population.  
Fiscal decentralisation is an opportunity for developing countries to improve 
service delivery, get closer to citizens, involve them in the decision-making 
process, and to increase economic gains. However, a lack of economic stability 
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and institutional capacity of developing economies, in addition to difficulties in 
implementation, make it hard for them to capture these benefits of fiscal 
decentralisation. 
2-2-4 THE DESIGN OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION  
Sequencing and the design of fiscal decentralisation play a key role in the 
success and failure of the decentralisation process. Evaluation can be made of 
the effectiveness of a fiscal decentralisation programme according to the 
procedures in place to achieve decentralisation. Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2006) propose a normative pattern to sequence decentralisation, which is 
applicable to many countries. This design looks very straightforward but 
problems arise in the application of it in the real world. 
According to the model, the first step towards a decentralisation process is the 
deconcentration of service delivery from national government to local 
governments. Transferring personnel and facilities for service delivery to local 
governments before the start of the programme can facilitate decentralisation 
and make it more feasible when the process begins. Holding a national debate 
about decentralisation is the next step. To have a sustainable process, it is 
necessary to get some degree of consensus before the initiation of the process. 
This debate can be held in the context of a national election, or led by an 
appointed national commission. The third step is the design of the fiscal 
decentralisation programme. At this stage, a White Paper outlines the 
Government’s plan for accomplishing the goals of the decentralisation 
programme. This White Paper will be the basis for writing the decentralisation 
law.  
According to this road map, the fourth step is to pass the decentralisation law. 
This law gives legal standing to the implementation of the fiscal decentralisation 
programme. This document must include key features of the programme but 
should not include details because it cannot predict all the realities of 
administration that will arise. Developing the details of the implementation 
regulations is the fifth step. The implementation regulations must clearly 
indicate the details of the programme, such as details of the transfer of 
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employees and a timetable for implementation. Implementation is the sixth step. 
At this stage a sub-national government starts to work with its decentralised 
institutions and begins its new fiscal responsibilities. 
The last, but on-going, step of this programme is step seven. Central 
government should have a monitoring system from the first day of 
implementation. In the initial years, monitoring should be about addressing 
unforeseen implementation problems but in later years it can focus on the 
impacts of the system. However, as it will be shown in the succeeding chapters, 
the fiscal decentralisation of municipalities in Iran has happened without a plan 
and a defined order. The next part of the literature review will look at the funding 
system of municipalities as a result of the fiscal decentralisation programme and 
the gaining of fiscal autonomy. 
2-3 FUNDING MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE 
Municipalities, as a form of local government, need to find ways to finance their 
operating and capital expenditures to meet the services demanded by their 
residents. Nowadays there is more pressure on municipalities as a result of the 
decrease in central government financial assistance associated with the 
retrenchment of public finance (Brenner & Theodore, 2008). In order to address 
fiscal needs, municipalities increasingly rely upon local sources of revenue, user 
fees, and other instruments of private finance (Brenner & Theodore, 2008, p. 
22). Although municipal finance is about raising revenue and expenditure 
decisions (Slack, 2009), the focus of this study is on ways of generating income 
for municipalities.  
2-3-1 OPERATING AND CAPITAL BUDGETS 
Although the responsibilities of municipalities differ between countries, they 
generally have two types of budget to plan their revenues and expenditures: an 
operating or current budget and a capital budget. The current municipal budget 
consists of revenues and expenditures for the upcoming year. This budget 
deals with day-to-day costs and income to deliver municipal services. Examples 
of operating costs are salaries and wages, repairs and maintenance, and the 
purchase of short-life equipment. The sources of revenue to address these 
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expenditures can be a range of taxes such as property taxes, income taxes and 
payroll taxes, user fees and intergovernmental transfers (Slack, 2009).  
The capital budget is the municipality’s capital expenditure and anticipated 
sources of revenue for long-term plans. These plans will be carried out in more 
than one year. Examples of capital expenditure are infrastructure building such 
as roads, water and sewer lines, and public transport provision. Financing for 
capital expenditure includes reserves from the current budget, 
intergovernmental transfers, public-private partnerships, borrowing, 
development exactions and value capture levies (Slack, 2009).  
To finance operating and capital expenditures, municipalities use different 
funding tools which can be divided into two categories: classic tools, which have 
been in use for a long time in most countries and include property taxes, user 
fees and intergovernmental transfers; and new, alternative ways of financing 
that try to mobilise private capital to the municipal budget such as development 
charges, value capture taxes and relaxing regulation taxes. The following 
sections will look at these two categories in more detail.  
2-3-2 CLASSIC FINANCING TOOLS  
Intergovernmental transfers, property taxes and user fees are classic tools 
mainly used to fund operating expenditures of municipalities. Table 2-1 shows 
the contribution of each source to raise funds for the current costs of four cities. 
The table shows that the combination and share of each funding source varies 
from city to city depending on the legal, economic and political conditions of 
each country. 
 Cape Town  
2007–08 
Toronto  
2007 
Madrid  
2003 
Mumbai  
2007–08 
Property taxes 25.4% 41.5% 12% 19% 
Other taxes   19% 46% 
User fees 40.09% 21.8% 16% 23% 
Intergovernmental 
transfers 
25.2% 20.9% 39% 4% 
Other  8.5% 15.8% 14% 8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 2-1: Sources of municipal operating revenues for selected cities. Source: 
(Slack, 2009, p. 22)  
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2-3-2-1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS  
The finance of local governments (including municipalities) is, to some degree, 
dependant on transfers from central government. These transfers can be 
conditional upon specific purposes, or unconditional. The general purpose of 
intergovernmental transfer is to meet the fiscal gap of the municipality, 
equalising between municipalities with differences in resources and spill-over of 
services over the boundaries of the municipality (Slack, 2009). 
The main challenge of intergovernmental transfers for municipalities is the 
potential effect of the grant on the local decision-making process as, in most 
cases, the transfer is conditional upon the spend happening where the senior 
government want it to (Slack, 2009). Moreover, governmental grants can affect 
local revenue-raising decisions and can distort the pricing system of services 
and encourage an increase in demand (Oates, 2008). These transfers may also 
reduce accountability, since it is not clear which level of government is 
responsible in the case of complaints (Slack, 2009). 
2-3-2-2 PROPERTY TAXES 
Slack (2009) considers six types of tax at the local level to generate revenue for 
municipalities. These taxes are: property taxes, personal income taxes, 
corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, general consumption taxes, and excise 
taxes. With the exception of property taxes, other types of tax make little 
contribution to funding plans, so this study will only look at property taxes. 
Property taxation is an important tool to raise income at local level in almost all 
countries (Slack, 2009) and is seen as a mainstay of municipal revenue in both 
developed and developing countries (Smoke, 2008). Property taxation is a 
stable and predictable source of funds but will not grow in the same way that 
income and sales taxes do as a result of economic growth (Slack, 2009). This 
tax can be levied on residential, commercial and industrial properties but with 
different assessment and rate ratios (Slack, 2009). Levying taxes on properties 
is costly and difficult to administer since it includes the following steps: property 
identification to assemble a list of properties; assessment of the property 
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according to its area and value; determining the property tax rate; sending out 
bills; and tax collection (Slack, 2009). 
Smoke (2008) identifies four shortcomings associated with the design and 
administration of property tax in developing countries. The first problem is the 
presence of taxation bands for certain types of properties for political reasons, 
such as higher rates for business properties than residential properties. This 
can lead to the relocation of businesses or the transfer of the tax burden to 
residents who pay higher prices and who were supposed to be protected. The 
second issue is the complexity of the valuation procedure. The third relates to 
tax collection difficulties and the fourth is the problem of obtaining the 
information required for the administration of property tax. 
2-3-2-3 USER FEES 
Another way to finance public services is the imposition of user fees for 
services. A user fee is ‘a charge per unit of output’ (Slack, 2009, p. 33) and can 
be levied on households for the provision of services such as rubbish collection 
and street sweeping. Nowadays, reliance of municipalities on this tool is greater 
and cities seek to attach fees to the services they deliver (Pagano, 2010). 
User fees can promote efficiency in two ways. Firstly, they provide information 
for the public sector about the willingness of users to pay for the service. 
Secondly, citizens value the services supplied by the public sector at this 
marginal cost, which can reduce over-consumption of that service. For example, 
user fees for water will encourage water conservation (Bird and Tsiopoulos, 
1997). However, these fees can raise the problem of equity since ‘low-income 
families cannot afford to pay user fees and will either not use the services or will 
have to reduce their consumption of other services’ (Slack, 2009, p. 35). 
2-3-3 ALTERNATIVE FINANCING TOOLS 
Revenues from the above mentioned sources (intergovernmental transfers, 
taxes and user fees) are unlikely to be sufficient to cover the expenditure of 
municipalities. As a result, municipalities search for other ways to access 
private capital (Slack, 2009). Various means of charging new developments and 
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their developers have been utilised to generate income for municipalities. 
Charges can be set through negotiation (Section 106 agreement in England), 
regulation (Canada, US) or even bidding (Brazil). These compensations have 
formed new relationships between developers and planning authorities (Healey, 
Purdue and Ennis, 1996). 
Although there are many ways to levy new developments in different countries, 
they can be divided into three categories: development charges, value capture 
tools, and relaxing regulation fees. 
2-3-3-1 DEVELOPMENT CHARGES 
Many municipalities and local governments levy charges on developers to 
provide facilities that the additional development necessitates, or in some cases 
the developer has to provide those services directly, depending on the planning 
laws of that country (Healey et al., 1996; Needham, 2000; Slack, 2002, 2009). 
Development charges can be used to cover the costs of infrastructure such as 
roads, as well as public services such as schools, but it is not permitted to 
spend them on costs that are not directly related to the additional development 
(Walls, 2010). 
The main rationale for extracting such gain from developers, which are known 
as development charges, planning obligation (Section 106 agreement), 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), impact fees, lot levies and development 
exactions, is ‘growth should pay for itself and not be a burden on existing 
taxpayers’ (Slack, 2002, p. 15). Healey, Purdue and Ennis (1996, pp. 149–150) 
consider three rationales for developers’ contributions in the British context: first 
‘to facilitate the implementation of development’; second ‘to mitigate the impact 
of the development’; and third to return the benefits to the community. 
In some countries, such as Canada, these charges are structured according to 
rules (Slack, 2002) and in some others, such as Britain, some of these charges 
are negotiable between developers and planning authorities (charges related to 
Section 106 agreement) and some are fixed (e.g. CIL). Based on section 106 of 
the English 1990 Town and Country Planning Act local planning authorities, in 
order to grant planning permission, negotiate with developers to provide 
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affordable housing and make financial contributions to local services such as 
education and open space. This is to ensure ‘that part of the additional 
development value created by granting planning permission goes to mitigate 
negative outcomes and positively to benefit local communities’ (Burgess, Monk 
and Whitehead, 2011).  
Slack (2009) in the context of Canada suggests eight steps for the calculation of 
development charges. The first step is an estimation of growth by anticipating 
population growth rate, the housing stock composition, and occupancy rates 
(number of persons per unit) for different types of housing, and employment 
forecasts for non-residential developments. The second step is the 
determination of the services that will be covered by the charge, including 
water, sewers, roads, transit, recreational facilities, police, fire, public works, 
libraries, parks, and waste management.  
The third step involves the estimation of the ratio of the total capital costs to 
service growth over a period of 10 years. These forecasts need to be detailed 
and it is better if they are identified by specific areas of the municipality and by 
specific projects. The municipality should use these forecasts to determine what 
proportion of the estimated total capital cost is growth related. In step four, 
service standards should be determined. Municipalities need to establish 
realistic service standards and they need to show that they are not trying to fund 
levels of service that are in excess of what they are currently providing. Step 
five is to estimate net capital costs by service and deduct future grants, 
subsidies, and fees from total capital costs.  
In step six, costs should be apportioned to residential and non-residential 
properties. The percentage of costs attributed to different land uses depends on 
the services required and the type of development. Step seven is the decision 
as to whether the charges should be area-wide or uniform. The last step is to 
determine what proportion of costs to recover through charges. The municipality 
can decide to recover less than 100 percent of the eligible growth-related capital 
costs. It can also decide to exempt some parts of the municipality from the 
charge (e.g. the downtown core) or some property types (e.g. industrial 
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properties) to encourage certain kinds of development or developments in 
particular locations. 
2-3-3-2 VALUE CAPTURE TAXES 
Value capture taxes are another type of public-financing tool which capture 
some or all of the value that public investment, such as public transportation, 
highway exchange, sewer facilities or parks, generate for private landowners. 
These taxes are known by different names in different countries such as land 
value increment taxes, tax increment financing, betterment taxes, special 
assessments, and valorisation taxes.  
Value capture internalises the positive externalities of public investments by 
capturing the unearned value of increased adjacent land values generated as a 
result of public investment in the area. In terms of equity, this taxation 
addresses the public concern about unfair windfalls to owners of property when 
values go up as a result of a major infrastructure investment that is paid from 
general city revenues. Politically, it is useful for the city to capture a share of the 
positive externalities of financed investment (Slack, 2009). The most common 
value capture mechanism is through real property tax, with no special features 
other than regular assessment of market value before and after public 
investment in an area. The value of any given property is correlated by its 
proximity to various amenities and infrastructures.  
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is a financing mechanism used by local 
governments, mainly in the US, to revitalise blighted inner urban areas. 
Revitalisation in TIF-designated areas can have a positive impact on the quality 
of urban life and growth in property that can be earmarked for future tax 
revenue. Another type of value capture practice, known as valorisation in some 
Latin American jurisdictions, allocates the cost of public service or infrastructure 
to property owners in proportion to the benefits conferred by the works (Bird, 
2001). This charge is a lump sum levy and generally collected from beneficiary 
properties before construction work begins (Slack, 2009). 
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2-3-3-3 RELAXING REGULATION TAXES 
Some municipalities relax planning restrictions in a designated area and give 
developers the right to build beyond the limits of density or land use for a fee. 
Conditional zoning in the US is an example of this. Conditional zoning allows 
increased flexibility and permits municipalities to accept a particular land use 
application which might be disallowed under regulations. Mostly this tool has 
been used to permit the building of a school or community centre (Brown and 
Shilling, 1981). 
Density bonus is another way to levy charges on developers. In this scheme, 
developers are permitted to exceed the density limits of planning documents in 
return for meeting conditions such as preserving an historic building or paying 
extra charges to the municipality (Slack, 2009). 
An additional construction potential is a Brazilian scheme, Urban Operation, 
whereby a developer can build beyond the regulations in designated zones by 
purchasing certificates of additional construction potential bonds (CEPACs) 
issued by the city hall in the Sao Paulo Stock Market Exchange. Urban 
Operation is an intervention tool in an area of the city that needs improvement 
(Sandroni, 2010). 
Although in most countries relaxing regulation taxes is used to provide public 
goods and services, some commentators criticise this as it is contrary to public 
policy (Brown and Shilling, 1981). 
2-3-4 FINANCING TOOLS AFFECTING URBAN PLANNING  
Studies show that revenue-raising tools that municipalities and local 
governments use to generate income could positively or negatively affect the 
development process and the delivery of urban planning objectives. Slake 
(2002) asserts that ‘in some cases, municipal financing tools work in tandem 
with planning tools, but in other cases the two have opposite effects’ (Slack, 
2002, p. 1). Below, two examples will be presented in which taxation could 
distort the planning objective.  
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By using a hypothetical case study, Downing (1973) shows how user fees could 
lead to the residential development of fringe land. This hypothetical city has 
three categories of density that decrease from the centre outwards. The cost of 
sewerage increases as density increases. If the charge for this service is 
assessed based on average cost, those in the central area will be charged more 
than marginal costs and those in suburban areas will pay less. This can lead to 
residential development of fringe land. To avoid an undesirable development 
pattern, the fee charged should be equal to the marginal costs of the service 
(Downing, 1973, p. 637).  
Slake (2002) believes that the property tax in Canadian cities has a reverse 
effect on planning objectives as the property tax encourages urban sprawl while 
the planning objective is to curb sprawl. This is because, in Canada, the 
property tax levied is calculated on the assessed value of the property, which 
means that any improvement in the property, including an increase in density, 
will raise the market value of that property and will result in increased tax. As a 
result, developments with higher densities have to pay higher property tax 
which has discouraged increases in density and led to an expansion of the city 
(Slack, 2002).  
Needham (2000) argues that, by calculating the price elasticity of supply and 
demand, one could estimate the effect of tax on urban planning. He says that if 
the taxing mechanisms are used to raise income for the public purse and do not 
have planning purposes, then the intention should be that the tax has little effect 
on prices to the final user or on the amount of development. In other words, the 
‘volume effect’ of the charge should be small. In terms of price elasticities, it 
means that in taxing land of sort M, the price elasticity of supply and demand of 
land of sort M should be low (Needham, 2000).  
However, if the taxation is used as a planning tool, then it must change the price 
of the taxed land and the amount of the taxed land which is used. In these 
circumstances ‘The bigger the “volume effect” of the tax, the more efficient is 
the tax as an instrument for planning’ (Needham, 2000, p. 249). In other words, 
in this case the price elasticity of supply and demand of land sort M should be 
high. 
    
CHAPTER 2 – A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
48 
 
2-4 URBAN PLANNING, MARKET FORCES AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
In the era of public finance retrenchment when private capital plays a crucial 
role, understanding the role of urban planning in market process to achieve 
public planning agendas is important (Heurkens, Adams, & Hobma, 2015). This 
section first focuses on the development process to study what the 
development process is, why it is important to study it, what are the models to 
analyse it and who are the main agents involved in this process. Then it 
examines how urban planning, by using various tools, tries to intervene or 
facilitate this process.  
2-4-1 THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Guy and Henneberry (2002, p. 5) describe the development process as ‘a 
complex process which entails the orchestration of finance, materials, labour 
and expertise by many actors within a wider social, economic and political 
environment’. Healey (1992a, p. 36) believes that the development process is 
‘the transformation of the physical form, bundle of rights, and material and 
symbolic value of land and buildings from one state to another, through the 
effort of agents with interests and purposes in acquiring and using resources, 
operating rules and applying and developing ideas and values’. 
Adams (Adams, 1994; Adams & Tiesdell, 2013) compares the land and 
property development process to any other production processes in which 
complex organisational systems are required to put together the necessary 
inputs at the correct time in order to produce the final product, such as in car 
assembly. The finished product of the development process is the built 
environment. Although people may equate the development process with the 
construction process, earlier preparation to start the construction plays a crucial 
role, as in car assembly (Adams, 1994, p. 38).  
Urban planning, as Adams (1994, p. 44) says, in order to be able to intervene 
effectively, has to be based on an understanding of what happens behind the 
scenes of the development process. Therefore, to be able to produce effective 
plans, it is essential to consider the contribution of actors, the significance of 
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events in the process and the complexity of relationships that make the 
development happen. 
Although in the 1980s academic interest in the interaction between 
development processes and state agencies grew (Healey, 1991), it was not until 
the 1990s that discussions on the development process and its conceptual 
models received a considerable amount of attention. Many academics, such as 
Gore and Nicholson (1991), Healey (1990, 1991, 1992a), Healey and Barrett 
(1990), Madanipour (1996), and Ball (1998) have paid attention to models of the 
development process. In the following sections, firstly the development process 
models will be reviewed and then, strategies of two categories of development 
agents, landowners and developers will be briefly discussed.  
2-4-1-1 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MODELS 
To analyse and understand what is involved in the development process, 
numerous conceptual models of the development process have been proposed. 
Gore and Nicholson (1991, p. 728) state that different models of the 
development process offer different levels of understanding and could be used 
for a purpose. They (1991) identify four categories of conceptual models for the 
development process. These approaches are ‘sequential or descriptive 
approaches’, ‘behavioural or decision-making approaches’, ‘production-based 
approaches’, and ‘structure of provision’.  
Healey (1991) also identifies four models of the development process, including 
‘equilibrium models’, ‘event-sequence models’, ‘agency models’ and ‘structural 
models’. Healey (1991) says, although each of these models make a 
contribution in analysis of the development process, none adequately address 
all the possible forms and dynamics which the development process may take. 
Later Healey (1992a) proposes a model based on the gap addressed in the 
development process models identified in Healey and Barrett’s (1990) research. 
This model is called the ‘structure-agency institutional models’ of the 
development process. Here a brief summary of some of the models identified by 
Healey (1991, 1992a) and Gore and Nicholson (1991) are described.  
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‘Equilibrium models’ are derived from neoclassical economics. These models 
assume that ‘the development process is driven by the demand for new 
property’ (Healey, 1991, p. 221). Focusing only on quantities of supply and 
demand resulted in the failure of these models to address diverse forms of 
demand, the non-economic interests of those involved in development, the 
uncertainty in assessing future gain, the distortions produced by the valuation 
and appraisal methods to evaluate risks and rewards, and the complexity of the 
development process (Healey, 1991). 
‘Event-sequence models’ (Healey, 1991) or ‘sequential descriptive approaches’ 
(Gore & Nicholson, 1991) focus on stages through which the development 
process happens. The development process can be divided into various events. 
For example, Cadman and Topping (1995) recognise four events in the 
development process: ‘evaluation’, ‘preparation’, ‘implementation’ and 
‘disposal’. Other researchers in the field propose different ways of dividing the 
development process (Goodchild and Munton, 1985). Although these models 
are useful to illustrate the complexity and potential blockages in a development 
project, they do not pay attention to the role of actors in the development 
process. In this respect, Healey (1991, p. 224) says ‘without some specification 
of actors and interests, they provide little help in explaining why a development 
process takes the form that it does in a particular case’. 
‘Agency models’ (Healey, 1991) or ‘behavioural decision-making approaches’ 
(Gore & Nicholson, 1991) ‘focus on actors in the development process, the 
roles they play and the interests which guide their strategies’ (Healey, 1991, p. 
224). Although agency models can be seen as a step forward compared to 
event-sequence models as they consider agents as well as events (Gore & 
Nicholson, 1991), they ‘fail to address the driving forces of the process, which 
act as its structural imperatives’ (Madanipour, 1996, p. 127). 
‘Structure models’ (Healey, 1991) or ‘production-based approaches’ (Gore & 
Nicholson, 1991) are grounded in the urban political economy and are 
concerned with ‘the way markets are structured through the power relations of 
capital, labour and landowner’ in a capitalist economy (Healey, 1991, p. 232). 
While these models address the importance of the broader socio-economic and 
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cultural dimensions affecting the development process, ‘they barely penetrate 
into the detail of the events of the development process and the nexus of 
agency relationships which might surround each’ (Healey, 1991, p. 235). 
To address the inadequacy of the aforementioned development models and to 
address all the possible forms and dynamics that the development process may 
make, Healey (1992a) proposes ‘structure-agency institutional models’ of the 
development process. Healey (1990, p. 4) in her earlier work notices that the 
analysis of the development process ‘requires an approach to the relations 
between structure, in terms of what drives the development process and 
produces distinctive patterns in particular periods, and agency, in terms of the 
way individual agents develop and pursue their strategies’. Then, based on the 
interrelation between agency and structure proposed by Giddens (1984), she 
proposes her model (1992a). 
This model is in four levels: 
1. A description of events  
2. An identification of roles and power relations  
3. An assessment of the strategies and interests shaped by resources, 
rules and ideas, and  
4. The relation between these resources, rules and ideas and the wider 
society.  
The first three levels of analysis are empiricist and the last level moves towards 
theorisation of the social relation (Healey, 1992a). 
Gore and Nicholson (1991) also propose a similar approach which is ‘structures 
of provision’. They assert that ‘the production and consumption (that is, 
provision) of buildings are not only the physical process of creating and 
transferring such artifacts to their occupiers, but are also a social process 
dominated by the economic interests involved’ (Gore & Nicholson, 1991, p. 
725). Hence, they suggest that it is important to understand both the structures 
within which the provision of building happens and the social agencies engaged 
in the process of provision. In their view ‘a series of interconnected social 
relations’ exists ‘between the agents and institutions involved, the legal 
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framework regulating such activity, and the financial arrangements that allow it 
to proceed’ (Gore & Nicholson, 1991, p. 726).  
Institutional approaches (both ‘structure-agency institutional models’ and 
‘structures of provision’) provide a conceptual tool for understanding the 
interplay between structures and agents. However, it should be noted that 
summarising all aspects of a development process (structures and agents) in a 
single model is conceptually and operationally difficult (Ball, 1998; Hooper, 
1992). To overcome this difficulty, in studying a particular development process, 
it is not necessary to study all aspects of the structure-agency dynamics, but 
rather focus on those interplays which are necessary to provide the context for 
the analysis (Gore & Nicholson, 1991, p. 728).   
Based on the structure-agency model and other theoretical underpinnings, 
Madanipour (1996) suggests a practical model of the development process. 
According to this model, ‘in a development process, there are “development 
agencies” who operate through certain “development factors” within interrelated 
social and spatial “contexts”’ (Madanipour, 1996, p. 136). Physical and social 
contexts, which include resources, rules and ideas, are the two main parts of 
this process. When these two contexts overlap, development agencies will 
become involved to produce the built environment (Madanipour, 1996). Figure 
2-1 illustrates the component parts of the development process identified in this 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: A model of the development process (Madanipour, 1996, p. 136) 
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According to institutional models of the development process, there is a 
dialectic between structure and agency: structure (e.g. the decision 
environment) influences agency, however, ‘agency is not hopelessly determined 
by structure’ but ‘over time agents change structure’ (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 
2005, p. 57). In this regard, Gore and Nicholson (1991, p. 726) assert that ‘both 
conflict and collaboration between agents may lead to the imposition of new 
legal controls or to the provision of new forms of finance, and so on’. This 
implies that agency might affect structure.  
2-4-1-2 DEVELOPMENT AGENTS: DEVELOPERS AND LANDOWNERS 
In studying the urban development process, which is mostly dominated by the 
private sector, it is necessary to have sufficient knowledge about the nature of 
the actors involved in the production of the built environment in any specific 
context. For planners it is important to know to what extent they can influence 
the activities of these actors to achieve the objectives of urban planning, as 
sometimes the powers and resources of landowners and developers may be 
greater than those of the planning authority (Adams, 1994, p. 7). 
Although various types of agents, with different expertise, contribute in the 
development process, only the characteristics and strategies of landowners and 
developers will be briefly explored here in the context of England. In subsequent 
chapters, these roles will be explored in the context of Tehran. 
LANDOWNERS 
Landowners are necessary actors in the development process as they bring 
forward the land for development. However, landowners do not respond to the 
development potential of their land uniformly as their motives and 
circumstances are diverse (Goodchild and Munton, 1985). There are three 
basic decisions that landowners make (or fail to make): financial decisions, 
which deal with if and when to develop their land; operational decisions which 
are concerned with how to relate to other actors; and management decisions 
which are about managing the land before development. To reach these 
financial, operational and management decisions, landowners interact with 
contextual factors (e.g. land prices and taxation policy), site characteristics (e.g. 
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size and location) and owner characteristics (e.g. attitude to risk) (Adams, 1994; 
Goodchild and Munton, 1985). 
As landowners wish to maximise their financial gain, they might seek to 
influence planning policy in such a way as to enhance the contextual factors of 
their lands (Adams, 1994, p. 92). In the British context, they might challenge 
and transform the structural framework to pursue their strategies (Adams, 
1994). 
DEVELOPERS 
Developers play a key role in the development process as they assemble the 
inputs to production, organise the production process and market the product 
(Healey, 1991, p. 224). They are at the nexus of all actors involved in the 
development process and ‘play a crucial role in interpreting the requirements of 
occupiers and investors and translating them into built form’ (Henneberry and 
Rowley, 2002, p. 99). Since the 1980s, the role of the public sector in the 
production of buildings in Britain has reduced and the private sector has 
become the predominant supplier (Henneberry and Rowley, 2002). 
In Britain, the development industry is mostly in the hands of larger companies 
who have access to finance capital and have been in business for a long period 
of time. The activities of small- and medium-size development companies have 
been in decline because of their financial dependence on banks, which restrict 
the availability of credit for these companies (Adams, 1994, p. 107). As Wellings 
(2001) reports, the production of new homes is increasingly dominated by a 
small number of very large companies. He says that this trend is continuing as, 
in 1990, 32 companies each started more than 500 units and together claimed 
41% of the market share and in 2000, there were 43 companies of this size 
whose combined market share was 71%.  
The main goal of private sector developers is ‘to accumulate profit by producing 
buildings whose realised value is greater than the cost of development’ 
(Henneberry, 1999, p. 1446). In order to achieve this goal, developers monitor 
the trends of the property market to assess the development profitability, 
normally by using a residual valuation technique (Henneberry, 1999). The 
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residual valuation ‘will estimate the maximum purchase price of a site by 
deducting the expected total costs of the development, including an allowance 
to cover risk and profit, from the expected price that the completed development 
could be sold for in the market’ (Morley, 1988, p. 3). 
Despite the valuation carried out prior to initiation of the development process, 
developers deal with uncertainty in their calculations, especially over the final 
value of the completed building (Henneberry, 1999). Here is where the planning 
system with a restrictive nature, as in Britain, could protect developers by 
preventing overproduction of residential buildings (Adams, 1994, p. 131). In 
fact, Adams (1994) contends that, in the British context, developers and 
planners share common interests as ‘local authorities look to the private sector 
to help implement urban plans, while the planning system offers the developers 
and investors that element of certainty which could never be provided by the 
free market alone’ (Adams, 1994, p. 130). As a result, developers are keen to 
participate in the planning system and urban plans tend to incorporate market 
criteria to protect developers (Adams, 1994). 
2-4-2 URBAN PLANNING IN A MARKET ECONOMY  
Urban planning is a state intervention in the development process which can be 
justified only if evidence shows that such intervention could generate a better 
urban environment than leaving the matter to the market (Adams, 1994, 2008). 
In the era of neo-liberalisation, government retrenchments and decentralisation 
policies achieving public planning goals through privately-led developments are 
noteworthy. Thus, understanding state-market relations and the role of planning 
tools in the creation and maintenance of this relationship is important (Heurkens 
et al., 2015).  
The aims and roles of urban planning have changed through time. Nowadays, 
the role of urban planning is mostly to influence the process of change and the 
development of cities, as opposed to override this process or regulating this 
process, instead of controlling it (Healey et al., 1988). Blacksell et al. (1987, p. 
1) state that ‘in the market economy, the function of town planning is to regulate 
rather than control the timing, form and location of development in order to 
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promote the efficient allocation of resources, minimize externalities and ensure 
the conservation of valued environments’. Before focusing on the dynamics of 
state-market relationships and the implications of neo-liberalisation on the 
planning system, the changing role of urban planning in Britain is briefly 
discussed below.  
2-4-2-1 THE EVOLVING ROLE OF URBAN PLANNING  
In the first five decades of the twentieth century, it was believed that the 
reconstruction of existing settlements and the creation of new ones by 
producing comprehensive plans (or civic designs) could provide amenity and 
safety for residents. In this view, planners were master-builders and civic 
designers whose profession originated in architecture, engineering and 
surveying (Adams, 1994, p. 3). This method could only address the physical 
aspects of the built environment rather than social and economic aspects, which 
could result in a poor physical environment. Ineffectiveness of these plans 
resulted in the abandoning of this approach in the 1960s (Adams, 1994). 
In the 1960s, corporate planning became popular in order to prevent the 
uncoordinated action of the bureaucratic system. In this period, urban planning 
dealt with the management and delivery of public services, such as education 
and housing. In this context, planners were master allocators of the resources 
(Adams, 1994). This was the time when urban planning became a tool to control 
the market and address its economic and social externalities. In the 1970s, 
rational planning, which was a scientific method to address urban challenges, 
became the prevailing course of action. Rational planning was highly dependent 
on the availability of information, which was both expensive and difficult to 
collect. In this system, planners had to come up with various alternatives and 
evaluate the consequences of each in order to choose the best course of 
action. Structure plans of the 1970s were products of this era (Adams, 1994). 
The 1980s were concurrent with the new right-wing thinking favoured by the 
Thatcher Government. The scope of urban planning was affected during this 
ideological shift. Economic efficiency became the paramount responsibility of 
urban planning (Adams, 1994). The dominant direction of urban planning during 
this decade was to facilitate market-led development of the private sector 
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regeneration schemes (Brindley, Rydin, and Stoker, 1996). In the 1990s, 
concerns for environmental sustainability and a deep recession in property 
development moved urban planning away from mostly facilitating marked-led 
development. Healey (1992b, p. 412) says that by 1990 ‘the emphasis once 
again shifted back to balancing market considerations within a concern for 
environmental quality and community development’. 
To some degree, the 1990s approach of balancing market considerations with 
the agenda of sustainable development has continued into the 2000s. Spatial 
planning, which focuses on ‘multi-sectoral and multi-scalar coordination and 
integration of development’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013, p. 16) was the 
major planning practice of this decade. However, the economic recession and 
public sector austerity in 2007 led the planning system to move from spatial 
planning towards localism. This transition happened in the 2010s as part of the 
Localism and Devolution agenda of the elected coalition government. By 
proposing ’open source‘ thinking, emphasis shifted from the interventionist 
approach of spatial planning to a more pro-market localism which was 
fragmented, locally determined and incentive driven (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2013). Neighbourhood plans are the products of this era. 
Throughout the history of urban planning in Britain, as presented above, the 
relationship between planning and market has been changing from controlling 
the market in the 1960s to supporting the market in the 1980s. Although in the 
1990s and part of the 2000s the state again became a proactive player in the 
planning field to protect sustainability agendas, as Allmendinger and Haughton 
(2013) assert, protecting the market for economic growth was still the major 
objective of state intervention. However, once again in the 2010s, by adopting 
localism, the state’s intervention in urban planning has once more been 
reduced. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, the evolution of urban planning in Iran will 
be discussed.  
2-4-2-2 SYMBIOTIC URBAN PLANNING  
Understanding the relationship between state and market in the planning 
process has been the subject of discussions of governance. The discussion 
used to be around whether the state should ignore the market in the process of 
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planning (pro-planning approach) or that market-led growth was the only way 
forward (anti-planning approach). However, in the 1990s scholars started to 
acknowledge the interactions of market and state regulations rather than their 
opposition. In this regard, Healey (1992a, p. 420) says ‘instead of simplistic 
oppositions between planning and the market which tended to structure debate 
in the 1980s, it is now more productive to explore the interactions between 
planning regulation and market conditions’.  
The pro-planning approach is known as the Pigovian paradigm after Pigou's 
book Economics of Welfare published in 1920. This approach is conceived as 
an interventionist paradigm, since it perceives a positive role for the government 
regulation of the land market. However, opponents of this paradigm constantly 
‘cast doubts about the cost of such regulation’ (Lai, 1994, p. 92). The pro-
planning approach argues that if the conditions are not those required for 
optimal allocative efficiency and, as a result, there are market failures, then it is 
the responsibility of the state to correct those failures in such a way that the 
allocative efficiency will be better than the market itself can achieve under its 
imperfect conditions. Thus, state intervention is rationalised because of the 
existence of market failure as a result of the existence of externalities (positive 
and negative), inadequacy of the market in the provision of public goods, 
imperfect information, and monopolies (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010). 
In urban planning, advocates of state intervention believe that market 
imperfections can be corrected by land use planning and various social goals 
can be achieved. Needham (2006) justifies urban planning using arguments 
from law (rights in land) in addition to economics. In terms of law, he states that 
different people may have different interests in a piece of land. Those interests 
may be protected or not protected by law. Unprotected interests, such as 
keeping a national park as open countryside, should be protected by the state. 
Regarding the economic benefits of planning, he asserts that land use 
ambitions, such as the protection of an ecological resource or demolition of a 
factory, could be achievable only through state intervention as it may not have 
the economic justification for the market to do it (Needham, 2006). 
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Critics of state intervention, mainly Coase (1960), challenge state intervention 
because of the transaction costs including the search, bargaining and 
enforcement costs, imposed by this intervention (Lai, 1994). Another criticism of 
state planning is the information deficiency of these plans because they require 
centralised information and this information is always partial or defective 
(Webster and Lai, 2003). Coase (1960) states that urban planning can be an 
example where regulation has made matters worse because of the transaction 
costs of this intervention. He says that although the state’s plan is simply 
assigning, reassigning and attenuating the rights of landowners, we have to be 
careful about the cost of such intervention and see whether it is greater or 
smaller than the alternative of leaving the matter entirely to the market (Lai, 
1994, pp. 89–92). 
To tackle externalities, this approach suggests evaluating the monetary effects 
of intervention. An example can clarify this thinking: if, as a result of pollution, 
fish are killed, the question to be asked is ‘is the value of the fish lost greater or 
less than the value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes 
possible’ (Coase, 1960). However, later Coase (1988) changes his stance and 
expresses that, in the case that the negative externalities may harm many 
people, it will be difficult to reach a satisfactory solution through the market and 
it might be preferable to impose special regulations (Coase, 1988; Lai, 1994). 
Moving beyond the dichotomy of planning versus market, Tiesdell and 
Allmendinger (2005) propose the concept of market-aware forms of planning 
which focuses on the interrelationships between state and market. Market-
aware planning is aware of ‘motivations of the various actors (e.g. individuals, 
firms and governmental bodies) in the land and property development process’ 
(Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2005, p. 57). More recently, Adams and Tiesdell 
(2010) have put forward the idea of planners as market actors, whose activities 
help to construct the market. They suggest that the relationship between 
planning and the market are symbiotic rather than dichotomous. 
Based on this approach the final outcomes are the result of ‘decisions that are 
made and actions taken’ by various actors (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2005, p. 57) 
and it is ‘problematic to ascribe outcomes either to planning or to market’ (Adams & 
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Tiesdell, 2013, p. 65). Because ‘market actors seek to anticipate and influence what 
planners might do (and planners do likewise of other market actors)’ (Adams & 
Tiesdell, 2013, p. 65).  
Table 2-2: Planning tool types. Source: (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005, p. 64)  
Based on the nature of the interaction that planning tools have with market, 
Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005, pp. 63–69) offer a classification of planning 
tools in England. They divide planning tools into: market-shaping tools, market-
regulation tools, market-stimulation tools, and capacity-building tools. The 
following table (Table 2-2) summarises their categorisation.  
Market-shaping tools are the tools that influence land and property markets by 
shaping the context within which transactions take place. In land and property 
markets, plans, by providing information, can be seen as a principal directive 
Intended/characteristic 
market affect  
Typical sub-types Typical example  
Shaping 
(e.g. shaping the 
decision environment or 
context) 
! Development plans (e.g. 
public infrastructure 
investment plans) 
! Regulatory plans (e.g. 
statutory plans/ 
! policies/strategies) 
! Indicative plans (e.g. non-
statutory plans/ 
! policies/strategies and 
advice) 
! Transport infrastructure 
investment plans 
 
! National planning policy 
and development plans 
 
! Establishing spatial vision 
for area  
Regulation  
(e.g. defining the 
parameters of the 
decision environment) 
! State (or third party) 
regulation 
! Contractual (or bi-lateral) 
regulation 
! Planning/development 
controls  
 
! Restrictive covenants 
attached to land transfers 
Stimulation  
(e.g. restructuring the 
contours of the decision 
environment)  
! Indirect/fiscal measures 
 
 
 
! Direct state action 
! Subsidies (tax breaks) to 
encourage more of desired 
activities (e.g. derelict land 
reclamation grants) and/or 
taxes to discourage certain 
activities (e.g. tax on 
greenfield development) 
! Compulsory acquisition of 
land 
! Joint ventures  
Capacity building 
(e.g. developing actors’ 
ability to identify and/or 
develop more 
effective/desirable 
strategies)  
! Actor-network relationships 
! Social capital 
 
! Cultural perspectives  
! Arenas for interaction/ 
networking  
! Partnerships/partnering 
arrangements 
! Thinking ‘outside the box’  
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market-shaping tool. They have three informative functions for influencing the 
market. Firstly, they provide general coordinating information which may reduce 
uncertainty. Secondly, they indicate government intentions regarding its future 
development plans. Thirdly, they provide information about regulatory polices 
(Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005, pp. 63–66). 
Market regulation tools seek to regulate and control market actions and 
transactions. Whereas plans affect decisions by providing information, 
regulations affect decisions by restricting the set of choices available. In land 
and property markets, ‘market regulation planning tools generally operate by the 
state taking certain rights in land and making subsequent exercise of those 
rights subject to express permission’ (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005, p. 67). 
Market stimulation tools seek to enable markets to work better. They ‘do not 
limit choices but simply change the contours of that opportunity space making 
some strategies more (or less) advantageous to market actors’ (Tiesdell and 
Allmendinger, 2005, p. 68). Subsidies that encourage more of a desired activity 
or taxes discouraging an undesired activity are examples of these kinds of tools.  
Capacity-building tools try to build the abilities and capacity (e.g. skills, 
knowledge, networks, rules of operation, working practices, etc.) of market 
actors in order to facilitate the operation of the other planning tools. These 
planning tools include ‘the more diffuse – though nonetheless real – 
phenomena of building relations, trust and/or more commonly social capital 
among the range of development actors’ (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005, p. 
68). 
Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005) believe that these tools can be combined to 
achieve the desired policy objectives. For example, ‘If regulatory tools have a 
major role in affecting an increase in the supply of land for development but only 
a minor impact on expanding demand, another planning tool (for example, a 
market stimulation tool such as financial inducements) may need to be used in 
combination with the regulatory tool’ (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005, p. 73). 
Heurkens et al. (2015) by looking at two regeneration projects in the UK (Bristol 
and Liverpool), show that planners performed a crucial role in shaping, 
regulating and stimulating the private sector’s decisions. In these two cases, 
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planners used a combination of planning instruments in order to have impact in 
the final production. Heurkens et al. (2015) call this ‘plan-shaped markets’.  
2-4-2-3 NEOLIBERAL PLANNING IMPLICATIONS 
Despite the existence of various and distinctive planning cultures in different 
countries and regions (Friedmann, 2005), globalisation and neoliberalisation 
policies have affected urban planning systems around the world since the late 
1970s (Tasan-Kok, 2012). These policies have resulted in ‘major changes in the 
institutional structure, processes, influence, and scope of planning’ (Friedmann, 
2005, p. 184). Evidences show that cities with different political and socio-
economic backgrounds are moving towards neoliberal planning (Friedmann, 
2005; Sanyal, 2005; Tasan-Kok & Baeten, 2012). Some of the results of 
neoliberalisation in urban planning are discussed in this section.  
As Harvey (1989, p. 4) discusses, ‘a reorientation in attitudes to urban 
governance’ has been happening since the 1970s. He argues that the 
‘managerial approach’ which was prevailing in the 1960s has given way to 
‘entrepreneurial forms of actions’ (Harvey, 1989, p. 4). He sees public-private 
partnership (collaboration of businesses and corporations with state actors) as 
the centrepiece of the entrepreneurial shift of government. Although he avoids 
generalisation, he (Harvey, 2005, pp. 76–77) asserts that in many cases 
businesses and corporations who collaborate with state actors have ‘a strong 
role in writing legislation, determining public policies and setting regulatory 
frameworks’ which are mainly advantageous to themselves.  
Also Tasan-Kok (2012, p. 2) discusses that the reorientation in urban planning 
has resulted in the replacement of ‘rigid and regulatory land-use planning 
process’ with ‘a more flexible and negotiable strategic planning process’ which 
supports market-friendly policies in land and property development. She shows 
how planning authorities would alter the zoning plan in a neoliberal city to 
support the dynamics of property-led urban development which, for example, 
would result in the construction of a new large-scale commercial property in the 
city centre. She argues that ‘the local government allows a change in the zoning 
plan, convinced that a large commercial facility in the centre would enhance the 
city’s competitive advantage. The expected outcome of the land transaction 
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includes a new image for the city, besides rent (and tax) revenue for the local 
government’ (Tasan-Kok, 2012, p. 12).  
Similarly, Jou et al. (2012, p. 167) by investigating in four case studies in Taipei 
observe that ‘land use codes could be “flexibly” changed to legalise some 
commercial property development in meeting the “market need”’. They argue 
that the financial deficit of Taiwan’s government in the mid-1990s resulted in the 
need of central government and Taipei municipality to rely on private capital in 
the provision of public infrastructure. In order to legalise the involvement of 
private capital in public-private partnership some laws were issued by the 
central state. In case studies that Jou et al. (2012, p. 154) studied they found 
out that in the decision-making process ‘the assumption that private capital is 
more sensitive to “market needs” and changes than government was’, resulted 
in ‘flexibly’ changing land use plans to accommodate investors and developers 
needs. They conclude that ‘for private capital, what keeps them continuously 
cooperating and negotiating with Taipei municipal government is that they can 
accumulate their own economic capital … by transferring the public land … into 
private profit’ (Jou et al., 2012, p. 167).  
2-5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter literature has been reviewed according to the proposed research 
questions. In this section the main points of the literature will be drawn together 
to identify to what extent the review can improve understanding of the research 
questions. 
After the Introduction section, the second part reviewed the changing role of 
governments and discussed how the cities of developed and developing 
countries are moving towards neoliberal states with decentralisation agendas. A 
neoliberal state, in theory, is opposed to state interventionist theories and seeks 
to guarantee individual freedoms, the privatisation of state’s assets and the 
facilitation of movement of capital. However, in practice, different countries took 
different paths based on the context and inherited regulatory landscapes of 
each country. Decentralisation and moving towards governance is an important 
component of shifting towards a neoliberal state.  
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In general decentralisation (including administrative, political and fiscal 
decentralisation) is framed as transfer of power from central government to local 
government. However, in reality it is suspected that real power has been 
transferred to the local government. 
Although it is conceived that decentralisation can lead to economic efficiency 
and more desirable public service outcomes, in developing countries it is hard 
to conclude that this is the case. The failure of fiscal decentralisation in 
developing countries can be because of:  
" inappropriate funding and spending compositions  
" incorrect revenue assignment between different levels of 
government 
" constraints on raising revenue and making decisions about 
expenditure  
" lack of responsiveness of local governments to people. 
Previous studies suggest that preparing a road map for the initiation of the 
process of fiscal decentralisation can increase the effectiveness of the process. 
Monitoring of this road map can help to address implementation problems and 
the impacts on the system. Fiscal decentralisation is a process and its 
implementation could take time. 
The third part of this chapter focused on the ways in which municipalities fund 
their operating and capital expenditures. Classic ways including 
intergovernmental transfers, property taxes and user fees were discussed. 
Recent trends of financing municipal expenditure were then reviewed. These 
alternative tools can be divided into development charges, value capture taxes 
and relaxing regulation taxes. Figure 2-3 summarises these funding trends. 
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Figure 2-2: Municipal funding tools 
Despite the fact that fiscal decentralisation has happened/is happening in the 
majority of local governments and new financing strategies are in use to 
mobilise private capital to fund expenditure, local governments still somehow 
rely on transfers they receive from central government. Besides central 
government’s transfers, property tax is a stable and predictable source of funds 
for many municipalities. However, funds raised from governmental transfers and 
property taxes have been insufficient. Municipalities and local governments use 
alternative tools to access private capital. Various mechanisms and forms are in 
use in different countries. 
No matter what tools municipalities use to raise revenue, these tools could 
affect the development process and the delivery of urban planning objectives. If 
the taxing mechanisms are used to raise income for the public purse and do not 
have planning purposes then the volume effect of the charge should be small 
and, contrarywise, if the taxation is used as a planning tool, then the volume 
effect of the tax should be large. 
The last section of this chapter looked at the development process, its models 
and the role of the urban planning system in this process. The development 
process is a process through which the physical form, bundle of rights and 
material and symbolic value of land and buildings transforms from one state to 
another. Development agents, by using resources, operating rules and applying 
and developing ideas and values, make this transformation happen. Therefore 
Municipal 
funding tools 
Alternative 
tools 
Classic 
tools 
Intergovernme
ntal transfers 
Property taxes 
User fees Relaxing 
regulation 
taxes 
Value capture 
Development 
charges  
To fund operating and capital 
expenditure 
To fund capital expenditure 
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to understand why a certain development pattern takes place in a location, we 
need to look at the available resources, operating rules and strategies of the 
development agents.  
Five models of the development process: equilibrium models; event sequence 
models (sequential or descriptive approaches); agency models (behavioural or 
decision-making approaches); structural models (production-based 
approaches); and structure agency institutional models (structures of provision) 
were discussed. Although each of the development models makes a 
contribution in an analysis of the development process, it is only the structure 
agency institutional models (structures of provision) of the development process 
which adequately address all the possible forms and dynamics which the 
development process may take. A structure agency institutional model of the 
development process is an approach to the relations between structure, in 
terms of what drives the development process and produces distinctive patterns 
in particular periods, and agency, in terms of the way individual agents develop 
and pursue their strategies. 
Based on the structure agency institutional model, the powers and resources of 
landowners and developers should be studied in order to understand their 
strategies. The implementation of plans in a market economy depends on the 
decisions of these agents as their powers and resources may be greater than 
those of the planning authority. To reduce risk, landowners and developers 
need planners as the planning system and urban plans tend to incorporate 
market criteria to protect developers. This is why consideration should be given 
to planners as market actors.  
Besides the importance of the development agents’ role in the development 
process, structures through which these agents carry out development should 
also be considered. The urban planning system is one of the major structures 
which shape and influence the development process. Depending on the stance 
of states towards the market, the urban planning system of a country could be 
in support of market mechanisms or could be interventionist and try to control 
every aspect of development. However, in general, planning systems are 
moving towards symbiotic approaches to work with the market, as both planning 
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authorities and the market need each other to achieve their agendas. The 
following table summarises the arguments between the planning system and 
market control. 
Approach  Founder  Argument  Evidence to 
support 
argument 
Criticism by 
opponents 
Pro-
planning 
Pigou, 
1920 
State should 
intervene in the 
market to 
correct its 
failures 
Existence of 
market 
failure/protection 
of public interest 
Transaction costs 
of state regulation 
Anti-
planning Coase, 1960 Market solutions are 
superior/against 
intervention 
Transaction costs 
of state 
intervention 
Unable to tackle 
externalities and 
provision of public 
goods 
Planning 
with market 
Healey, 
Webster, 
Lai, 
Needham 
State should 
intervene where 
the transaction 
costs of using 
the market are 
greater than 
using rules 
Public domain 
problems 
Larger role for 
markets and 
individual 
transactions, but 
also does not 
accept market 
interactions as the 
best form of 
allocating all 
resources 
Table 2-3: Classification of approaches towards the market in urban planning 
The history of the urban planning system in Britain is an example in which the 
relationship between the planning system and the market has been changed 
from controlling the market in the 1960s to supporting the market in the 1980s 
and finally to planning with the market.  Now, in Britain urban planning to 
intervene or support the market mechanism uses various tools which could 
have differing effects on the development process. These tools are classified 
into: market shaping tools, market regulation tools, market stimulation tools and 
capacity building tools. These tools are characterised by the way they tend to 
affect the decision of market actors and it is important to be aware of their 
effects. 
The move towards symbiotic planning (planning with the market) and the 
financial need of local authorities to provide for cities has had implications for 
urban planning. Authorities’ decisions in some cases are affected and shaped 
by the interest of businesses and corporations as they have a role in the 
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decision-making process. Moreover, to secure income and increase 
competitiveness, zoning plans have faced changes to meet market need and 
more flexible and negotiable approaches are in demand.  
In summary, the literature shows that the development process would be 
affected by any change in the structure in which the development is happening. 
Imposition of a new taxing system or introduction of an urban policy could affect 
the structure. Development agents would address these changes happening in 
the structure by adjusting their strategies and decisions. Simultaneously, the 
implementation of urban plans depends on the way that development agents (in 
this study developers) respond to the urban plan. 
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3-1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops the design and form of the investigation which leads the 
researcher to find answers to the questions posed by this thesis. Derived from 
Chapter 2, the conceptual basis of the research is presented and, then, this 
chapter focuses on research questions, the hypothesis and the strategy of the 
research. Data collection strategies and the researcher’s reflection on the 
politics of data collection are presented. To conclude the strategy method of 
analysis of the data is discussed. 
3-2 CONCEPTUAL BASIS 
Drawing on Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens, 1984b), which explores the 
relationship between both the structure and the agents, a structure-agency 
institutional model of development process is proposed to explore the dynamics 
between the two in the process of space production. In this model, structure is 
what drives the development process and produces distinctive patterns in 
particular periods. The term agency is understood to mean individual agents, 
involved at different stages of the development process, pursuing their 
strategies. 
In the institutional model of the development process, the relationship between 
structure and agency is a key to the understanding of spatial change. Although 
agents’ activities are framed by the broader social, economic and political 
structures, based on this model these activities shape the structures too. There 
is a dynamic relationship between structures and agents. As Gottdeiner (1994, 
p. 200) argues ‘the production of space is captured best as the complex 
articulation between structures and agency, which is always in motion’. 
Based on the institutional model and its related arguments, any change in rules 
in the social environment, e.g. a new taxing system or the introduction of an 
urban policy, would be considered as a change to the structure in which the 
development agents work. As a result, development agents would address 
these changes by adjusting their strategies and decisions; at the same time, the 
    
CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
71 
 
way they respond to those changes would shape those structures either 
intentionally or unintentionally. 
By using evidence from Tehran, this thesis investigates the dynamics between 
structural changes and the development agents’ decisions and activities. The 
following diagram (Figure 3-1) shows the conceptual framework of this 
research. As shown in the diagram, change in the municipality financing system 
affected the development agents’ activities and, subsequently, the response of 
the development agents to this structural change has affected the structure. All 
of these interrelated dynamics between agents and structure have manifested 
spatial changes in some parts of the city. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Conceptual framework of the research 
Based on the concept of ‘duality of structure’ proposed by Giddens (Giddens, 
1984b), two levels of analysis form this thesis. Firstly, the analysis of 
development agents involved in the production of a particular space and, 
secondly, the structural properties within which those agents operate. Moving 
on from conceptual arguments, the rest of the chapter elaborates on the 
practical dimensions used to carry out the research. 
3-3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research design is the logic that guides the kind of data to be collected and 
analysed, based on the initial research questions (Bryman, 2012; Yin, 2009). 
Structural change: change in 
municipality financing system 
Affects agents’ activities Other structural changes 
Spatial change 
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Yin (2009, p. 26) explains that a research design is ‘a logical plan for getting 
from here to there, where “here” may be defined as the initial set of questions to 
be answered, and “there” is some set of conclusions (answers) about these 
questions. Between here and there may be found a number of major steps, 
including the collection and analysis of relevant data’. The following sections 
present the plan of this research and how it progressed from research questions 
to final conclusions. 
3-3-1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this research is to investigate the possible impacts of the municipal 
fiscal decentralisation on the development process and the planning system in 
the context of Tehran. In particular, as mentioned in Chapter 1, three research 
questions are considered in this study: 
1. How the construction density charge in Tehran has affected the 
decisions of housing developers/investors? This research question 
investigates whether this tool has affected the location, type and density 
of housing developments built by developers. 
2. How, as a result of using the construction density charge tool, decisions 
(tendencies) of housing developers have shaped the city of Tehran. This 
research question studies the spatial change of the city as a result of the 
market-led development based on developers’ activities. 
3. The last research question deals with the planning implications of 
developers’ decisions and the market-led growth of the city. This 
research question looks at how, in turn, this market-led growth has 
affected the way the city is planned (during the preparation, revisions and 
implementation of plans). 
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The following table (Table 3-1) shows the main questions and sub-questions of 
the research. 
Research questions Breaking down research questions 
How the construction density 
charge in Tehran has affected the 
decisions of housing developers  
! Who are the developers and what is/are their 
goal(s)? 
! How they understand extra construction 
density charge? 
! What are the ways to get extra construction 
density? 
! What are the decisions of developers: where, 
what, how and for whom to build? 
! Has extra construction density affected their 
decisions? 
How, as a result of using the 
construction density charge tool, 
decisions (tendencies) of housing 
developers have shaped the city 
of Tehran 
! What is the development pattern of Tehran? 
Is it marked-led growth? 
! Which are the regions under more demand to 
exceed construction density limits? 
! What is the role of developers in this pattern? 
! What is the role of regulations in this pattern? 
How, in turn, this market-led 
growth has affected the way the 
city is planned 
! What is the planning and governing system of 
Tehran?  
! What is urban planning procedure? 
! Are developers’ tendencies being 
acknowledged in planning decisions? Can 
they influence the plans during preparation 
and implementation phases?  
Table 3-1: Research questions and sub-questions 
3-3-2 HYPOTHESES 
The main proposition of this research is that the city is not managed by official 
plans but by responding to spontaneous growth, which is partially the result of 
the application of the excess construction density charge. Although Tehran has 
a Structural-Strategic (Comprehensive) Plan and District Plans for each region, 
this research argues that the city has grown and been managed spontaneously 
rather than in a planned way. 
This proposition consists of three parts. Firstly, construction density bonus has 
created a market that did not exist, or was not of a considerable size. By 
adopting the policy, the tendency to build taller than the height permitted in the 
official plans increased the economic benefits for developers. The construction 
industry became very profitable and attracted many people from other 
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professions to invest and work in this sector. Prime locations came under more 
pressure for construction and, as a result, spatial development of the city was 
handed over to the vagaries of housing developers’ interest. 
Secondly, the decisions of developers affected the spatial order of the city. To a 
great extent market trends have shaped the city of Tehran. In many parts of the 
city, the spatial development of the city has been shaped by the developers’ 
ability to, and interest in, buying the right to build more densely in the areas 
where they thought it would be more profitable. Financial dependency of Tehran 
municipality on the construction sector boosted the power of developers to 
construct what benefitted them economically. Thirdly, this market-led growth 
has affected the way the city is planned. The plans are not driving the growth. 
They have been adjusted to meet the requirements of the market and the 
growth has been spontaneous rather than planned. 
In addition, the density bonus strategy to finance the municipality’s expenditures 
has changed the logical relationship between plans and developers. Instead of 
plans affecting the decisions of the developers, the developers’ agendas direct 
the plans. These propositions will be revisited at the end of this thesis in 
Chapter 8.  
3-3-3 STRATEGY OF RESEARCH 
According to the nature of proposed research questions which are concerned 
about a contemporary phenomenon (Bryman, 2012) and have an explanatory 
nature (Yin, 2009), case study design is considered in the research for this 
thesis. 
The single case study of this research is Tehran, a city in which the granting 
excess construction density has been utilised extensively. Tehran is comprised 
of 22 regions. Ideally, to be able to examine the research’s propositions, all the 
22 regions would be looked at to examine how the tool has affected the spatial 
development of the city. However, considering the time frame of this research, 
the focus of this research will be on Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 which have been 
under more pressure to develop high-rise residential buildings which exceed 
construction density limits. The reason behind this selection is explained below. 
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The information from the Statistical Centre of Iran shows that demand for 
construction is not the same in different regions of the city. There are three 
indicators in these statistics which are useful to determine which areas of the 
city have higher demand for construction. These three indicators are: the 
number of granted construction permissions in each region; the amount of gross 
floor area granted to be built in each region; and the number of residential units 
permitted to be built in each region. 
Based on four years’ statistical data, the highest number of permissions granted 
belonged to Regions 2, 4, 5, 8, 14 and 15 (SCI [Statistical Centre of Iran], 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014). These are the regions most under construction, but the 
question is whether these constructions are exceeding construction density 
limits. The amount of gross floor area granted and the number of residential 
units to be built in each region reflect the demand for construction of additional 
housing units. Developers want to increase the amount of floor areas by 
constructing taller buildings. 
The largest gross floor area permitted to be built in these four years belonged to 
Regions 1, 2, 4, 5, 22 and 3 and the highest number of residential units granted 
was for Regions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 21 (SCI [Statistical Centre of Iran], 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014). Although Regions 8, 14 and 15 had a high amount of permissions 
granted, they are mostly not for tall buildings, so they are not the concern of this 
research. Regions 21 and 22 are out of the scope of this research as it was not 
until the 2000s that they became official regions of the Tehran Municipality and 
much of these regions have only recently been released for development. The 
map below (Figure 3-2) shows in which of the 22 regions of Tehran the amount 
of construction permits, the floor area permitted to be built, and the residential 
units permitted are higher in comparison to the remaining regions. 
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Figure 3-2: Regions of Tehran with high number of construction permits, floor 
areas and residential units 
The research for this thesis will examine three research questions in five 
municipality regions where the construction of buildings exceeding construction 
density limits are most prevalent. These five regions are not case studies of this 
research where specificities of what happens in them would be analysed and 
compared. However, they are the localities in which to carry out interviews. In 
Chapter 5, the characteristics of these five regions will be explored in depth. 
3-4 DATA COLLECTION 
The general orientation of this research is qualitative strategy in which data 
collection and analysis are based on words rather than quantification (Bryman, 
2012). The nature of the questions for this research, which investigate behind 
the scenes of the planning and development process, requires an in-depth view 
of involved agents. However, this research tries to use secondary quantitative 
data, mostly statistics and official urban plans, to confirm and understand the 
results of the qualitative data. 
3-4-1 DATA SOURCES 
Two levels of data were gathered for this research; contextual data to portray 
how the city is being governed and developed and more specific data to answer 
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the research questions. Sources of information for these two types of data are 
primary and secondary sources, which will be discussed in detail below. 
3-4-1-1 PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION 
Conducting semi-structured interviews with relevant agents generated the 
research’s primary data. Rather than structured interviews, this research 
employs semi-structured interviews in order to be able to have greater latitude, 
explore beyond the answers of the interviewee and enter into a dialogue with 
him/her (May, 2011). However, a set of questions was prepared before 
interviews to help the researcher to stay focused3. 
Although attempts were made to discuss different aspects of all three research 
questions with most of the contributors, the interviews focused on the specific 
speciality and experience of each interviewee. As a result, most of the findings 
for the first research question, which is how construction density charge has 
affected the decisions of housing developers, are generated from interviewing 
housing developers. Data for the second and third research questions, which 
are respectively how tendencies of housing developers have shaped the city 
and how market-led growth has affected the way in which the city is planned, 
are mostly generated by interviewing planners, city council members and 
municipality employees.  
There are two extremes in the spectrum of developers working in Tehran; at 
one end there are the large construction companies and at the other are the 
individual developers. To be active in the construction industry in Iran it is not 
necessary to be registered as a development company. Ordinary people, as 
opposed to legally-qualified professionals, without a registered business can 
work as developers. However, to be able to be involved in larger projects it is 
sometimes necessary to be a registered construction (development) firm. In 
later chapters, more details of how the construction industry works in Tehran 
will be presented. In order to obtain answers to the first question, opinions, 
strategies and tendencies of both individual and registered developers have 
been investigated in this research. 
                                                
3 Refer to Appendix 1 for examples of interview guidelines 
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Before conducting the interviews, it was planned that the research should select 
a specific number of individual developers and large companies in each of the 
five mentioned regions. However, during data collection it became obvious that 
a more flexible approach would be needed. For example, it was intended to 
interview four individual developers in each region, but, as some of the 
developers have been working in different regions, by interviewing one person 
information about different regions could be gathered. Moreover, there was no 
intention to interview any developer active outside of these five regions but later 
it became necessary to identify the aspirations of those working in less 
expensive areas. 
A snowballing strategy was used to contact potential developers who would 
agree to participate in the research. It was found that interviewees who were not 
introduced by someone that they knew were reluctant to collaborate. In total 15 
developers were interviewed; the following table (Table 3-2) shows the details 
of interviewed developers. To be in line with the UCL Code of Ethics, all the 
interviewed people remain anonymous4. Each developer is allocated a code 
starting with letter D for developer. 
Code Individual 
developer 
Large development 
company 
Regions worked 
in 
Date of 
interview 
D1 √  1, 2 24/05/2014 
D2 √  1, 3, Eslamshahr 14/06/2014 
D3 √  1 10/06/2014 
D4 √  3 11/09/2014 
D5 √ √ 1, 2, 3, 5, 22 11/09/2014 
D6 √  1, 3, 4, 8 14/09/2014 
D7 √  5 02/02/2015 
18/07/2016 
D8  √ 1, 3, 4 30/01/2015 
D9  √ 2, 5 02/02/2015 
D10 √  1, 2, 3, Karaj 15/04/2015 
D11 √  8, 13, 14 15/04/2015 
D12 √ √ 4 17/04/2015 
D13 √  3, 4, 5 29/04/2015 
D14 √ √ 1, 2, 3 29/04/2015 
D15  √ 1 29/04/2015 
Table 3-2: List of interviewed developers 
                                                
4 For the list of interviewees’ names refer to Appendix 2. To keep the respondents anonymous, 
names are ordered randomly in Appendix 2  
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As shown in Table 3-2, 15 developers were interviewed. Nine of them have 
experience of only working as an individual developer (or small construction 
company), three of them have experience of only working in a large 
construction development company and three of them have experienced both 
working as an individual developer (or small construction company) and as part 
of a large development company. As most of the production of housing in 
Tehran is carried out by individual developers, the number of interviewees who 
are individual developers are more than those in large-scale registered 
companies. 
In order to investigate the second and third research questions, planners and 
decision makers were interviewed. There are two types of planners in Tehran; 
planners working at the municipality (public sector) and planners practicing at 
architecture and planning consultant companies (private sector). In Iran, 
planners in the private sector prepare the plans ordered by the municipality or 
the government and the municipal planners supervise and/or implement those 
plans. It was necessary to include the viewpoints of both groups. In each region 
there was an undertaking to interview at least one municipal planner and one 
planner from the consultant company which prepared that region’s plan. 
To generate data about various aspects of planning and financing for the city it 
is necessary to know what the planning and decision-making system is at 
macro level. Interviews were carried out with key informants who are or used to 
be members or employees of relevant departments of the Urban Planning and 
Architecture High Council5 (UPAHC), Islamic City Council of Tehran (ICCT); 
Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (MRUD); Tehran Municipality (TM); 
Tehran Urban Planning and Research Centre (TUPRC); Commission No. 56 
(CN5); and ParsBoom Consulting Engineers (synthesiser company and 
producer of Tehran’s plan). 
                                                
5 In Farsi: Shoray-e Aali-ye Shahrsazi va Meamari  
6 In Farsi: Comesion-e Madeh Panj  
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The following table shows the details of the interviewed planners. The 
interviewed planners are anonymous and each planner is allocated a code 
starting with the letter P for planner. 
Code Institution  Provided information  Date of 
interview(s) 
P1  University of Tehran  Academic knowledge on Tehran’s 
planning system  
21/09/2014 
P2  UPAHC, MRUD Decision-making process, 
dynamics between government 
and municipality 
11/06/2014 
04/09/2014 
12/09/2015 
P3 CN5 How the commission works 18/04/2015 
12/09/2015 
P4 Consultant Company  Regulating high-rise constructions 16/04/2015 
P5 MRUD Dynamics between government 
and municipality 
23/09/2014 
P6 TM Introduction of structure and 
strategic plans 
23/09/2015 
P7 TM Funding municipality 12/09/2015 
P8 TM Funding municipality, preparing 
plans 
20/09/2015 
P9 Consultant Company Producer of Region 2 District Plan  14/09/2015 
P10 Consultant Company Producer of Region 3 District Plan 22/09/2015 
P11 ICCT Dynamics between city council 
and municipality  
14/09/2015 
P12 Region 4 Municipality  Plan implementation at local level 13/09/2015 
P13 TM Plan preparation, municipal 
funding  
19/09/2015 
P14 TM Funding municipality, preparing 
plans 
12/09/2015  
P15 Region 1 Municipality Plan implementation at local level 12/09/2015  
P16 CN5 Dynamics between commission 
and municipality  
19/09/2015 
P17 TM Municipality funding, preparing 
plans 
23/09/2015  
P18 Region 4 Municipality Plan implementation at local level 13/09/2015 
P19 Consultant Company Preparing plans 21/09/2015 
P20 Consultant Company Producer of Region 1 District Plan 14/09/2015 
P21 ICCT Dynamics between city council 
and municipality  
24/09/2015 
P22 Consultant Company Plan production and 
implementation  
15/09/2015 
P23 Region 2 Municipality Plan implementation at local level 15/09/2015 
P24 Consultant Company Producer of Region 5 District Plan 17/09/2015 
P25 TM Municipality funding, preparing 
plans 
22/09/2015 
P26 Consultant Company Preparing plans 20/06/2015 
P27 Region 2 Municipality Plan implementation at local level 15/09/2015 
P28 TUPRC Dynamics between government, 
municipality and city council 
16/09/2015 
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P29 Consultant Company Producer of Region 4 District Plan 12/09/2015 
P30 Consultant Company Producer of Region 4 District Plan 12/09/2015 
P31 Centre for Urban Studies 
and Architecture of Iran  
Plan implementation  28/12/2016 
P32 TM Plan preparation, Commission 
No. 5  
29/12/2016 
Table 3-3: List of interviewed planners 
By establishing contact with two specific planners, the researcher was able to 
gain access to a broad range of interviewees: P2 holds a high position in the 
government (at the time of interview) and introduced the researcher to key 
interviewees in TM and ICCT. P3 has personal and professional connections 
with many of the planners working in consultant companies and introduced the 
researcher to the relevant consultant companies. In section 3-4-2 of this 
chapter, the implications of this way of contacting interviews will be elaborated. 
Most of the interviewees consented to record the whole interview. However, a 
few asked to stop the recording and keep some information off the record. A 
few other interviewees, mostly those working at region (local) municipalities, did 
not give permission for the researcher to record the interview. In those 
circumstances, notes were taken at the time of interview. 
Before moving on to discussing secondary data collection methods, it should be 
mentioned that the first few interviews with developer (D1) and planners (P1, 
first interview with P2 and first interview with P3) were unstructured interviews in 
order to understand: the development process; the developers’ roles in the 
development process and the excess construction density charge in Tehran; 
how and where to find secondary data (statics, plans…); and who were the 
gatekeepers to contact. 
3-4-1-2 SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION 
Published and unpublished materials prepared by various institutions and 
organisations have provided the secondary data of this research. Statistics, 
regulations and directives, maps and plans, reports, books and articles are the 
main materials used to form and answer the research questions. In the following 
paragraphs, the main sources of secondary data for this research will be 
described. 
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Statistics provided by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI), Central Bank of Iran 
(CBI) and MRUD are used to gain a better understanding of housing 
development activity, population distribution and the property market in 22 
regions of Tehran over the relevant time period. The following table (Table 3-4) 
summarises the data gathered from these institutions’ websites. However, 
generating data from the website of these institutions is not always 
straightforward; at the time of data collection for this research access to the 
census of the SCI was banned from outside Iran7 which made the data 
collection complicated. 
Data Source Un/published 
Private Sector's 
Construction Activities in 
Iranian Cities  
CBI Published  
Population and Housing 
Census  
SCI Published 
Information of 
Construction Permits 
granted by municipalities  
SCI Published 
Average purchase price of 
a housing unit per square 
metre in 22 regions of 
Tehran 
MRUD Published 
Average purchase price 
per square metre of land 
in 22 regions of Tehran  
MRUD Published 
Table 3-4: Sources of statistics data 
Another source of information for this research were official bills and directives. 
Official bills and directives have influenced the way in which urban development 
happens. As a result, understanding the context and content of them is 
necessary. Most of them are prepared and approved by the Islamic Parliament 
of Iran (IPI), UPAHC, ICCT and CN5. Most of these laws and directives are 
accessible through the official website of Iran’s Parliament which is called the 
Islamic Parliament Research Centre of The Islamic Republic of Iran8. However, 
there are books published by these organisations, or their affiliates, that 
elaborate on the laws or categorise them based on themes relevant to this 
thesis. 
                                                
7 The website used to be accessible from outside Iran but the access was reduced after cyber 
attacks from Saudi Arabian hackers (BBC, 2016) 
8 Islamic Parliament Research Centre of The Islamic Republic of Iran website: 
http://rc.majlis.ir/fa 
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Besides the sources mentioned above, studying development plans of Tehran 
and its regions provided the researcher with an in-depth knowledge of the 
planning process and its development throughout the period of the research. 
Most or the information regarding the development plans were provided by 
consultant companies who were/are involved with the preparation of those 
plans. Private archives of some interviewees also facilitated the process of 
collecting the planning documents. 
Published books, articles and reports alongside unpublished PhD theses, 
reports and meeting minutes of Iran’s Parliament sessions are used to prepare 
the context for presenting this research. In respect of this, newspaper archives 
are studied to follow the historical development of the events related to the 
selling of construction density and related issues. 
3-4-2 THE POLITICS OF DATA COLLECTION  
Before discussing the data analysis strategy of this research, it is worth 
reflecting on the experience of data collection in Tehran and the implications of 
this experience. In the following paragraphs, experience of the power hierarchy 
and the impact of micro geographies in the process of data collection will be 
discussed. Then, implications of these on methodology and analysis will be 
considered. 
3-4-2-1 POWER HIERARCHY 
Based on critical methodological literature, Elwood and Martin (2000) argue that 
interviews, like any other social interactions, have inherent power dynamics 
forming a particular relationship between the researcher and the interview 
participants. By looking at the work of a number of feminist ethnographers on 
the discussion of power relations, Elwood and Martin (2000, p.651) conclude 
that ‘race, class, family status, ethnicity, and other social identities are important 
sources of differential power that shape relationships between researchers and 
participants, even if they share similar national or local identities’. 
Power struggle, as a methodological challenge, has affected the data collection 
process of this research. Being a young woman carrying out research in a male-
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dominated environment and a PhD student of a British university who wants to 
research on a sensitive, internal, potentially political topic in Iran sometimes put 
the researcher in a challenging position. At the time of negotiating to get the 
consent of interviewees to conduct an interview and during the course of the 
interviews, power struggles were identified. 
For example, some potential interviewees, mostly working at the municipality, 
refrained from participating in the research, often without explaining why. 
However, one of the potential interviewees explicitly refused to participate in the 
interview merely because the researcher is an overseas student. As some of 
these people were key to this research, gradually a strategy was established to 
contact former employees who used to work in the same role or close to that 
role, to supply the missing information. Another strategy which was used to turn 
around the power struggle between the interviewee and the researcher was to 
ask a mutual contact to introduce the researcher to the potential interviewee 
prior to the interview. This greatly facilitated the process of interview as another 
dimension was added to the power relation and helped to balance the dynamic. 
However, power relations are not only a methodological challenge but are 
themselves key data which often gets overlooked (Moore, 2015, p. 391). In this 
regard, Briggs (2003) says that power relations that emerge in interviews are 
embedded in the data they produce. As a result, it is important to address them 
in data analysis. Chapters 6 and 7 reflect on the impact of these power relations 
on the analysis of the data for this thesis. For example, after a few interviews it 
became quite clear that employees of regions’ municipalities were very 
concerned about what information they disclosed. As a result, they would divert 
the conversation onto a subject which they were willing to share. This helped 
the researcher to understand what areas of tension need to be considered while 
discussing planning and urban development trajectories. 
Another concept, which is related to the discussion of power, is Goffman’s 
(1959) impression management of the interviewees.  In a research interview, as 
in any other social interaction, both interviewee and interviewer, consciously or 
sub-consciously, would attempt to influence the perception of the other with 
various tactics. As Moore (2015) reflects in her research on the New Urbanism 
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in Canada, interviewees throughout the interview attempted to establish a 
position with her on New Urbanism and how their work aligns or distances itself 
from this label. 
In Tehran’s interviews, impression management of the interviewees on how 
they take position against or align with the construction density charge or the 
alteration of plans to accommodate the financial needs of Tehran Municipality 
unpacks interesting facts. For example, people working in the system of the 
municipality will not say anything against the system. However, consultants 
(e.g. working for private urban planning companies) or ex-employees of the 
municipality are keen to disclose information. It has been necessary to be 
careful when the municipality’s employee’s views are interpreted to answer the 
research question. 
3-4-2-2 MICRO GEOGRAPHIES 
Elwood and Martin (2000) in their paper discuss the micro-geographies of the 
interview site. For them the interview site itself embodies multiple scales of 
meaning, which can offer new insights for the researcher in order to understand 
and interpret interview material and highlight particular ethical considerations 
that researchers need to address. They say ‘Although the interview site may not 
be part of the primary avenue of inquiry in the research, observing dynamics in 
that place, and paying attention to what the participant says about the place, 
may generate useful research material’ (Elwood & Martin, 2000, p. 656). 
Elwood and Martin (2000) give an example of a piece of research done by 
McDowell (1998) in which McDowell examines the ways that her interviews with 
bank employees were influenced by the location of the interviews at the 
workplaces of the interviewees. She suggests that some participants had 
concerns about confidentiality in the shared interview space. 
In the Tehran interviews, the same concern was observed when interviewing 
someone sharing his/her office with others. For example, interviewee P14 who 
was working in a shared office at the Tehran Municipality tried to speak quietly, 
as he did not want to be overheard by his colleagues. On several occasions 
during the interview he mentioned that it was difficult for him to talk freely there. 
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He offered the interviewer an opportunity to continue the discussion out of the 
office space, which was rejected due to ethical considerations and cultural 
norms.  
As will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7, reflecting on the micro-geographies of 
some of the interviewees provides insights for the researcher to better 
understand the place dynamics. 
3-5 DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
Yin (2009, p. 130) underlines the importance of having a general analytic 
strategy for research in order to ‘treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling 
analytic conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations’. Four general 
strategies for data analysis are proposed by Yin (2009): relying on theoretical 
propositions, developing a case description, using both qualitative and 
quantitative data and examining rival explanations. This research relies on 
theoretical propositions. Therefore, research questions and the hypothesis of 
this study will guide the analysis of collected data. 
Developing a case description and using both qualitative and quantitative data 
strategies are not used as this research is neither concerned with describing the 
case study nor focuses on quantitative data. However, examining rival 
explanations strategy is used at some points of the research to test different 
interpretations and to enhance the credibility of the research findings. 
Relying on theoretical propositions, an explanation-building technique is used to 
analyse the data and to build an explanation as to how the construction density 
charge has affected the planning system and spatial development of Tehran. 
Elements of explanations stem from research questions and the theoretical 
framework of the research. The following themes are prepared, preliminarily to 
order and analyse the data: 
" Housing developers and their strategies:  
o Understanding housing development process 
# Who are the housing developers? 
# What are their goals and objectives? 
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# What are their strategies to achieve their goals? 
# What are the decisions of developers: where, when, what 
and for whom to build? 
o Developers and excess construction density charge 
# What is their approach towards the excess construction 
density charge? 
# What are the ways that they could get the extra 
construction density? 
# What is the role of extra construction density on their 
decisions? 
o Developers and urban planning system 
# What is the developers’ understanding of formal plans and 
regulations? 
# How much do they think they can play with those plans 
and regulations to achieve their goals? 
" Urban governance of Tehran 
o Urban planning system 
# What is the system? 
# How are plans prepared, approved and implemented? 
# Who are involved in the decision-making process? 
# Does the interest of the municipality or a group of 
developers affect the preparation and implementation of 
the plan? 
o Urban planning and excess construction density charge 
# What is the role of construction density in the plans? 
# How flexible is the amount of construction density in the 
plans? 
# What are the conflicts? 
o Municipality’s system 
# What is the municipality’s budget? 
# How is the municipality dependent on excess construction 
density charge? 
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" Development pattern of Tehran 
o How do the power of developers and the financial need of the 
municipality affect the pattern of growth? 
o Market-led development 
# Why is there a concentration of high-rise buildings in 
certain areas? 
# What is the reason behind transformation of inner city 
gardens? 
After ordering the content of interview data in the tables, based on the themes 
above, all the data relating to each specific theme was compiled in a separate 
document and an appropriate narrative for that theme was found. Each theme 
or couple of themes form a section in which both data (parts of interviews’ 
content) and analysis of data are presented. 
As all the collected data was in Farsi; the first stage of data analysis (organising 
data in tables) was done in Farsi and only later those quotations that are used 
directly in the thesis translated into English by the researcher. 
3-6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter of the thesis is dedicated to the research design and 
methodologies of the research. In this chapter, the conceptual basis of the 
research is presented. Based on an institutional model of the development 
process deriving from a structuration theory, this research seeks to have a 
better understanding of the dynamics between agents and the structure in 
urban development of Tehran. In particular the research explores the following 
three research considerations: 
" How the construction density charge in Tehran has affected the 
decisions of housing developers 
" How, as a result of using the construction density charge tool, 
decisions (tendencies) of housing developers have shaped the city 
of Tehran 
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" How, in turn, this market-led growth has affected the way in which 
the city is planned. 
As presented in section 3-3-2, this research proposes that by using construction 
density charge, Tehran Municipality’s budget became dependent on the fee 
received from developers and this boosted the power of developers to construct 
what they preferred rather than what plans suggested. As a result, developers’ 
decisions on what to build and where to build have shaped the spatial 
organisation of the city, market-led development has undermined the planning 
documents and the city is not managed by official plans but by responding to 
spontaneous growth. This hypothesis will be revisited and consolidated in 
Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
Based on proposed research questions, the strategy of the research is case 
study design. Tehran is the case study of this research and it focuses on, and 
collects data from, the chosen five regions where density bonus policy is 
extensively used. In this chapter, it is explained that the main source of primary 
data for this research was semi-structured interviews with housing developers, 
urban planners, city council members and municipality employees (or ex-
employees). In total, 47 interviewees were questioned for this research; 
however, some are interviewed on more than one occasion. 
In addition to the primary data, there is secondary data which helps the 
researcher to understand the context of the research. Statistics, regulations and 
directives, maps and plans, reports and books and articles are the main 
secondary sources of information for this research.  
During the data collection phase, the researcher experienced power struggles 
which affected the data collection and had implications for data analysis. Also, 
in some cases, characteristics of the interview site affected the quality of 
interviews and had implications for data analysis which will be discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
To analyse the collected data, this research relies on theoretical propositions 
which means that the research questions and the hypothesis of this research 
guides the analysis of the data. Relying on theoretical propositions, explanation-
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building techniques are used to analyse the data and to build an explanation on 
how construction density charge has affected the planning system and spatial 
development of Tehran. Elements of explanations are arrived at from the 
research questions and the theoretical framework of the research. 
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4-1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter and the following chapter provide contextual information about 
Tehran and its regions. It briefly investigates: the background of Tehran and its 
transformation to a metropolis; its governance system; the institutions involved 
in governance; the plans proposed for Tehran; the importance of the 
construction density charge in municipal financing, and how that affects the 
housing construction industry. Most of the information used in this chapter was 
obtained from secondary sources, mainly published books and articles.  
4-2 PORTRAIT OF TEHRAN  
4-2-1 THE FORMATION OF A METROPOLIS 
Tehran used to be a village until the time that Shah Tahmasp of the Safavid 
dynasty ordered walls to be built around the village and some major buildings to 
be constructed in 1554 AD (961 Lunar Hijri Calendar) in the village (TMICTO & 
Tehran University, 2011, p. 34). Why Shah Tahmasp paid particular attention to 
this village is not clear. However, the attention of the Shi’i king could be 
because of the religious orientation of Tehran’s residents who were also Shia 
Muslim (TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011, p. 34). Shah Tahmasp’s 
successors continued to add major buildings and infrastructures inside Tehran. 
It was in the reign of Karim Khan of the Zand dynasty (between 1751 and 1779) 
that Tehran was first considered as a possible capital city of Iran but it was not 
until 1785, when Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, the founder of the Qajar 
dynasty, chose Tehran as his capital and it has remained the capital of Iran 
since then. Successors of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar continued to build 
palaces, religious buildings and schools. The city has developed gradually since 
the rule of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar who ordered the walls around the city to be 
pulled down and for it to expand outwards (TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011).  
While the Westernisation and modernisation of Tehran began in Naser al-Din 
Shah’s time, it reached its zenith during the ruling of Reza Shah, the founder of 
the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah was determined to modernise the city by 
expanding it, creating straight roads through the fabric of the city without any 
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consideration of the social, economic and physical consequences. Clark (1981, 
pp. 282–283) describes this act as ‘simple and brutal’. During Reza Shah’s 
reign (1925–1941) the country was in transition from a feudal system to one 
with a central government and from a traditional to a more secular society 
(TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011, p. 35). 
In the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, successor of Reza Shah and the last 
king of Iran, Tehran expanded considerably. The increase in oil revenues 
affected the development of the city, especially during the 1970s when oil 
revenues rose from $1.2 billion in 1970 to $20.9 billion in 1977 (Clark, 1981, p. 
281). The following map (Figure 4-1) shows the expansion of the city throughout 
its history.  
Figure 4-1: Evolution of built-up areas in Tehran. Source: (TGIC-CNRS, 2004) 
4-2-2 SPATIAL STRUCTURE 
Tehran is situated between the Alborz Mountains and the desert, on the 
southern slopes of the mountain range. The northern part of the city is 
approximately 640 m higher than the southern part (Madanipour, 1999, pp. 59). 
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This height difference between the north and the south has created the city’s 
unique landscape (Hamidi, 1998). 
Tehran’s population, based on the 2006 census, is 7,803,883 inhabitants 
(Markaz-e Amar Iran, 2006, p.21) who are concentrated in an area9 of more 
than 600 km2. Tehran is a densely-built city which accommodates 146 people 
per hectare (Bertaud, 2003, p. 8). This population is not distributed evenly 
throughout the city; southern parts have a higher population density while 
northern parts have a lower one. However, this density distribution may change 
in the future as southern parts are losing and northern parts are gaining 
population (Bertaud, 2003, p. 9-10).  
 
Figure 4-2: Tehran – Population growth per year per district between 1986 and 
1996. Source: (Bertaud, 2003, p. 29) 
Historically, Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, which is located in Region 12, used to be 
the central business district (CBD) of the city before the extensive 
transformation which occurred during the last century. At the moment, 
employment and commerce are dispersed across Tehran and it lacks a 
dominant CBD. Based on Bertaud’s (2003) research of origin-destination 
                                                
9 For a long time, Tehran’s boundary was not fixed and there was a dispute over its area. Now 
the boundaries are set at 614 km2. 
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matrices for vehicles travelling to work and on shopping trips, Regions 6 and 12 
of Tehran are the closest thing to a CBD. However, these two regions attract 
‘only 27% of all shopping trips and 30% of all job commuting trips’ (Bertaud, 
2003, p. 11).  
Lack of a dominant CBD in Tehran, which could cause the development of a 
polycentric city, could partly be as a result of Tehran’s first Comprehensive Plan 
in the 1960s which suggests polycentric growth of the city and the development 
of what is described by Garreau (1992) as edge cities. This mode of regional 
urbanisation, in contrast with what has been happening in North American cities 
such as Los Angeles, (Soja, 2011) did not happen spontaneously as a result of 
people’s choices and density convergence. Tehran was planned to become a 
regional city encompassing a number of edge cities. 
Tehran suffers from a striking north-south spatial and social division. The north 
is mostly populated by wealthy people and the south by the poor. As mentioned 
before, the north is less populated and less densely-built than the south. Floor 
space consumption (Figure 4-3), land prices, households’ income and 
expenditures (Figure 4-4), rate of literacy, rate of employment, size and height 
of buildings all follow the north–south pattern and are higher in the north than in 
the south (Bertaud, 2003; Madanipour, 1999, 1998; TMICTO & Tehran 
University, 2011).  
 
Figure 4-3: Tehran – Household expenditures 2001. Source: (Bertaud, 2003, p. 33) 
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Figure 4-4: Tehran – Households’ floor space consumption. Source: (Bertaud, 
2003, p. 33) 
The reasons behind the creation and then continuation of this north–south 
physical and social division are varied. Madanipour (1999, p. 59) believes that 
the foundation of this north–south dichotomy goes back to the first major 
transformation of Tehran in the 1860s when the city was expanded and upper-
class neighbourhoods were developed in the north of the traditional city. 
Moreover, the height differentiation resulted in a more moderate and appealing 
climate in the north for the better off and a harsher climate in the south for the 
poor (Madanipour, 1999, p. 59). 
Besides historical and geographical reasons for the north–south division, 
Madanipour (1999, pp. 185-186) asserts that the mechanism of land pricing has 
sustained this social and spatial stratification between the north and the south 
by institutionalising the supremacy of the north which has consistently been 
reflected in land price differences. However, lack of attention to the plan for 
social integration between north and south has contributed to the continuation 
of this socio-physical segregation.  
During the time that Karbaschi was the Mayor in the 1990s, attempts were 
made to break down this division by introducing various projects, such as 
cultural facilities and sport centres for less affluent Tehranis (Ehsani, 1999). The 
construction of Bahman Cultural Complex in south Tehran is an example of one 
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of these projects. Bahman Cultural Complex was built in 1992 on the former site 
of a slaughterhouse in one of the poorest neighbourhoods of the city. 
Immediately, this complex became a very popular place (Ehsani, 1999, p.25). 
As Ehsani (1999, p.25) says, ‘for the first time there was something attractive to 
visit in south Tehran, reversing the city's usual northward flow of movement’. 
Despite these attempts the north–south division of the city is still striking. 
4-3 THE GOVERNANCE OF TEHRAN 
Tehran has a fragmented system of city government. Although it is recognised 
that the Tehran Municipality, in conjunction with the Islamic City Council of 
Tehran (ICCT), run the city (Madanipour, 2011, p. 74), various other 
governmental or public institutions and private organisations have considerable 
power and roles in the city’s management. Many services that one would 
imagine would be controlled under one management system, such as the 
provision of water and electricity or the supply of housing, are not under the 
control of the municipality (Salehi, 2003, p. 67). 
In the following sections: firstly governmental organisations involved in the 
governance of the city will be identified; then, Tehran municipality roles and 
responsibilities will be overviewed. ICCT, which is a local institution, will be 
inspected; and finally, the Integrated Urban Management Act that is under 
preparation for presentation in parliament, will be briefly discussed. 
4-3-1 GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS 
Different Ministries and organisations are involved in governing Tehran besides 
the Tehran Municipality. Table 4-1 illustrates most of the organisations with 
direct responsibilities for the urban management of Tehran. The Deputy of 
Urban Development and Architecture (DUDA) of the Ministry of Roads and 
Urban Development (MRUD) has the major share in Tehran’s government, after 
the Tehran Municipality and ICCT. This Deputy supervises the preparation and 
implementation of city-wide plans for all Iranian cities, including Tehran.  
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Government 
Ministries/Organisations  
Deputies or affiliated 
companies 
Responsibilities 
Deputy of Urban 
Development and 
Architecture 
Supervising the 
preparation and 
implementation of 
development plans 
Deputy of Housing and 
Building 
Responsible for housing 
quality and construction 
codes 
Urban Development and 
Revitalisation Organisation 
Responsible for 
revitalising the 
dilapidated and 
inefficient fabrics of the 
city 
Enforcement Agency for 
Government and Public 
Buildings and Facilities  
Deals with the 
construction of 
governmental and public 
buildings 
New Towns Development 
Company 
Planning and supervising 
the establishment of new 
towns outside of the 
city’s boundaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MRUD 
National Land and Housing 
Organisation 
Providing, managing and 
utilising land and housing 
Deputy of Development 
Coordination (Technical 
Bureau) 
Overseeing the 
implementation of plans 
 
 
Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
Cooperation Organisation of 
Tehran’s Municipalities 
Supporting and providing 
required services for 
municipalities 
Tehran Regional Electric 
Company 
Distributing electricity  
Tehran Regional Water 
Authority  
Providing drinking water, 
water for agriculture, 
industry and service use  
 
 
 
Ministry of Energy (MoE) 
Tehran Wastewater 
Company  
Dealing with sewage and 
water treatment  
 
Housing Foundation of the 
Islamic Revolution 
 Provision of housing for 
underprivileged and low- 
income communities 
through cooperation  
Endowment and Charity 
Organisation 
 Responsible for 
management of 
endowments (e.g. 
shrines, mosques) 
Department of 
Environment (DoE) 
Tehran Office  Combating 
environmental pollution 
and conserving 
ecosystems 
Management and 
Planning Organisation of 
Iran 
Management and Planning 
Organisation of Tehran  
Regional planning for 
Tehran province  
Table 4-1: Organisations with responsibility for the urban management of Tehran 
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Apart from all these governmental institutions, there is a High Council that has 
the ultimate authority on urban planning decisions. The name of this council is 
the Urban Planning and Architecture High Council (UPAHC). The secretariat of 
this council is located at the DUDA. Members of this council are ministers (or 
their representatives) of different ministries including the MRUD, heads of a few 
departments such as the Department of Environment, and a representative from 
the Islamic Parliament of Iran (IPI). The main responsibilities of this Council are 
to prepare planning regulations, supervise the preparation and implementation 
of comprehensive and detailed plans and to communicate with all the relevant 
institutions (IPI, 1973). 
The responsibilities of the UPAHC are at national level. For a more local focus 
on planning and architectural issues, based on the fifth article of the 
Establishment of Iran’s Urban Planning and Architecture High Council Act and 
its later amendment, a commission was established in Tehran10, which is called 
Commission No. 5 (CN5), to review and approve detailed plans of the city and 
their changes. This Commission consists of representatives of the MRUD, the 
MoI, the MoE, the DoE, the Mayor of Tehran (or his representative) and the 
Head of ICCT (IPI, 1986).  
Only in Tehran the secretariat of CN5 is at the Tehran Municipality and the 
Mayor of Tehran is the head of this commission. At this commission, the Tehran 
Municipality has the position and power to influence or amend plans as long as 
the changes are not contrary to the comprehensive plan approved by the 
UPAHC. Decisions of this commission have been very controversial in recent 
years. When Tehran did not have an approved plan (or an updated plan) the 
decisions of this commission were the basis for what development occurred. 
The excessive granting of permission for construction density beyond limits and 
changes of land use have been happening with the approval of this commission 
(Moeini, 2006) which will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                
10 The other Iranian cities have a local Commission No. 5 but their arrangement is different from 
Tehran.    
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4-3-2 THE TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY 
The establishment of modern municipalities in Iran goes back to an act 
approved in 1907, which is known as the Baladiyeh (Municipality) Act 
(Madanipour, 1998, p. 65). Since this act the IPI has approved various acts and 
amendments for the establishing and organisation of the municipalities. 
However, the 1955 Act and its later amendments are the basis of current 
municipal practice in Iran. 
According to the Municipality Act, cities are run by municipalities under the 
supervision of ICCT whose members are elected by the people. A municipality 
is a public organisation with responsibility to deliver services to its residents. 
ICCT members elect the Mayor and the Mayor in Tehran appoints the Mayors 
for the 22 regions of the city. These 22 Mayors should report directly to the 
Mayor of Tehran. 
From the beginning of the establishment of municipalities in Iran, it was 
perceived that they should be autonomous institutions. However, the history of 
Tehran shows a continuous conflict between their aspirations to be autonomous 
and the pressure to be attached to the Government (Madanipour, 1998). 
Studying acts and laws passed by the IPI from 1907 until the present day 
clearly shows the occasions when the Government wanted to reduce the 
independence of the municipalities.  
For example, the 1930 Municipal Act overruled the 1907 Act which gave the 
elected council members the authority to appoint the Mayor. This Municipal Act 
made municipalities entirely dependent on the MoI and gave the Ministry the 
right to appoint a Mayor. This act was approved in the reign of Reza Shah who 
put a lot of effort into creating a strong central government (Madanipour, 1998, 
p. 66). Section 4-5-1 describes how, after the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, 
the aspirations for having an independent municipality resulted in the proposal 
of controversial funding methods.  
According to Article 55 of the Municipality Act passed by IPI in 1955, 
municipalities have wide-ranging responsibilities, from building cemeteries and 
mortuaries to proposing trade unions’ legislation (Mansour, 2012). However, in 
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Tehran and other cities, some of these responsibilities have been transferred to 
other organisations. For example, based on the Urban Development and 
Redevelopment Act which was passed in 1968, it was the municipalities’ 
responsibility to prepare plans for the cities. However, a later act, Renaming the 
Ministry of Development and Housing Act, was approved in 1974, transferring 
this responsibility to the MRUD (Salehi, 2003, p. 67). 
Currently the chief responsibilities of Tehran Municipality, which are the concern 
of this research, are implementing plans and directives approved by the UPAHC 
and ICCT, preparing detailed plans for regions, granting construction permits to 
the applicants, impeding illegal constructions in Commission No. 10011 (CN100) 
and constructing new, and maintaining existing, roads, parks and public spaces. 
4-3-3 ISLAMIC CITY COUNCIL OF TEHRAN  
City (or village) councils in Iran are local governments. The formation of local 
councils, whose members are democratically elected by the people, was clearly 
mentioned in the Baladiyeh Act of 1907. Despite the central role of these 
councils in the management of the city, mentioned in the Baladiyeh Act of 1907, 
the first city council of Tehran was formed 23 years later in 1930 (Madanipour, 
1998, p. 66). Before the Islamic revolution in Iran, city councils were operating 
intermittently and were sometimes under the control of central government 
(Madanipour, 2011, p. 75). 
After the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, although Article 7 of the 
Iranian Constitution clearly envisages these local councils should be created 
and be part of the decision-making and administrative organs of the 
Government, local councils were not formed for a further 20 years. It was in 
1999 that people were given the chance to elect their local council members 
which had been promised in the campaign of the reformist president, Khatami 
('Iran prepares for first-ever local elections,' 1999). 
The first ICCT was dissolved in 2002 due to internal squabbling. This Council 
had appointed Morteza Alviri as the Mayor of Tehran in 1999. However, the 
relationship between the Mayor and the ICCT was very tense. The main 
                                                
11 In Farsi: Comesion-e madeh 100. This commission deals with construction violations  
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difference of opinion was over the municipal budget and the selling of 
permission for extra construction density to developers which was criticised by 
the ICCT members and resulted in criticism of the Mayor. Finally, the Mayor 
resigned from office. However, the Council had the same dispute with the next 
Mayor, Malekmadani. In addition to the tension between the Mayor and the 
ICCT, members of the ICCT had contrasting political views which became the 
Council’s Achilles’ heel and resulted in the dissolution of the Council in 2002 
(Alekajbaf, 2014). However, a second City Council was formed in 2003 and is 
still presiding. 
The city (or village) Councils, in their local government role, are given wide-
ranging powers in the management of cities (and villages). Among the major 
responsibilities of a ICCT in its four-year term are: electing the Mayor for four 
years; approving the plans for the city; approving the local legislation proposed 
by the Mayor; approving the annual budget of the municipality and the budget 
appendixes; and overseeing the performance of the municipality (Alekajbaf, 
2014). However, Tehran’s City Council is still struggling to use all of its legal 
powers to oversee the performance of the municipality. 
4-3-4 THE INTEGRATED URBAN MANAGEMENT ACT12  
The Tehran Urban Research and Planning Centre (TUPRC) of Tehran 
Municipality is drafting a Bill which proposes an integrated urban management 
system for Tehran and the other metropoles of Iran. This bill is being prepared 
in response to the current practice of implementing outdated and improper 
municipal laws. The aim of this bill is to address existing ambiguities over: what 
is Government’s and what is municipality’s responsibility in the management of 
cities; the importance of devolution of power to local governments; and ways to 
involve residents so that they take responsibility and participate in the urban 
decision-making process (TUPRC, 2013).  
At the time of preparing this thesis, the draft version of the Bill is prepared and 
has been sent to the MoI to be sent to the IPI for approval. This Bill has more 
than 300 articles and elaborates on all aspects of the urban management 
                                                
12 In Farsi: Ghanoon-e Jamea Modiriyat Shahri  
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system. Based on the draft now available, if Parliament passes this bill, 
residents will be able to vote to choose the Mayor of the city, and the 
municipality and the city council will gain a considerable amount of power in the 
management system of the city (TUPRC, 2013). 
4-4 PLANS FOR TEHRAN 
In understanding the planning tradition of Tehran, it is important to uncover the 
culture of planning in the city. In this section, a review of the planning attempts 
for the city will be presented which shows the planning system of Tehran has 
been evolving from a physical and pragmatic kind of intervention to more 
complicated and multi-layered plans. However, the system is still top-down and 
authoritative despite moving towards decentralisation (Tajbakhsh, 2005, p. 67).  
4-4-1 BEFORE THE MODERN PLANNING SYSTEM  
Before the existence of formal planning systems, Tehran, like other cities, went 
through many processes of organic, and also imposed, transformations to 
accommodate growth. Most of these major changes in Tehran happened under 
the direct order of kings. The first major transformation for Tehran happened in 
1868 when the king (Nasser al-Din Shah) ordered the old city walls to be 
demolished, the city expanded and new walls and gates to be built 
(Madanipour, 1998, pp. 31-32). This newly-built fortification was in an octagonal 
shape designed by a French General, Bohler, who was a military teacher in 
Tehran at that time. In the design of this fortification he was inspired by the 
shape of Paris’s old fortifications (Madanipour, 1998, p. 199). 
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Figure 4-5: Tehran’s map before Nasser al-Din Shah’s transformation  
 
 
Figure 4-6: Tehran’s map after Nasser al-Din Shah’s transformation  
    
CHAPTER 4 – URBAN PLANNING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEHRAN 
105 
 
The second massive transformation of the city happened in the reign of Reza 
Shah in the 1930s. The previously-built walls were demolished, the moats were 
filled in and the city was greatly expanded. This time the city saw a massive 
destruction of old neighbourhoods and the creation of long, wide streets 
(Madanipour, 1998, pp. 37-38). At this time, many old neighbourhoods in the 
central areas were demolished to accommodate the administrative function of 
the new era and new neighbourhoods were created in the northern and western 
parts of the city (Hamidi, 1998).  
Madanipour (2010) describes the process of transformation at this period as 
follows:  
‘The move was radical and brutal, aiming to integrate the urban space and unify 
the national space, so that the power of the central government could be 
consolidated. In Tehran, the old walls and gates were pulled down and a 
transport network of more than 200 kilometres was superimposed on the urban 
fabric. The city was “radically re-planned and re-built” in a way that was 
described as “quite ruthless”. This process of modernization lay the foundations 
for the rapid urban growth that followed.’ (Madanipour, 2010, p. 487)  
 
Figure 4-7: Tehran’s expansion at three stages, Black: before Nasser al-Din 
Shah’s expansion. Dark grey: after Nasser al-Din Shah’s expansion, Light grey: 
Reza Shah’s expansion. Source: (Hamidi, 1998, p. 45)  
    
CHAPTER 4 – URBAN PLANNING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEHRAN 
106 
 
Concurrent with these massive transformations during Reza Shah’s reign, a 
legal basis for these alterations started to emerge. The following section 
presents what is believed to be the first formal urban planning law in Iran. 
4-4-2 PAVING THE WAY: THE ROAD WIDENING ACT AND 
OTHER ACTS  
The Road Widening Act which was passed by the parliament in 1933 is known 
as the first urban planning law in Iran (Farivar Sadri, 2014, p. 30; Madanipour, 
1998, p. 203). This Act, and its subsequent amendments in 1941 and 1966, 
were concerned with the construction and widening of roads, alleys and 
squares to facilitate the movement of traffic in the city. The Municipality had the 
responsibility for preparing maps of the streets which were planned to be 
widened or built. The accuracy of these maps and plans needed to be approved 
for implementation by the MoI. The Municipality could then purchase the land 
from the owners and implement the plan (IPI, 1933, 1941). 
In the early stages, the Municipality’s plans were merely site specific without 
having a holistic view and without considering the implication of their 
interventions on the rest of the city. However, experts working at the Planning 
Bureau13 of the MoI who had to make decisions about the plans started to 
acknowledge the need to have a whole plan for the network of streets. The 
presence of foreign experts as advisors in the MoI in the 1960s familiarised 
these Iranian experts with the importance of holistic urban planning. One of the 
most influential of these foreign advisors who were working at the Planning 
Bureau was Fridrisch Pfeil14, a German planner who tried to introduce a 
regional planning system for Iranian cities but died before succeeding (Farivar 
Sadri, 2014).  
The preparation of plans for street networks was the first step towards planning 
for cities in Iran. The next two critical steps were the 1967 Municipality Act 
Amendments and the ratification of the Urban Development and 
                                                
13 In Farsi: Omoor-e Tarhrizi 
14 Fridrisch Pfeil used to work at Kox engineering consultancy. He first went to Iran to prepare a 
comprehensive plan for Esfahan. He then became advisor to the Interior Minister (Farivar Sadri, 
2014, pp. 39, 40) 
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Redevelopment Act in 1968. These two Acts provided the necessary legal basis 
for the preparation of comprehensive plans for Tehran and other cities. 
The 1967 Municipality Act Amendments considers the preparation of 
comprehensive plans for cities and the formation of the UPAHC to study and 
approve these plans. Later, in 1973, an Act with the title of The Establishment of 
Urban Planning and Architecture High Council Act elaborates on the 
responsibilities of this institution whose decisions on planning and architecture 
were at the highest level.  
The 1968 Urban Development and Redevelopment Act clarifies the 
responsibilities of municipalities and introduces property tax as a financing tool 
for them. The first article of this Act explicitly puts the municipalities in charge of 
preparing plans and comprehensive maps in order to develop, renovate and 
adapt cities and their streets, parks and public infrastructure (Mansour, 2012, p. 
335). The rest of the articles of the Urban Development and Redevelopment Act 
mostly elaborate on financing mechanisms and property taxation to generate 
income for the municipality to implement its development plans (Mansour, 
2012). These financing tools were supposed to be sufficient to be effective but 
failed.  
Approval of these Acts provided the basis for preparing urban planning 
documents for the big cities of Iran, including Tehran. The following sections 
summarise the efforts towards preparing official plans for Tehran. These plans 
are the Tehran Comprehensive Plan, ATEC Comprehensive Plan and the latest 
plan for Tehran which is the Tehran Structural-Strategic (Comprehensive) Plan. 
4-4-3 THE TEHRAN COMPREHENSIVE PLAN  
The Tehran Comprehensive Plan (TCP) was the first planning document for 
Tehran. An American-Iranian consortium, Victor Gruen-Farmanfarmaian under 
the direction of Fereydoun Ghaffari, was hired to prepare this plan in 1964. The 
UPAHC approved the TCP in 1968 and passed it to the Tehran Municipality for 
implementation (Farivar Sadri, 2014). The TCP identified Tehran’s problems 
and envisioned a 25-year planning horizon for its development. The identified 
issues were: the high density of the city centre; the expansion of commercial 
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activities along the main roads; air and water pollution; inefficient infrastructure; 
unemployment; and, rural-urban migration (Madanipour, 1998, p. 207). 
To address these issues, the TCP proposed: to reduce the density and 
congestion of the city centre through a polycentric linear expansion of the city 
towards the west; limited expansion towards the east; a controlled, and very 
limited, expansion towards the north; and the introduction of an express 
transportation system to connect the centres (Ghaffari, 2006). This polycentric 
linear development was designed at three levels. The first was at the 
neighbourhood level, with the population of 5,000 having a primary school, a 
local park and shops. The second was at the level of the community with 20,000 
to 30,000 people, with a high school, a large park and a commercial centre. A 
regional level, with a population of between 300,000 and 500,000 was the third, 
with access to higher education and universities, government offices and high- 
density developments like CBDs (Ghaffari, 2006). 
 
Figure 4-8: Concept plan of Tehran Comprehensive Plan. Source: 
(Farmanfarmaeian, 2006, p. 21) 
The idea of envisioning a polycentric urban development for Tehran was 
influenced by the British New Town movement. At that time, Victor Gruen was 
an advocate of these developments and proposed a linear version of the social 
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cities of Ebenezer Howard in which a central city is surrounded by 10 outer 
districts, each with its own centre. However, the plan did not address the social 
justice aspect of Ebenezer Howard’s garden city and was merely a physical 
plan (Madanipour, 1998, p. 208).  
 
Figure 4-9 Proposed linear development in Tehran Comprehensive Plan. Source: 
(Farmanfarmaeian, 2006, p. 23) 
Most of the TCP objectives have not being implemented. Farmanfarmaeian, 
one of the partners of the consortium, (2006, p. 25) believes TCP was a realistic 
one but could not achieve its goals because of the old cumbersome ownership 
regulations of Iran. The only parts of the plan that were implemented were the 
proposals related to creating a system of highways for Tehran. Also, some of 
the building codes, which are still in practice, are the legacy of TCP. Locating 
the building on the northern 60% of the land is one of those codes. This code 
has considerably affected Tehran’s townscape (Farivar Sadri, 2014, p. 153). 
Eventually, the whole plan was abandoned because of the 1979 Islamic 
revolution and the subsequent war between Iran and Iraq. 
4-4-4 ATEC COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
For more than a decade after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Tehran did not 
follow any official plan and was managed based on some common practices 
which had been mostly inherited from the TCP. Constructing buildings with two 
floors built above piloti which should be located on a maximum 60% of the north 
side of land (Moeini & Zarrin, 2006, p. 30) was one of these common practices. 
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In 1984, preparing a new plan for Tehran was put on the agenda by the Ministry 
of Housing and Urban Development of the time (now the MRUD). In 1987, 
ATEC engineering consultants was appointed by government (MRUD) to 
prepare this plan. In 1991 the plan was passed by UPAHC for implementation 
(ATEC Consultants, 1992). Although the plan’s title was Plan for Organising 
Tehran15, it is known as ATEC plan.  
The plan’s prospect was for 1996 when Tehran would reach its final capacity in 
regards to a population estimated at over 6,750,000 and an area of more than 
720 square kilometres (ATEC Consultants, 1992). However, at the time of the 
plan being approved by the UPAHC, these figures had slightly changed. This 
plan, like its predecessor the TCP, had two main strategies, one to pursue the 
polycentric development of Tehran but in a different arrangement to encourage 
decentralisation and the other, to limit the population growth of the capital. 
The plan considered five districts (centres) for Tehran, one in the centre which 
already existed and the other four around this central area. The highway system 
of the TCP was amended to connect these centres. A twin city of Karaj was 
considered to solve the population intensity and traffic problems of the city 
centre. More radically, in the long term it was planned to construct five new 
towns around Tehran to move people and services out of Tehran and into these 
towns (ATEC Consultants, 1992). 
In order to address the size of the population, the ATEC plan proposed 
educational and medical programmes to limit the rate of population growth in 
the capital. At that time, the Iran–Iraq war was over and it was proposed to 
encourage migrants of war-affected areas to return to their cities. This plan also 
considered the necessity of public transport in Tehran and the importance of the 
improvement of other public infrastructures. The plan also looked at moving 
industrial and military buildings out of the city (Farivar Sadri, 2014). 
 
                                                
15 In Farsi: Tarh-e Samandehi-ye Tehran  
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Figure 4-10: Tehran Conurbation Development Plan. Source: (ATEC Consultants, 
1992) 
Although this plan was approved by the UPAHC, it remained only on paper. The 
Tehran Municipality neither collaborated with the consultant company to 
prepare the plan nor did it take it seriously after its approval (Farivar Sadri, 
2014, p. 155). Here, Tehran’s Mayor’s political and institutional power to ignore 
the plan was considerable.  
4-4-5 TEHRAN 80 PLAN  
Without paying attention to the ATEC plan, the Tehran Municipality, under the 
supervision Karbaschi, prepared a strategic plan for the city, known as Tehran 
80, for the period of 1996– 2001. This plan introduced a set of strategies for the 
city and proposed policies in order to achieve those strategies. Instead of being 
concerned about land-use planning, Tehran 80 plan outlined six following goals 
for the city:  ‘a clean city, ease of movement in the city, the creation of parks 
and green spaces, the development of new cultural and sports facilities, reform 
of the municipal organization, and planning for the improvement of urban space, 
including preparation of comprehensive and detailed plans for land use and 
conservation’ (Madanipour, 2006, p. 436). 
Based on this plan the Tehran Municipality increased the amount of green 
spaces and cultural centres in the south, expanded the motorway network of the 
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city to reduce traffic and encouraged new development by relaxing construction 
density (FAR) regulations (Madanipour, 2006). It was during this period that the 
Tehran Municipality became financially independent. To fund the municipality’s 
expenditures, Tehran’s Mayor planned to redirect the liquid capital into the 
construction sector by bending the planning rules in exchange for steep fees 
(Ehsani, 1999, p. 23). 
4-4-6 TEHRAN STRUCTURAL-STRATEGIC (COMPREHENSIVE) 
PLAN 
During the 1990s the city was growing and changing fast, based on the 
municipality’s discretion and without any effective scrutiny over its performance. 
Concerned experts in the field of urban planning established a professional 
group16 and were discussing the matter for years. In 2002, they made a 
proposal to the Tehran Municipality’s Deputy Director of Planning and 
Architecture17 to prepare a new plan for the city (Farivar Sadri, 2014). 
Tehran Municipality accepted the experts’ proposal to prepare a new plan. To 
avoid the repetition of previous physical and rigid plans, the municipality 
amended the existing treaties to make contracts with consultant companies. It 
was decided to allocate one consultant company to carry out the analysis and 
planning for each region of the city instead of only one consultant company for 
the whole city (Farivar Sadri, 2014). First, 21 consultant companies were 
appointed but later another one was added for Region 22 which had been 
annexed to Tehran later. Furthermore, a synthesiser consultant company, 
ParsBoom Consulting Engineers, was appointed to facilitate the collaboration 
between these 22 companies. 
For the first time in the urban planning of Tehran, collaboration between Tehran 
Municipality, Government and consultant companies was created. This 
collaboration was crucial in order to be able to prepare and implement the plan. 
The failure of previous plans proved that Government planning for the city 
would not work without involving the Tehran Municipality as it was the main 
institution delivering the plan. To facilitate this collaboration a joint institution, 
                                                
16 Tehran’s Expert Group (in Farsi: Gorouh-e Takhasosi-ye Moshtarak-e Shar-e Tehran) 
17 At that time, Dr. Hamid Majedi, a UCL alumnus was in charge of that office 
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the Tehran City Planning Agency (TCPA)18, was created. This institution 
transferred its responsibility to the Tehran Municipality Urban Research & 
Planning Centre in 2010 (Saidnia, 2012). 
It was agreed to prepare a Structural–Strategic Plan at city level instead of 
using the traditional comprehensive planning approach. At local level, District 
Plans (DP) and, at a more micro level, Area Action Plans and Thematic Plans 
(AAP and TP) replaced previous detailed plans (land use plans) (Majedi, 2012). 
The title of Structural–Strategic was chosen for this plan to emphasise that 
identifying economic, social and physical development structures would provide 
the basis for effective strategies to achieve them (Majedi, 2012, p. 18). 
However, in the end, the word comprehensive was added to the title because of 
legal issues. 
Tehran Structural–Strategic Plan is an assemblage of three various planning 
systems of comprehensive planning, structure plans and strategic planning. 
Saidnia (2012) states that there are contradictions between these three 
methods of planning which make it impossible to combine them. However, 
Majedi (2012) argues that combining these approaches is the best way to 
address Tehran’s urban issues. 
The UPAHC approved the Tehran Structural–Strategic (Comprehensive) Plan 
(TSS(C)P) in 2007. Although the TSS(C)P and local level plans (DP, AAP and 
TP) were produced concurrently (Saidnia, 2012, p. 19) it took five years for the 
District Plans of 22 regions to be approved and get into the implementation 
phase. This research will focus on the reasons and consequences of this delay 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
TSS(C)P proposes seven visions, nine goals (objectives) and 17 strategies to 
achieve the proposed goals (Tables 4-2 and 4-3) for a timeframe of 2007–2026. 
This plan proposes a maximum population of 8.7 million people for the city, 
which rose to approximately 10.5 million inhabitants by the direct order of the 
President of the time, Ahmadinejad. The size of the city limits and its protected 
                                                
18 In Farsi: Nahad barnamehrizi-ye shahr-e Tehran 
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buffer zone are set at 614 km2 and 5918 km2 respectively in this document 
(TSS(C)P, 2007). 
Visions 
• an authentic Islamic-Iranian city  
• a smart and global city 
• a green, lively and vibrant city with diverse public spaces 
• a resilient city in responding to challenges and disasters 
• a sustainable city in which to live, work and have leisure  
• a moving city with appropriate public infrastructures to reduce inequality  
• a metropolis with both global and national functions, with an advanced 
economy, the centre of culture, research and political affairs and one of three 
important and major cities of south-west Asia 
Table 4-2: Visions for Tehran. Source: (TSS(C)P, 2007) 
Goals 
• Increase Tehran’s international, national and regional roles 
• Define a buffer zone for the city and fix Tehran’s boundary 
• Fix residential zones and their density, expand public spaces and services  
• Increase economic growth by maintaining the current activity zones and 
create new job opportunities  
• Conserve the environment and protect the city against natural disasters  
• Improve the connectivity and transportation system of the city by expanding 
the infrastructure of public transport  
• Improve quality of the urban environment and its spatial organisation  
• Regularise the urban landscape with attention to Iranian-Islamic architecture 
and urbanism  
• Improve the environmental quality, conserve natural and cultural heritage and 
expand public spaces of Tehran by implementing Area Action Plans and 
Thematic Plans 
Table 4-3: Goals for Tehran. Source: (TSS(C)P, 2007) 
The plan suggests a structural network for Tehran based on its historic, natural, 
movement system and functional structures. These structures are five north-
south axes and three east-west axes. Spatial organisation of the city, similar to 
previous plans, focuses on the decentralisation of the city and promotes a 
polycentric development at different levels. Zoning of functions is another 
component of this plan to segregate incompatible uses. Four zones were set 
out for the city: residential (R); business, administrative, service and industrial 
(S); mixed used (M); and green and open areas (G) (TSS(C)P, 2007).  
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Figures 4-11 and 4-12: Maps of five north-south axes and three east-west axes of 
the city. Source: (TSS(C)P, 2007) 
The construction regulations section of the plan discusses details of the 
construction density limits, access issues, the amount of open space required 
for each building and other technical issues of each of these four zones. The 
plan also elaborates on the conditions to be met in order to implement the plan 
and proposes a delivery plan (TSS(C)P, 2007). 
Figure 4-13 1:10,000 map of the Tehran Structural-Strategic (Comprehensive) 
Plan. Source: (TSS(C)P, 2007) 
District Plans of 22 regions were approved in 2012. The general part of this 
plan, the Regulations for Integrated Detail Plan of Tehran, elaborates more on 
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zoning rules and provides more details on other topics covered in the TSS(C)P. 
More details of the process of preparation of these plans will be presented in 
Chapters 7. AAP and TP are defined in the TSS(C)P to address both site-
specific and thematic issues. In total 10 AAPs and 18 TPs were proposed to be 
implemented by various municipal and governmental organisations. 
4-5 THE TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY BUDGET AND 
CONSTRUCTION DENSITY CHARGE  
4-5-1 FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE OF MUNICIPALITIES  
The importance of the independence of municipalities was emphasised in the 
first municipal laws in Iran. It was perceived that the independence of 
municipalities would only happen if they had financial independence. One of the 
important Acts which elaborates on municipal financing tools is the Urban 
Development and Redevelopment Act, approved in 1968.  
The Urban Development and Redevelopment Act describes all necessary 
details about how municipalities can collect land and property taxes to finance 
their expenditures and become financially self-sufficient. It also introduces a 
compulsory purchase right for municipalities to acquire wide areas of the city to 
develop profitable projects. Value capture tax is another suggestion of this Act 
which enables municipalities to recover from private landlords some of the value 
generated by the municipal intervention in an area. However, the Urban 
Development and Redevelopment Act was not successful in making 
municipalities self-sufficient. Farivar Sadri (2014, pp. 87-89) relates the failure of 
the Urban Development and Redevelopment Act to the low rate of land and 
property taxes considered by this act, compared to the market value of these 
lands and properties, the lack of initial fund provision to start the profitable 
projects and the lengthy process to plan and organise these financing tools. 
The other attempt towards enabling municipalities to become financially self-
sufficient was the formation of a municipality fund by Parliament approving the 
Municipal Mutual Fund Act in 1975. This fund was established as a financial 
institution in partnership with municipalities and the Government. The 
implementation of development plans could be financed by loans that the 
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municipality received from this financial institution. It was perceived that, in 
order to pay back the loan, municipalities would implement profitable projects 
(Farivar Sadri, 2014, p. 92). However, after the Islamic Revolution, the 
Government did not support this fund and finally, in 1983, Parliament approved 
the dissolution of this institution (IPI, 1983b).  
It was in Section 52 of the Budget Bill of 1983 that Parliament approved that 
Iran’s Government should prepare a three-year plan to start to phase out its 
financial assistance to municipalities (IPI, 1983a). However, there is no 
evidence for the preparation of such a plan. Finally in Iran’s First 5-year 
Development Plan (1990-1995) it was approved that, by the end of the time 
span of this plan, municipalities should be self-sufficient and financially 
independent from the government (IPI, 1990) 
Although the legislative body, the parliament, in the Budget Bill of 1983 and 
Iran’s First Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan, makes the 
Government in general, and the MoI in particular, responsible for the 
preparation of plans for municipalities to become financially independent, the 
plan was never prepared. At this stage, municipalities were under pressure to 
become financially self-sufficient as the Government was cutting their budgets.  
As a result, municipalities in general, and Tehran Municipality in particular, 
started to look for innovative tools and ways to generate income to manage 
their cities (Azizi, 2005). Changing land-use of buildings for a fee, selling 
municipal lands, increasing property taxes and privatising some services and 
sectors of municipalities were some of the ways in which Tehran Municipality 
generated income (Izadi, 2008, p. 86). However, from 1990, the major 
generator of revenue became the fees obtained from developers to allow them 
to increase the construction density of their buildings (Azizi, 2002). This 
financing tool was called ‘selling density’ for a long time but now it is called the 
excess construction density charge. 
By adopting these new approaches to generate revenue, the Tehran 
Municipality’s budget grew very fast, from IR41.2bn in 1987 to IR400bn in 1992 
and IR700bn in 1993 (Madanipour, 1998, p. 78). This financial growth in the 
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Tehran Municipality brought accusations of embezzlement for the Mayor, 
Karbaschi19, who was controversially put on trial (Madanipour, 2011, p. 88). 
4-5-2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF A PLANNING TOOL TO A 
FINANCING TOOL 
Construction density (FAR) has been used as a planning tool in the Iranian 
cities to control population growth of neighbourhoods. However, by relaxing 
construction density limits in exchange for a fee, this tool was transformed to a 
financing tool. As a result, the concept of optimum population considered by the 
plans to provide public infrastructure becomes irrelevant. 
For the first time, construction density was recognised as a planning tool to 
control the city’s population in the TCP, Tehran’s first plan. This plan proposed 
a maximum population of 5.5 million for Tehran in an area of 715 km2 during a 
25-year time span. To achieve this goal, TCP proposed different construction 
density limits throughout the city, ranging from low to high density. However, a 
piece of research carried out by the Tehran Municipality shows that, even if 
Tehran was built based on the TCP construction density regulations, its 
population would become 12 million in the 1990s (Tehran Municipality, 1991). 
After the Islamic revolution in 1979, the TCP proposals including construction 
density limits were altered by both the municipality and the Government. 
Regarding construction density, a single construction density of 120% of all land 
was set for the whole city. By combining this rule with another rule which limited 
ground coverage to a maximum of 60% on the north side, one could build a 
two-storey building on a maximum 60% of land area.  
Later, in 1984, in order to encourage construction and redevelopment in the 
southern part of the city, known as the deteriorated neighbourhoods, the city 
was divided into two construction density zones. Construction densities of a 
maximum of 120% and 180% were considered for areas located on the north 
side of Enghelab Street20 and the south side of this street respectively. 
                                                
19 Gholamhossein Karbaschi was Mayor of Tehran from 1989 until 1998. 
20 Enghelab Street (and its western extension which is Azadi Street) goes through centre of the 
city and divides the city into north and south. 
    
CHAPTER 4 – URBAN PLANNING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEHRAN 
119 
 
However, some areas of the city were excluded from this rule (Tehran 
Municipality, 1991). 
In 1991, the UPAHC passed the Increasing Density and High-Rise Building Act 
which allowed a maximum of 25% increase in the population and construction 
density of cities with over 200,000 people (UPAHC, 1991). Based on a previous 
Act approved by the UPAHC in 1987, municipalities were permitted to capture 
the value added to properties because of the increase in their construction 
density (UPAHC, 1987). These two Acts provided the legal basis for the Tehran 
Municipality to charge applicants who wanted to build property at a construction 
density higher than 120%.  
The financial needs of the Tehran Municipality encouraged this institution to 
grant permits beyond the construction density limits without any plan. By law, 
CN5 should decide about the applications asking for excess construction 
density. Apart from some controversial decisions of CN5 regarding increasing 
construction density, it bestowed decision-making power on the Tehran 
Municipality and the region’s municipalities for a long time. As a result, 
Agreements Commissions21 were formed in the region’s municipalities to reach 
agreements with the applicants. 
Agreements Commissions in regional municipalities could decide about the 
level of construction density and land-use of applications without any urban 
design framework. During the 1990s and 2000s, many applicants could get a 
construction permit to build high-rise buildings. This practice caused the 
transformation of the urban landscape very quickly (Madanipour, 2011, p. 86) 
and raised public opposition as not enough infrastructure was available as a 
result of the imposed construction density and increased population 
(Madanipour, 1998, p. 79). 
4-5-3 ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE SELLING CONSTRUCTION 
DENSITY 
In the late 1990s, the physical and social consequences of the arbitrary granting 
of construction density was emerging and the consequences of this received a 
                                                
21 In Farsi: Comesion-e Tavafoghat 
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lot of attention from the public. At this point, both CN5 and the UPAHC tried to 
intervene in the process and rein in the effects of construction density bonus by 
introducing directives. In the following sections, firstly CN5’s directives for 
buildings up to five floors and then the UPAHC directive for buildings more than 
six floors will be briefly discussed. 
4-5-3-1 COMMISSION NO. 5 DIRECTIVES  
CN5 first introduced Directive 269 and then amended this directive by approving 
Directive 329. 
DIRECTIVE 269 
In September 1997, CN5 prepared the following table to be used by regions’ 
municipalities while granting construction permissions to applicants based on 
the Increasing Density and High-Rise Building Act of the UPAHC, which was 
approved in 1991.  
                Metre M2 Width of 
passageway<12  
Width of 
passageway>12 
and <20 
Width of 
passageway>20 
Area of land <300 One storey  Two storeys  Two storeys   
300<Area of land<600 Two storeys Three storeys Three storeys 
Area of land>600 Three storeys Three storeys Four storeys 
Table 4-4: Limits of increasing construction density based on passageways’ 
width and lands’ area in Directive 269 
This table shows the maximum number of storeys that could be added to the 
original 120% (two storeys) construction density, based on the area of a land 
and the width of the street where the land is located. This means the maximum 
height of a building could be six storeys. However, in certain circumstances, 
such as in the case that the land area is very large or is located in a certain 
area, if the developer wished to build a taller building he/she could ask for 
permission from CN5 to get the permit.  
Besides the area of land and the width of street, the other necessary condition 
to get extra construction density was provision of parking for all the units, in 
piloti or underneath the building. However, in some regions where it was not 
possible to provide parking for all the units, at least 80% of parking lots should 
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be provided and the developer should pay a fee to the municipality for the 20% 
of the parking that he/she could not provide. In return, the municipality were to 
build parking elsewhere with the received money, an event which hardly ever 
happened.  
DIRECTIVE 329 
The title of this directive which was approved in February 2001 is ‘Temporary 
regulations for construction of up to 5-storey buildings in Tehran until the 
Preparation of region’s detailed plans’. This directive modifies some parts of 
directive 269.  
Based on this directive, permitting excess construction density in streets with a 
width of less than 6 m was prohibited, the maximum extra floors which could be 
added is three storeys rather than four storeys, all the necessary parking should 
be provided in regions 1 to 8 and at least 80% of parking should be provided in 
regions 9 to 21, and in five-storey buildings the minimum units’ area should be 
120m2 in regions 1 to 8 and at least 60m2 in regions 9 to 21.  
4-5-3-2 THE URBAN PLANNING AND ARCHITECTURE HIGH COUNCIL 
REGULATION 
REGULATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTING BUILDINGS WITH SIX STOREYS OR 
MORE 
In 1999, the UPAHC passed this Act in order to regulate the way tall buildings 
(with six or more storeys) were constructed without any regulation during that 
decade. However, some of the suggestions of this Act, like the optimum shape 
of the buildings, which was a pyramid, later became controversial.  
This Act set some general rules for building high-rise buildings such as the 
minimum width of a passage which should be at least 12m wide, the minimum 
space between blocks should be half of the height of the buildings and the 
building should not cut the access of winter sunlight to other buildings. This Act 
had a 1:25000 map in Appendix to show appropriate and inappropriate 
locations for high-rise constructions, based on various criteria. A more accurate 
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location map was ordered which was to be prepared by the regions’ 
municipalities within three months. This did not happen.  
4-5-4 DISPUTE OVER CONSTRUCTION DENSITY  
After Karbaschi, who was Tehran’s Mayor for nine years, Alviri became the 
Mayor and was in office for two years and eight months before resigning. Alviri 
continued Karbaschi’s route with regard to granting construction density bonus. 
This resulted in conflict between the Mayor and the newly-established First 
ICCT. This conflict concluded with the resignation of Alviri. Tehran’s First city 
council, appointed a new Mayor for Tehran, to replace Alviri, in 2002.  
The new appointed Mayor, Malekmadani, was not an advocate of the way the 
municipality was providing for the city. A few weeks after he became Mayor, he 
announced that, in Regions 1 to 7, selling construction density should be 
stopped. While Malekmadani in his interview with the press (Khabaronline, 
2016a) asserts that ICCT and the UPAHC were consulted about this decision 
before the announcement, these two institutions deny this consultation (Iranian 
Official Journal, 2002b).  
It is not clear what really happened during this period and whether the Mayor 
had any hidden agenda or was really concerned about the city. Two contrasting 
theories exist on this matter which needs researching in depth. Reactions to this 
decision were quite bold. The Members of Parliament voted for an official 
inquiry into the reasons for this decision, as it had resulted in a dramatic rise of 
the price of housing in Tehran (Iranian Official Journal, 2002a).  
The inquiry committee, in its report (Iranian Official Journal, 2002b), concluded 
that the Mayor’s decision was illegal as the ICCT was the only organisation who 
could make decisions about changes in construction density. This report made 
accusations that, after the announcement of the ceasing of this practice, the 
Mayor was still granting excess construction density in those regions, behind 
closed doors. 
In the ICCT, the members were divided in two groups, a group in favour of the 
Mayor’s decision and a group against it. This division resulted in the refusal of 
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some members to attend the Council’s meetings and, as a result, the meetings 
were not recognised as legal. Finally, because of these internal issues, the First 
ICCT was dismantled by the MoI early in 2003 (BBC Persian, 2016). 
A few days after the closure of the First ICCT, Iran’s Court of Justice issued a 
warrant for Malekmadi and he was put in jail after being in office for 10 months 
(BBC Persian, 2016). This illustrates the political complications of construction 
density in Tehran which can even result in the closure of the ICCT. More recent 
development on construction density charges will be revealed in the next 
chapters. 
4-6 THE HOUSING CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
The construction industry in Tehran was boosted in the 1990s as the Tehran 
Municipality relaxed the construction density limits which made construction a 
profitable business. Among all kind of constructions, housing construction has 
had a large share. Almost 30% of the urban land in Tehran is residential land 
(TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011, p. 297), and housing construction is the 
major construction activity in the city. Traditionally, housing construction has 
been in the hands of the private sector (Madanipour, 1998, p. 191). The 
Government’s involvement in housing production in Tehran has been limited to 
the provision of housing for public employees and the construction of new towns 
outside of the city boundaries.  
In Tehran Province, construction of residential buildings encompasses 80% of 
the total construction activities between 2011 and 2015. Table 4-5 shows the 
share of residential, mixed-use and non-residential developments in the 
construction activity of Tehran province. Figures shows that in the first six 
months of 2015, 80.9% of construction activities were in residential 
development, 7.3% in building mix-used buildings and 11.8% in non-residential 
buildings, such as industrial, educational and leisure buildings (Bank-e Markazi, 
2016, p. 17). 
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Year Residential  Mixed-use  Non-residential 
2015 (first half) 80.9% 7.3% 11.8% 
2014  83.1% 4.8% 12.1% 
2013  89.8% 4.7% 5.5% 
2012  90.9% 5.4% 3.7% 
2011  87.4% 5.9% 6.7% 
Table 4-5: Private investment in construction in Tehran Province; Source: (Bank-
e Markazi, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) 
4-6-1 HOUSING DEVELOPERS 
As mentioned previously, the private sector is the major developer in Tehran’s 
residential construction industry. Nevertheless, cooperatives and the public 
sector have made a small contribution to housing development. The World 
Bank (2004, p. 126) reports that in Iran, based on construction permits issued 
between 1996 and 2000, the private sector built 86% of new housing, housing 
cooperatives built 11% and the public sector built only 3%. 
Briefly, before looking at the private sector developers, housing cooperatives 
and the public sector’s role in housing development will be explored. Housing 
cooperatives were established in the mid-1960s to assist civil servants and low-
income families to become homeowners. However, due to land and capital 
shortages, they could not produce a large amount of housing for their members 
(Madanipour, 1998, p. 169).  
Despite the Constitution Law’s emphasis on the role of Government in housing 
provision, the contribution of the Government has been very limited. However, 
in 2007, Ahmadinejad’s Government introduced a major housing scheme, which 
was called the Mehr Housing Plan, to facilitate housing provision for low-income 
groups. The main mechanism proposed in this scheme was to reduce the price 
of residential units by removing the land price from the finished price. In order to 
achieve this objective, the Government started to lease state lands for long-term 
exploitation rights (Housing Foundation of Islamic Revolution, 2016). 
In the Mehr Housing Plan, although the Government is not the developer, it 
provides the land, mostly out of the city boundaries and in the form of new 
towns, for private and cooperative developers to construct housing units. This 
provision of land and other financial exemptions resulted in a 20% reduction in 
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the final price of the housing units (Rahpoo Sakht-e Sharestan, 2013, p. 22). 
However, the success of this housing plan in setting and achieving its goals and 
the quality of the produced housing units came under criticism (Rahpoo Sakht-e 
Sharestan, 2013).  
As mentioned previously, despite this recent scheme of the Government, the 
major housing developers were from the private sector. Madanipour (1998) 
categorises these private developers based on their organisation’s size and 
consequently the type of development they will produce. He categorises 
developers into individual developers, small construction companies, large 
construction firms and international developers (Madanipour, 1998, pp. 167). 
The latter is out of the scope of this research as they were active in the 
development industry of Iran only for a limited time before Iran’s revolution.  
An individual developer is a person who acquires a piece of land to develop and 
sell without setting up a formal company. This individual used to be a Master 
Builder but the profitability of housing construction has attracted many others, 
such as doctors and civil servants, into this business (Madanipour, 1998, p. 
167). Madanipour (1998, p. 167) explains that the individual developer, for tax 
purposes, might ask the original landowner to transfer the ownership to the final 
buyer of the property. Later, in Chapter 6, it will be explained that, in many 
cases, the developer might establish a partnership with the landowner. 
By establishing a small construction company, an individual developer can 
become a formal developer and secure a legal place for itself in the construction 
industry. However, to develop land, the developer does not need to be a 
registered company. Both the individual developer and the small construction 
company supervise a team of workers and contractors during the construction 
(Madanipour, 1998, p. 167).  
Large construction firms began to be formed in the mid-20th century at the time 
when Tehran’s population started to grow rapidly and the demand for housing 
increased. This category of developers could build any sort of building from a 
row of houses to a new town. Rapid increases in the number and scope of 
these large developers reached its peak in the 1970s. Shahrak-e Gharb and 
Shahrara new towns are some examples of the constructions of these large 
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developers in Tehran before the revolution. After a few decades of slowdown in 
activities of this type of developer, in the 1990s they began to be active again 
(Madanipour, 1998, pp. 167-168).  
4-6-2 INVESTMENT IN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 
The main purpose of developing housing units, historically, was for one’s own 
use. However, this purpose had changed over time; and exchange value 
became an important element in housing production. It was in the 1970s that 
housing production for self-use declined and housing production for sale, 
because of its exchange value, peaked (Madanipour, 1998, pp. 173-174). After 
the revolution in the 1980s, once again the rate of development for own use 
was higher than the development for sale, due to the economic situation of the 
country as a result of the war and also because of land regulations set by the 
Government. In the 1990s, again the rate of development for sale started to 
increase (Madanipour, 1998, pp. 174-175).  
The exchange value of the property has been a detrimental factor for both 
construction for use and for sale as both are ultimately meant for sale and are 
expected to increase the surplus value. Housing construction has been a 
secure form of investment in Tehran. Athari and Yazdani (2008) in their paper 
found that, between 1973 and 2001, 23% of private investment was attracted to 
housing real estate while only 18% was attracted to manufacturing. This means 
that the housing industry was a strong sector which had diverted private 
investment from manufacturing into the property market. 
All of this resulted in the emergence of a type of development agent which 
Athari (2007) calls ‘the landed property bourgeoisie’. Athari and Yazdani (2008) 
believe that the landed property bourgeoisie was looking to increase their profit 
margin by increasing the exchange value of real estate by influencing laws and 
institutions. This group of developers had gained a lot of economic and social 
powers and selling excess construction density had added to their power (Athari 
& Yazdani, 2008). 
The ever-growing demand for housing and the reality of land scarcity 
contributed to make housing construction a secure form of investment in Tehran 
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and increased the exchange value of residential buildings. Demand for housing 
had risen dramatically in Tehran. Population growth, as a result of the 
continuous flow of immigrants to the capital city and natural growth of the 
population, was the main reason for an increase in the demand for housing. The 
other contributory factor was the change that happened in the structure of 
households from the extended family to the nuclear family which caused more 
demand for housing units. The improvement in living standards, for example the 
number of persons per room, also worked as a trigger to increase the demand 
for more dwellings (Madanipour, 1998, p. 140).  
Lack of effective land-use regulations for a long period of time, fiscal 
decentralisation policies of the government, and introduction of excess 
construction density charge made housing construction a profitable industry. 
Many individuals and companies with access to capital were attracted to this 
business. Financial dependence of the Tehran Municipality to housing 
developers increased the power of these developers which affected the 
interrelationship of developers, the municipality and the planning system. 
Chapters 6 and 7 will investigate this relationship in detail by presenting primary 
data collected in Tehran.     
4-7 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this chapter was to provide background information about Tehran, its 
urban planning and management mechanism, the importance of construction 
density for the municipality and the housing construction industry of Tehran.  
Tehran was a village until the 16th century when it started to attract the 
attention of kings. In the 18th century Tehran’s importance was growing 
gradually until 1785 when Tehran was chosen as the capital city of Iran. 
Development pressure during the late 19th and the early 20th century resulted 
in the expansion of the city, mostly towards the north and west.  
Now Tehran is a polycentric city with almost eight million inhabitants 
accommodated in area of more than 600 km2. The city suffers physical, social 
and economic polarisation between the north and south. While the northern 
part, with its moderate climate, accommodates the wealthier residents and has 
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a lower population density, the southern part, with a harsher climate, 
accommodates less well-off families and has a higher population density.  
The urban governance of Tehran is sectoral and fragmented. Although Tehran 
Municipality, in conjunction with the ICCT, runs the city, many public 
organisations are involved to provide services for the city. With regard to 
decision making for the city, based on law, the UPAHC has the highest position 
to make decisions for Iranian cities, e.g. approving the comprehensive plans of 
cities. However, more specific decisions are left to CN5 of each city which 
works closely with the municipality of that city. 
Providing formal plans to guide the future growth of the city were recognised in 
the Municipality Act Amendments approved in 1967 and then the approval of 
the Urban Development and Redevelopment Act in 1968. Consequently, an 
American-Iranian consortium prepared Tehran’s first Comprehensive Plan to 
manage the growth of the city for the next 25 years. The main proposal of the 
TCP was the introduction of a polycentric expansion for the city with a 
comprehensive network of highways to connect these centres. The plan was 
abandoned after the 1979 Islamic revolution.  
After the revolution, Tehran grew without plans until 1991, when the second 
plan was prepared for the city. The second plan had two main strategies; one to 
pursue polycentric development of Tehran but in a different arrangement from 
the TCP and the other one, to control population growth of the capital. Despite 
extensive research in the preparation of this plan, Tehran Municipality refrained 
from implementing it. The Mayor of the time asked the municipality regions to 
prepare detailed plans of regions, based on the TCP, and ignored the new plan.  
Despite approval of some directives and regulations about construction density 
and building regulations, the city did not have an approved planning document 
to follow. At that time the urgent need for a plan encouraged the municipality 
and the Government to form an agency to facilitate collaboration between the 
different stakeholders involved in the planning process. 22 consultant 
companies were appointed to prepare a plan of each region and a consultant 
company was appointed to facilitate the work of those 22 companies. The 
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TSS(C)P of Tehran was approved in 2007. However, it took another five years 
to approve the detailed plans of each region which became controversial. 
The main characteristics of the TSS(C)P of Tehran were setting a vision for the 
city and proposing a set of strategies based on the recognised structures of the 
city. This plan, as previous plans, encouraged the polycentric development of 
the city. The plan divides the city into four zones and proposes regulations for 
each zone of the city. 22 DPs (detailed plans of 22 regions), 10 AAPs and 18 
TPs were prepared to support the vision of the TSS(C)P. 
In the 1980s while Tehran had been growing without a plan, Tehran Municipality 
started to grant extra construction density to fund its expenditures. In 1983 the 
Government decided to cease its financial assistance to municipalities. Tehran 
Municipality stared to use innovative ways to generate income; the most 
controversial of which was excess construction density charge. As a result, 
construction density which was a planning tool became a financing tool. Before 
the approval of Tehran’s recent plan, the UPAHC and CN5 tried to legalise 
Tehran Municipality’s activities by setting regulations on construction density, 
the success of which was questionable.  
Granting extra construction density in conjunction with other political and 
economic factors boosted housing construction activity in Tehran in the1990s. 
More than 80% of housing construction had been in the hands of the private 
sector; individuals who were not a registered company, could become involved 
in the housing development industry, as it was not mandatory to be a company 
to construct buildings. Besides these individual developers, small construction 
companies, large construction firms and, in rare cases, international developers 
were active in the production of housing units in Tehran.  
The profitability of housing construction has diverted private investment from 
manufacturing into property markets. To increase the profit margin, developers 
try to influence laws and institutions. Raising the barrier of construction density 
has given developers more power to influence the law. 
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5-1 INTRODUCTION 
While the previous chapter provided contextual information about Tehran, its 
development and management mechanism, this chapter focuses on some 
characteristics of Tehran’s regions. Although the term ‘divided city’, which is 
used as the title of this chapter, refers to a specific discourse in urban studies 
(political, social and physical contestation), here it is merely used to focus on 
how the city is sub-divided into regions for administrative reasons. First, the 
focus is on the whole city, how it is divided into regions and what are the 
specific characteristics of these regions in comparison with others. The focus 
will then shift towards details of five northern regions which are where this 
research will concentrate.  
Secondary sources of information are used to prepare this chapter; most of the 
quantitative information is taken from statistics provided by the Statistical Centre 
of Iran (SCI) or the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (MRUD). By 
compiling and analysing the raw statistical information it has been possible to 
present relevant findings. Alongside statistics, detailed information about each 
region was obtained from mostly unpublished reports by consultant companies 
who prepared District Plans of those regions. 
5-2 DIVIDING THE CITY 
Tehran has 22 administrative regions (Figure 5-1). There are however another 
19 organisations which provide services for the city and these have their own 
sub-divisions. They do not always follow the same pattern as the municipality’s 
divisions, each of which has their own mayor and are under the control and 
supervision of the Tehran Municipality and the Tehran Mayor. 
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Figure 5-1: 22 Administrative regions of Tehran 
5-2-1 METHODOLOGY OF DIVIDING THE CITY 
The methodology behind the way the city has been divided into regions is not 
clear. However, it seems to be based on the size and population density of the 
different areas; at the time of division there was an attempt to have regions with 
similar-sized populations. The boundaries of the separate regions were mainly 
defined by natural barriers, such as river valleys, or by the city’s main streets, 
for example the axis of Azadi Street, Enghelab Street and Damavand Road is a 
borderline dividing the northern regions from the southern regions (Mohandesin 
Moshaver ATEC, 1988). 
The divisions were implemented by experts of the SCI in 1980 by the order of 
the Economic Mobilisation Campaign22 (Mohandesin Moshaver ATEC, 1988, p. 
69). Originally the city was divided into 20 regions. Later, in 2004, Region 21, 
which used to be a part of Region 9, became a separate region and Region 22, 
which was outside of the city, became part of the city in 2000. It should be 
                                                
22 In Farsi: Setad-e Basij-e Eghtesadi. This campaign was formed to reduce the pressure of 
economic crisis during wartime; to make it possible to distribute basic necessities to the 
residents they needed to divide the city. 
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mentioned that the boundaries of some regions have changed slightly since that 
time.  
In some regions, the physical, social and economic heterogeneities throughout 
those regions are considerable. For example, in Region 4 there is a 
considerable difference between the average incomes of residents of Kooy-e 
Golestan on the western border of the region, which is an affluent area, and 
residents of Khak-Sefid, which is one of the most deprived areas of the city 
(Mohandesin Moshaver ATEC, 1988, p. 70). Each region is also divided into 
further sub-regions and these can include several neighbourhoods. Before the 
official administrative division of regions was introduced each neighbourhood 
used to have an unofficial name which are numbers now (Sharan, 2005). 
5-2-2 COMPARING THE REGIONS 
This section will look at some of the different statistics from these 22 regions. 
These and other considerations which will be unfolded in this chapter, have 
resulted in the choice of Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as locations for this research. 
However, not all the areas of each region are homogeneous.  
5-2-2-1 THE NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS 
Table 5-1 shows the number of housing construction permits issued by the 
Tehran Municipality between 2010 and 2014. On average, 20,000 permits have 
been issued each year. Tehran Municipality does not have any defined target of 
how many permits should be granted each year. The number of permits granted 
depends on the number of applicants wanting to construct on vacant land or 
reconstruct a developed site23.  
As Table 5-1 shows, the number of permits can vary from one year to another, 
for example, there is a difference of 11,000 between the number of permits 
granted in 2013 and those in 2014. The reason behind the difference varies 
and, in the next chapter, we will look at some of the reasons for this variation as 
mentioned by the interviewees. 
                                                
23 The number of constructions completed in a year is not necessarily the same as the number 
of permits granted in that year as construction can happen within two years of the permission 
being granted.  
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of granted construction permits 17,022 29,763 23,757 21,244 10,129 
Table 5-1: Construction permits issued between 2010 and 2014. Source: (SCI, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
The total number of permits granted for housing development in each region 
varies. Not all regions have the same number of permits granted. The following 
figure (Figure 5-2) shows the contribution of each region in terms of the overall 
number of construction permits issued between 2010 and 2014.  
 
Figure 5-2: Number of permits granted in the 22 regions of Tehran between 2010 
and 2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)  
Figure 5-2 shows which regions received the highest number of permits each 
year: Regions 5, 15, 14 and 8 in 2010, Regions 15, 4, 2 and 14 in 2011, 
Regions 8, 4, 2 and 14 in 2012, Regions 15, 4, 5 and 14 in 2013 and Regions 4, 
15, 2 and 8 in 2014.  
Regions 2, 4, 5, 8, 14 and 15 are the regions with the highest amount of 
housing construction permits granted during the five-year period. The reasons 
behind this trend need close examination in order to provide an explanation. 
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However, the availability of vacant lands in newer regions (e.g. Region 2, 4 and 
5) and the incentives for reconstruction in areas recognised as deteriorated 
neighbourhoods (large parts of regions 14 and 15 are recognised as 
deteriorated areas) must have played a role in attracting developers and 
landowners to apply for permission in these regions.  
5-2-2-2 FLOOR AREAS OF PERMITS 
The following figure (Figure 5-3) shows that although Regions 8, 14 and 15 are 
among those where the number of permits issued are high, the floor area to be 
built is not as great as in some northern regions, such as Region 1. This implies 
that in those Regions (8, 14, 15) the buildings to be constructed are not large 
developments or high-rise buildings. Figure 5-3 shows the floor area that the 
housing unit gave permission for in each region between 2010 and 2014.  
 
Figure 5-3: Amount of permitted floor areas in the 22 regions between 2010 and 
2014. Based on the data of (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)  
According to Figure 5-3, permissions for the largest floor areas have been 
given, respectively, in Regions 1, 22, 5, 2, 4, and 3 in 2010, in Regions 1, 4, 5, 2 
and 3 in 2011, in Regions 1, 5, 4, 2 and 3 in 2012, in Regions 22, 5, 2, 1, 4 and 
3 in 2013, and in Regions 2, 5, 4, 1, 22 and 3 in 2014. To sum up, Regions 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 22 are the regions given planning permission for developments with 
the largest floor area between 2010 and 2014. Although the number of permits 
in some of these regions are not as high as in Regions 8, 14 and 15, this is 
explained that each permit allows construction of a bigger building in either 
width or height by exceeding construction density limits. 
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Despite the spike in the construction of high-rise buildings in Region 22, the 
region is not chosen as one of the locations included in this research. Region 22 
annexed to Tehran recently and the story of its development is different from 
the other regions. There have been large undeveloped land plots in this region 
which have been released by the government for construction to governmental 
and co-operative institutions.  
5-2-2-3 POPULATION GROWTH 
The map in Figure 5-4 shows the population densities of areas in 1996. 
Population density in the southern regions of the city is higher than the northern 
regions. However, in the future this distribution of population may change, as 
population growth in the northern regions is rising. Figure 5-5 shows that 
between1986 and 1996 the highest population growth per year belonged to 
Regions 2 and 5 and then Regions 1, 3, 4, 13 and 15. With the exception of 
regions 13 and 15, the other regions with high rates of population growth are 
those in the north where the size of floor area of construction permits is also 
high. This implies that migration to these northern regions from other regions, 
both inside and outside of the city, is high as, for various reasons, these regions 
are perceived as being attractive. 
 
Figure 5-4: Population densities in built up areas of Tehran in 1996. Source: 
(Bertaud, 2003, p. 26) 
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Figure 5-5: Population growth per year per region between 1986 and 1996. 
Source: (Bertaud, 2003, p. 29) 
Table 5-2: population growth in 10 year per region between 1996 and 2006. Based 
on the data of (SCI, 2006) 
Regions 
Population 
1996 Population 2006 Growth rate in 10 years 
R 1 249676 379962 1.52 
R 2 458089 608814 1.33 
R 3 259019 290726 1.12 
R 4 663166 822580 1.24 
R 5 427955 679108 1.59 
R 6 220331 237292 1.08 
R 7 300212 310184 1.03 
R 8 336474 378725 1.13 
R 9 173482 165903 0.96 
R 10 282308 315619 1.12 
R 11 225840 275241 1.22 
R 12 189625 248048 1.31 
R 13 245142 245724 1.00 
R 14 394611 483432 1.23 
R 15 622517 644259 1.03 
R 16 298410 291169 0.97 
R 17 287367 256022 0.89 
R 18 296243 317188 1.07 
R 19 227389 249786 1.10 
R 20 356079 335634 0.94 
R 21 188890 159793 0.84 
R 22 56020 108674 1.94 
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A more recent report prepared by the SCI (summarised in Table 5-2) shows 
that, while the population of Regions 9, 16, 17, 20 and 21 has decreased 
between 1996 and 2006, the rest of the regions have experienced an increase 
in population. Among the regions experiencing growth in population, Regions 
22, 5, 1 and 2 have gained first to forth places respectively. 
5-2-2-4 HOUSING AND LAND PRICE 
The following table (Table 5-3) shows the average purchase price of a housing 
unit per square metre in the 22 regions of Tehran between 2010 and 2015. 
Based on the numbers in this table, which was collected by the MRUD, Region 
1 is the most expensive region of Tehran in which to purchase a housing unit. 
After which Regions 3, 2, 6, 5 and 4 are in second to sixth positions 
respectively.  
         
Year 
Regions 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 33,918 40,189 60,614 87,173 92,183 95,164 
2 23,560 28,198 42,181 56,817 60,699 62,903 
3 29,158 34,429 50,872 73,253 77,989 79,241 
4 18,212 21,117 31,950 42,150 44,227 44,624 
5 18,158 22,252 33,978 45,388 47,119 45,566 
6 21,882 25,525 38,537 54,312 56,360 57,217 
7 17,142 20,578 31,090 41,939 42,973 42,853 
8 16,792 19,975 29,663 39,583 40,976 40,527 
9 12,055 13,970 20,071 26,158 27,810 27,314 
10 12,490 14,554 20,857 27,470 28,555 27,433 
11 13,488 15,399 21,912 28,560 30,522 30,153 
12 12,632 14,208 20,593 26,480 29,326 28,743 
13 15,173 18,223 27,479 35,776 38,260 37,481 
14 13,276 15,547 23,195 30,788 32,436 31,686 
15 11,043 12,536 17,531 24,397 25,010 23,887 
16 10,524 12,697 17,180 20,596 23,640 24,054 
17 10,234 11,509 15,164 19,713 21,650 21,715 
18 9,401 10,717 14,947 19,136 21,110 20,758 
19 10,803 12,261 15,405 20,490 22,415 23,759 
20 9,929 11,353 15,701 18,351 20,123 22,503 
21 12,368 14,679 21,730 28,108 29,641 28,789 
22 14,339 18,615 27,777 36,753 38,520 36,560 
Table 5-3: Average purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in the 22 
regions between 2010 and 2015 (in Thousands Rial). Source: (MRUD, 2016a) 
However, figures in the following table (Table 5-4) suggests that the price of 
land per square metre does not follow the same pattern of price per housing 
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unit. Figures show that between 2010 and 2015 land prices in Region 3 had 
been the highest in Tehran, except in 2011 when Region 1 took the first place. 
After Region 3, Region 1 mostly has had the second place in land price, except 
in 2011 and 2010. Regions 6, 2, 5 and 7 are the next most expensive regions in 
terms of land price.  
       Year 
Regions 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 16,766 54,308 77,913 123,814 132,597 112,232 
2 18,750 36,621 61,505 70,596 85,735 80,348 
3 35,256 49,979 82,983 124,135 136,736 116,245 
4 16,334 29,790 45,858 67,578 68,292 53,559 
5 18,844 31,221 48,323 54,876 70,369 62,573 
6 27,446 42,223 57,664 88,431 94,096 85,303 
7 21,984 28,420 47,641 62,355 74,761 77,694 
8 17,430 28,407 42,610 58,177 66,882 60,600 
9 11,185 14,570 19,212 37,324 33,852 22,850 
10 11,225 16,562 25,141 33,321 32,619 31,093 
11 13,699 18,518 26,359 41,397 49,464 44,904 
12 12,554 15,341 22,749 35,200 40,602 35,580 
13 17,554 25,568 38,830 52,720 47,752 53,476 
14 15,109 21,190 30,783 41,696 44,190 48,920 
15 8,157 14,394 20,214 25,182 27,882 24,916 
16 7,468 17,565 14,286 23,908 26,212 28,203 
17 8,316 14,092 17,043 29,983 35,400 23,616 
18 6,062 10,560 16,069 22,213 23,684 22,525 
19 6,930 16,347 13,008 22,151 25,699 27,973 
20 - 11,766 15,561 16,426 20,485 17,927 
21 9,251 14,394 20,857 43,224 37,892 - 
22 12,439 20,305 33,663 51,044 49,000 45,981 
Table 5-4: Average purchase price per square metre of land in the 22 regions 
between 2010 and 2015 (in Thousands Rial). Source: (MRUD, 2016a) 
As the above figures show, the prices of housing and urban land are increasing 
most in the northern regions of Tehran between 2010 and 2015. However, the 
inflation rate should be considered in order to be able to say whether real prices 
have been increasing or not. Based on the Central Bank of Iran’s (CBI) report 
(CBI, 2017), the inflation rate of Iran has fluctuated between minimum of 11.9% 
and maximum of 34.7% between 2010 and 2015. Table 5-5 shows the inflation 
rate of the country during the mentioned time. If the inflation rate is deducted 
from the prices shown above, it still means that prices are mostly growing in the 
northern regions.  
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Year  Inflation rate  
2010 12.4% 
2011 21.5% 
2012 30.5% 
2013 34.7% 
2014 15.6% 
2015 11.9% 
Table 5-5: Inflation rate between 2010 and 2015. Source: (CBI, 2017) 
Moreover, although average prices enable us to compare the prices between 
different regions, it should be borne in mind that the average prices do not 
represent the actual prices, as the regions are not homogenous. There are 
regions, for example Region 4, that have very high prices at one end of the 
scale and very low at the other.  
5-2-2-5 COMMISSION NO. 5 (CN5) DECISIONS 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, one of CN5’s responsibilities is to decide 
about cases that are not in line with the approved detailed plans of regions, 
such as, the change in use of a land/property and an increase in construction 
density of a plot (Moeini, 2006, pp. 37-38). The following figure (Figure 5-6) 
shows the amount of decisions that CN5 made in Tehran’s regions between 
1989 and 2000.24  
Figure 5-6: Distribution and amount of CN5 directives in the Tehran regions 
between 1989 and 2000 (Moeini, 2006, p. 41) 
                                                
24 Regions 21 and 22 are not in this table as they were not part of Tehran at that time.  
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Although the figure in Figure 5-6 is not up to date25, it still shows that the 
number of requests to get permits beyond regulations are higher in the northern 
regions. In order, Regions 1, 5, 2, 4 and 3 are the regions with the highest 
amount of decisions made by the commission. Based on Moeini’s (2006) 
research, more than 59% of CN5’s directives are allocated to Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 5.  
5-3 SELECTED REGIONS 
This section investigates the characteristics of Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in more 
detail. These regions are the focus of this research and are where most of the 
interviews were conducted. 
These five regions share the same characteristics: they are under pressure to 
accommodate more housing; they are witnessing a high rate of population 
growth; the price of land and housing units are higher than the other areas of 
the city; and the numbers of requests from CN5 to get permits are noticeably 
higher than the other regions.  
Based on the information presented above it could be argued that Regions 6 
and 22 should also be included in this research. However, Region 22 was 
annexed to Tehran in 2000 and both the availability of land and the change in 
regulations have caused a rapid growth in that region making it a concern for a 
separate investigation. Region 6 is not included in this research as this region is 
under pressure for commercial development rather than residential 
development. Although the land and housing price are high in this region, the 
demand is mostly for commercial, institutional and service uses (Naqsh-e 
Jahan-Pars Consultants, 2005). 
The following sections will look at inter- and intra-regional differences between 
these regions by looking at their population growth, the property market activity 
and the pressure for development. Most of the information used in these 
sections has been researched from development patterns and detailed plans 
                                                
25 During the field trip to Tehran in September 2015, the author attempted to update the number 
of decisions of Commission No. 5, but the Commission’s decisions’ archive was not made 
accessible for researchers. 
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and reports prepared by consultant companies working in these regions. In 
addition to consultant companies’ reports, websites of the Region’s 
municipalities were used to find the required data. Statistics from the SCI were 
also used to understand the development rate of these regions. 
5-3-1 INTRODUCING THE FIVE REGIONS 
Figure 5-7 shows a map giving the position of these five Regions in Tehran. All 
these Regions are located in the northern half of the city and on the mountain 
slopes. Regions 1, 2, 4 and 5 in the north are limited by the mountain ranges 
while Region 3 is extended to the south of Region 1. 
 
Figure 5-7: Locations of Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
Each Region is comprised of a few sub-regions and each sub-region represents 
a number of neighbourhoods. Region 1 with an area of 3,605 hectares consists 
of 10 sub-regions (Figure 5-8). Region 2 is approximately 5,000 hectares and 
has nine sub-regions, which are shown in Figure 5-9, and 14 neighbourhoods. 
Region 3, with an area of 2,945 hectares, has six sub-regions and 11 
neighbourhoods (Figure 5-10). Region 4, with an area of 7,033 hectares, is the 
largest and most populated region; this region has nine sub-regions (Figure 5-
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11). Region 5, with an area of 5,287 hectares, has seven sub-regions and 29 
neighbourhoods (Figure 5-12).  
 
Figure 5-8: Sub-regions of Region 1. Source: (Shahrdari Mantagheh 1, 2016) 
 
Figure 5-9: Sub-regions of Region 2. Source: (Shahrdari Mantagheh 2, 2016) 
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Figure 5-10: Sub-regions of Region 3 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Sub-regions of Region 4. Source: (Shahrdari Mantagheh 4, 2016a) 
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Figure 5-12: Sub-regions of Region 5. Source: (Shahrdari Mantagheh 5, 2016) 
5-3-2 LAND USE 
The most frequent land use in all of these five regions is residential use. These 
regions used to be villages and farms, located outside of the city and became 
part of the city after the expansion of its boundaries. However, these regions 
are changing as more commercial and tourist development is under 
construction.  
Most of the area of Region 1 is allocated to residential use and is well known for 
accommodating international diplomatic residencies. In fact, 1.7% of the whole 
region (equal to 61,039 hectares) is allocated to international diplomatic 
residencies (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 22). It benefits from many public and private 
green spaces and gardens. Historically this region has been famous for its 
natural resources (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 24) and today 22% of the region is still 
green space; 3% public green space, 3% semi-public green space and 16% is 
private green spaces (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 18). However, approximately 45% of 
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the private gardens in the region have been destroyed between 1991 and 2001. 
Sub-region 2 of the region witnessed the most of this garden conversion. This 
phenomenon has affected the ecology of the area (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 19). 
Leisure is another major use of land in this region. Many of the employees’ 
clubs of ministries and organisations and recreational camps are located in this 
region. In total 1.65% of the area is allocated to this function (Baft Shahr, 2005, 
p. 23). Region 1 has the lowest number of economic units (commercial activity) 
in Tehran. Only 2% of all the economic ventures of the city are located in this 
Region (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 21). However, recently a lot of shopping centres 
are emerging which will change the figures in the future.  
Region 2 historically has been a residential region. 1,480 hectares, equal to 
30%, of the Region, is residential. 17% by area of the Region is allocated to 
public service, 11% to green spaces and parks, 3% to infrastructure, 2% to 
private gardens, 1% to commercial, 1% to institutions, 7% of the area is vacant 
land or under construction and almost 30% of the region is the road network 
(Saravand, 2005, p. 2, 5).  
The Sarvand Consultant Vompany (2005, p. 6) reports that there is a tendency 
in the region to develop for tourist and intra-regional activities. As a result, the 
development of non-residential uses is expanding in the region. The 
construction of three five-star hotels and the Yademan Complex, which includes 
the Milad Telecommunication Tower with several concert halls and restaurants, 
are evidence of this kind of non-residential development.  
The dominant use of Region 3 is also residential which occupies 39.2% of the 
region. The other uses are green space (9.4%), administrative (6.5%), sport 
facilities (3.9%), commercial (3.4%), educational and higher education institutes 
(2.5%) and cultural facilities (2.2%). Religious facilities, infrastructure, military 
and industrial uses also exist in this region but are a small portion. Road 
networks occupy 23.2% of the area of this region (Sharan, 2005, p. 4).  
In addition to the residential use, Region 3 enjoys a number of trans-regional 
uses (Sharan, 2005). Two large-scale trans-regional sites are located in the 
Region; they are mainly in sub-regions 1 and 4. One of these sites is in the 
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northwest of the Region with an area of 500 hectares and includes the 
International Exhibition Centre, the Enghelab Complex, the Park Mellat, the 
Khatam-ol Anbiya Hospital and some other facilities. The other one is on Abbas 
Abad hills with a 350 hectare area which includes the National Library, the 
Taleghani Park, the Central Bank and other major buildings (Sharan, 2005, p. 
2). 
Commercial and office uses are growing in Region 3 and it is obvious that, as 
the commercial use increases, so the residential use will decrease (Sharan, 
2005). In this respect the Sharan Consultant Company (2005) reports that many 
housing units in this region have been converted to offices and commercial use 
without official permission from the municipality. 
Region 4, historically, used to be a hunting ground for the king, an unloading 
ground (e.g. in Khak-Sefid neighbourhood) for commodities coming from 
eastern cities, a number of military areas and some industries (Arseh, 2006, p. 
116). It was in the 1960s that the first residential neighbourhood of the region 
was built (northern Narmak neighbourhood) (Arseh, 2006, p. 118). At the 
moment 17% of the region is used by the military which is a considerably large 
proportion (Arseh, 2006, p. 116).  
Historically, Region 5 used to be open land with scattered villages, such as Kan 
village (Sharmand, 2005, p. 1). The physical development of the region has 
happened in the last 50 years and mostly during the 80s and 90s (Sharmand, 
2005, p. 1, 2). Region 5 is mostly a residential region and 27.3% of the region is 
in residential use. Green spaces and gardens occupy, respectively, 7.5% and 
9.5% of this region (Sharmand, 2005, p. 10). Sharmand Consultant Company 
(2005) reports that, at the time of their data collection, 10% of the region lay 
vacant and unbuilt which provides a definite development opportunity. This 
region used to have large gardens which have been destroyed and replaced by 
housing apartments in recent years (Sharmand, 2005, p. 18).  
5-3-3 POPULATION 
These five regions are experiencing population growth as a result of 
immigration from other areas of the city. However, in most parts, the population 
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density of these five regions is still lower than some southern regions of the city. 
Education and the income rate of residents of these five regions, with 
exceptions in some parts of Region 4, are higher than Tehran’s average. 
Region 1 accommodates 3.7% of Tehran’s population (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 21). 
Population growth in this region is higher than in other regions of the city. The 
population growth rate of this region per year between 1986–1996 was 1.44% 
while the average growth rate in Tehran in the same period was 1.13% (Baft 
Shahr, 2005, p. 21). However, whilst the natural population growth of the region 
is 0.9%, in Tehran this growth is 1.5%. This nevertheless shows that the birth 
rate in the area is lower than Tehran’s average (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 21). 
The growth in population of this region is mostly due to the high rate of 
immigration which is 3.9% compared with Tehran’s immigration rate which is 
3.7% (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 21). Immigrants to this region are affluent residents 
who move from other regions of the city (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 19). The following 
table shows the population growth of the region between 1976 and 2006.  
Year 1976 1986 1996 2006 
Population 182,883 216,467 249,676 379,962 
Table 5-6: Population of region 1 between 1976 and 2006. Data sources: (TMICTO 
& Tehran University, 2011, p. 78) 
Although the population growth rate is high in this region, its population density 
is 67.3 persons per hectare which is lower than Tehran’s average which is 92 
persons per hectare (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 19). The portion of people educated 
to higher education level is high in this area and many of the city’s highly-skilled 
workers live in this region (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 25). 
Region 2 which is located on the west side of Region 1, began to take shape in 
the 1950s and its population has grown quickly since then (Saravand, 2005, p. 
1). It was forecast that in 2016, the population of the region would be 640,361 
(Shahrdari Mantagheh 2, 2016). The following table shows the population of the 
region in 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006.  
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Year  1976 1986 1996 2006 
Population 220,545 269,482 458,089 608,814 
Table 5-7: population of region 2 between 1976 and 2006. Based on the data of: 
(TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011, p. 78) 
The population density of the region is 93 persons per hectare (Shahrdari 
Mantagheh 2, 2016) which is 1% more than Tehran’s average at 92 persons per 
hectare. However, this population density is not equally distributed throughout 
the region. Based on the 1996 census, 39% of the region’s population lives in 
the northern part (which comprises 53% of the area of the region) and 61% lives 
in the southern side of the region (which comprises 46% of the area of the 
region). This shows that the population density of the southern side of the 
region is more than the northern part.  
This uneven distribution of the population in northern and southern parts of 
Region 2, has affected the quality of life in these two parts. The northern part 
benefits from a higher floor space for public space and amenities per person 
compared with the southern part.  
The region has a high level of literacy and 95% of the residents are literate, 
which is 5% more than Tehran’s average (Saravand, 2005, p. 2) and many of its 
residents are high-income residents (Saravand, 2005, p. 8). These high-income 
residents prefer to live in the northern part of the region which has resulted in a 
heterogeneity in the social and economic fabric of residents of the northern and 
southern areas (Mohandesin Moshaver ATEC, 1988, p. 69) 
Region 3, which is located on the southern side of Region 1 and eastern side of 
Region 2, has not experienced the same level of population growth between 
1976 and 2006 as Regions 1 and 2. This is probably because this region had 
joined Tehran long before Regions 1 and 2. The following table (Table 5-8) 
shows the population growth of the region between 1976 and 2006. As the table 
suggests, the region has had population growth except in 1986 when the 
population of the region reduced.  
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Year  1976 1986 1996 2006 
Population 222,007 217,084 259,019 290,726 
Table 5-8: population of Region 3 between 1976 and 2006. Based on the data of: 
(TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011, p. 78) 
Although the population growth of the region is not high (Sharan, 2005) 
compared with Regions 1 and 2, it is still higher than the cap suggested by the 
former plans of the region (Sharan, 2005). The main reason for the population 
growth in this region is immigration from other regions of the city as the rise in 
the birth rate is low (Sharan, 2005).  
Residents of this region are mostly high-income, skilled workers. The average 
income of households in this region is twice the average of households in 
Tehran (Sharan, 2005). The region is known as one of the more affluent areas 
of the city. Based on the 1996 census, 49.3% of the working population of the 
region are high-ranking civil workers, academics and technical employees 
(Sharan, 2005). However, this distinction has decreased lately and the region is 
becoming more middle-class (Sharan, 2005).  
As mentioned before, commercial and office use is growing in Region 3 and this 
has been reflected in the day and night population of the region. Sharan (2005) 
reports that the day population of the region is more than its night population 
and the difference between these two is growing as people come to work and 
visit this area instead of living there. 
Region 4, which is located on the eastern side of Regions 1 and 3, with 864,946 
residents is the most populated region and has 11% of Tehran’s population 
(Shahrdari Mantagheh 4, 2016b). The following table (Table 5-9) shows the 
population growth of the region in 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006. Population 
growth in this region has been above Tehran’s average. The growth was 3.3% 
between 1986 and 1996 while Tehran’s average was 1.1% and was 5.3% 
between 1996 and 2006 while Tehran’s average was 1.6% (Arseh, 2006a, p. 6).  
Year   1976 1986 1996 2006 
R 4 316,904 479,512 663,166 822,580 
Table 5-9: population of region 4 between 1976 and 2006. Based on the data of: 
(TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011, p. 78) 
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In general, there is a drastic social and economic difference between the 
western and eastern edge of the region. While the western sub-regions of the 
region (closer to Regions 1 and 3) accommodate residents with higher income 
and education with less population density per residential unit, the residents of 
the eastern sub-regions are mostly poorer with less well-educated people and a 
high population density (Arseh, 2006, pp. 52- 55). These social-economic 
variations have also translated into the built environment of the region. The 
eastern side of the region has subdivisions of a smaller size and has a poorer-
quality environment.  
Although the whole region’s literacy average is higher than Tehran’s average 
(with 92.4% compared to 90.06%), there is a difference between its 
neighbourhoods. While in the western sub-regions 98% of residents are 
educated, in some neighbourhoods located in the central and eastern parts of 
the region the rate of educated residents is around 84% which is lower than 
Tehran’s average (Arseh, 2006, p. 32, 33) 
Region 5, which is located to the western side of Region 2, is a relatively new 
region and its population has been growing fast. This region is a popular 
destination for migrants from other cities and from other regions of the city. It is 
mostly a dormitory region with its residents working outside of the region. In 
terms of education, the region is above Tehran’s average education rate. The 
unemployment rate is lower in this region than Tehran’s average. Income of the 
residents is above Tehran’s average and is in the upper-middle class category 
(Sharmand, 2005, p. 13).  
The following table (Table 5-10) shows the population of Region 5 between 
1976 and 2006. The population of the region grew by a factor of 10 between 
1976 and 2006.  
Year   1976 1986 1996 2006 
Population 67,199 243,824 427,955 679,108 
Table 5-10: population of region 5 between 1976 and 2006. Based on the data of: 
(TMICTO & Tehran University, 2011, p. 78) 
These five regions are all gaining in population due to immigration rather than 
natural growth as a result of births. Residents of Regions 1, north of 2 and east 
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of 4 are mostly highly-skilled residents with a higher amount of income while 
residents of Regions 5, south of 2 and 3 are upper-middle class residents. The 
population density in these regions is lower than Tehran’s average, except in 
the southern section of Region 2.  
5-3-4 PROPERTY MARKET 
As presented above in section 5-2-2-4, Region 1 is the most expensive region 
of Tehran in which to purchase a housing unit. Regions 3, 2, 6, 5 and 4 are in 
the second to sixth positions respectively.  
Relying on average prices to understand the property market of a region could 
be misleading, as regions are not homogenous. There are regions that have 
very high prices at one end and very low at the other, such as Region 4. 
However, access to the actual prices (as opposed to the average prices) of all 
the neighbourhoods of a region was not possible for all of the five regions, for 
this reason average prices are used here. In the regions where actual prices 
vary across the region, these differentiations are addressed.  
To be able to assess the growth of the real price from one year to another, 
inflation rates of each year have been considered in the figures presented 
below26. The price of housing and urban land in Regions 1 and 3 are much 
higher than the other regions of the city. Although the price of land per square 
metre in Region 3 is higher than Region 1, the price per square metre of a 
housing unit in Region 1 is higher than Region 3. This indicates affluent 
residents’ desire to live in this region (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 20) 
The average annual growth of land price in Region 1 is 24.9% while the 
average in Tehran is 21.6%. This growth rate has resulted in a great influx of 
capital investment in the real estate market of the region. The population of this 
region is mostly people with a high income who can afford to live there. (Baft 
Shahr, 2005). Table 5-11 shows the average and discounted for inflation 
purchase prices per square metre of housing units in Region 1 between 2010 
and 2015.  
                                                
26 For more information regarding inflation rate refer to table 5-5 
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 33,918 40,189 60,614 87,173 92,183 95,164 
Discounted for 
inflation 
29,848 31,549 42,127 56,924 77,803 83,840 
Table 5-11: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 1 
between 2010 and 2015 (in Thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 
2016b) 
The following figure (Figure 5-13) shows the price growth of purchasing per 
square metre of housing in Region 1 between 2010 and 2015. The figure shows 
that growth rate was steep between 2011 and 2014. The price of housing has 
increased almost three times between 2010 and 2015 excluding the rise in 
inflation. 
 
Figure 5-13: Growth of purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in 
Region 1 between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: 
(MRUD, 2016b) 
The average cost of renting a housing unit in Region 1 has also grown between 
2010 and 2015. However, if the inflation rate is considered, we can see that the 
real price of renting is dropped between 2011 and 2012. The following table and 
figure (Table 5-12 and Figure 5-14) demonstrate this growth in the price of 
renting a housing unit in Region 1 between 2010 and 2015.  
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 155,315 186,575 233,084 290,005 335,478 377,482 
Discounted for 
inflation 
136,056 182,462 161,994 189,374 283,144 332,562 
Table 5-12: Average rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 1 between 
2010 and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
 
Figure 5-14: Average rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 1 
between 2010 and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
After Regions 1 and 3, Region 2 is the most expensive region of Tehran in 
terms of the cost of a housing unit. The following table (Table 5-13) shows the 
price of one square metre of housing between 2010 and 2015. During this time 
the price has risen from 23,560 thousand Rial in 2010 to 62,903 thousand Rial 
in 2015, which equates to a growth factor of 2.67 times.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 23,560 28,198 42,181 56,817 60,699 62,903 
Discounted for 
inflation 
20,639 21,921 29,316 37,102 51,230 55,418 
Table 5-13: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 2 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016b) 
The following figure (Figure 5-15) shows the rise in the price of one square 
metre of housing in Region 2 between 2010 and 2015. The figure shows that 
the growth rate was steep between 2011 and 2014; the same trend as Region 
1. 
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Figure 5-15 Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 2 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousand Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016b) 
Although the region is an attractive one in terms of the property market, the 
north–south segregation has resulted in higher value property in the northern 
rather than the southern section of the region. Many investors in housing and in 
mixed-use developments have been attracted to invest in the northern section 
(Saravand, 2005, p. 7).  
The Saravand Consultant Company (2005, p. 8) reports that unofficial statistics 
of the region show that, between 1996 and 2004, the value of land and property 
grew more than 10 times in some areas located in the northern section of the 
region. This is despite the average growth of 2.67 throughout the whole region, 
showing that not all areas are the same. 
The cost of renting a housing unit in Region 2 is also growing but this is not as 
high as the rising cost of purchasing. The following table and figure (Table 5-14 
and Figure 5-16) demonstrate the growth of the price in renting a housing unit in 
Region 2 between 2010 and 2015.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 126,263 151,523 188,334 234,306 270,312 305,087 
Discounted for 
inflation 
110,607 118,946 130,893 153,002 228,144 268,782 
Table 5-14: Average rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 2 between 
2010 and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
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Figure 5-16: Rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 2 between 2010 
and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
The land price in Region 3 is more than Region 1. Table 5-15 shows the 
purchase price per square metre of a housing unit in Region 3 between 2010 
and 2015.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 29,158 34,429 50,872 73,253 77,989 79,241 
Discounted for 
inflation 
25,543 27,027 35,357 47,835 65,823 69,812 
Table 5-15: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 3 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016b) 
Although housing prices have been increasing between 2010 and 2015, the 
growth was higher between 2011 and 2014.  
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Figure 5-17: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in region 3 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016b) 
The average renting price of housing in Region 3 has been growing between 
2010 and 2015 while the real price of renting has decreased in 2011. The 
following table and figure (Table 5-16 and Figure 5-18) show the rent cost per 
square metre of housing in Region 3 between 2010 and 2015.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 175,365 183,184 221,791 278,230 324,598 361,817 
Discounted for 
inflation 
153,620 143,800 154,145 181,685 273,961 318,761 
Table 5-16: Rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 3 between 2010 
and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
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Figure 5-18: Rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 3 between 2010 
and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
The average size of a housing unit in Region 3 is 411 square metres which is 
bigger than Tehran’s average of 228.4 square metres (Sharan, 2005). The. 
Sharan Consultant Company (2005) reports that there are two categories of 
land in the region, larger plots (with an area of 1,000 square metres or more) 
with mostly high-rise buildings and smaller plots with an average plot size of 
400 square metres with mostly low-rise buildings.  
In Region 4, although the price of housing and residential land is not as high as 
the other three regions addressed above, housing prices are still high compared 
with other regions of Tehran. The Arseh Consultant Company (2006, p. 46) 
reports that in Region 4 the price of housing has grown more than Tehran’s 
average. While between 1993 and 1998 the rate of growth of housing price in 
Tehran was 23.25%, in Region 4 this rate was 31.8% and between 1998 and 
2003 Tehran’s was 34.20% while in Region 4 this growth rate was 39.43%. 
Table 5-17 shows the average and real purchase price per square metre of a 
housing unit in Region 4 between 2010 and 2015.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 18,212 21,117 31,950 42,150 44,227 44,624 
Discounted for 
inflation  
15,954 16,577 22,206 27,524 37,328 39,314 
Table 5-17: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 4 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
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Although the housing prices have been increasing throughout the period 
between 2010 and 2015, the growth has been more between 2011 and 2014.  
 
Figure 5-19: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 4 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
The renting price of housing in Region 4 has also been growing. The following 
table and figure (Table 5-18 and Figure 5-20) show the rent cost per square 
metre of housing in Region 4 between 2010 and 2015. The cost of renting a 
housing unit more than doubled in the period from 2010 to 2015.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 108,483 133,536 159,306 191,598 214,222 238,838 
Discounted for 
inflation 
95,032 104,826 110,718 125,114 180,804 210,417 
Table 5-18: Rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 4 between 2010 
and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
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Figure 5-20: Rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 4 between 2010 
and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
Based on the field work carried out by Arseh Consulting Engineers (2006, pp. 
46-51) in 2004, the price of residential land varies dramatically in the different 
neighbourhoods of Region 4. The most expensive areas are located on the 
western edge of the region; for example, streets branching from Pasdaran 
Avenue like 7th Negarestan Street and Golestan Street. The more we approach 
the eastern edge of the region the more the price drops down, as in the Khak 
Sefid neighbourhood. 
In Region 5, the availability of land, reasonable housing and land prices and the 
good natural environment have made the region an attractive one for residents 
(Sharmand, 2005, p. 17). Although the region benefits from good surroundings, 
its housing price is not as high as Regions 1, 2 and 3. Table 5-19 shows the 
purchase price per square metre of a housing unit in Region 5 between 2010 
and 2015.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 18,158 22,252 33,978 45,388 47,119 45,566 
Discounted for 
inflation 
15,907 17,468 23,615 29,639 39,769 40,144 
Table 5-19: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 5 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
Although the housing prices have been increasing between 2010 and 2014, in 
2015 the average housing price per square metre has fallen. The figure below 
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(Figure 5-21) presents the growth rate of the purchasing price of housing in 
Region 5.  
 
Figure 5-21: Purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in Region 5 
between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
The price of housing rents in Region 5 has also been growing. The following 
table and figure (Table 5-20 and Figure 5-22) show that the average rent cost 
per square metre of housing in Region 5 rose by more than 2.3 times from 2010 
to 2015.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Average price 102,776 133,577 160,691 197,067 222,245 244,093 
Discounted for 
inflation 
90,032 104,858 111,681 128,685 187,575 215,046 
Table 5-20: Rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 5 between 2010 
and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
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Figure 5-22: Rent of a housing unit per square metre in Region 5 between 2010 
and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
The following figure (Figure 5-23) compares the average purchase price of a 
housing unit in these five regions between 2010 and 2015. As the figure shows, 
Regions 1, 3 and 2 are respectively the most expensive regions and, after that, 
Regions 4 and 5 are almost in the same range. It should be borne in mind that 
these figures are the average price in the regions and the price in different 
neighbourhoods would vary. The extreme cases of the variation in price exist in 
Regions 2 and 4 where, respectively, the northern part and the western edge 
are more expensive compared to the other parts.  
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Figure 5-23: Average purchase price of a housing unit per square metre in 
Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 between 2010 and 2015 (in thousands Rial). Based on the 
data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
The following figure (Figure 5-24) compares the average renting price of one 
square metre of housing unit in the five regions discussed. Regions 1 and 3 are 
the most expensive regions, and then Region 2 is the third most expensive 
region. The average rent price in Regions 4 and 5 is almost in the same range.  
  
Figure 5-24: Average rent of a housing unit per square metre in Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 5 between 2010 and 2015 (in Rial). Based on the data of: (MRUD, 2016a) 
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5-3-5 CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND CONSTRUCTION 
DENSITY 
This section looks at the number of construction permits issued, the floor areas 
and the residential units of those permits in Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 between 
2010 and 2014. The construction density27 growth of each region, where 
information is available in the report of the consultant companies, will be 
presented for each region.  
The popularity of Region 1 for living and investment has resulted in a high 
demand for housing. As mentioned in sections 5-2-2-1 and 5-2-2-2, although 
the number of construction permits issued in Region 1 is not as high as some 
other regions, the permitted floor area in construction permits in this region is 
very high which means the demand for the construction of buildings with higher 
construction density is high. The following three figures (Figures 5-25, 5-26 and 
5-27) show the number of construction permits issued, the floor areas and the 
residential units of those permits between 2010 and 2014 in Region 1. In 2011 
and 2012, these numbers have increased dramatically.  
 
Figure 5-25: The number of permits in Region 1 between 2010 and 2014. Based 
on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
                                                
27 In this thesis construction density and floor area ratio (FAR) are used interchangeably 
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Figure 5-26: The amount of permitted floor area in Region 1 between 2010 and 
2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)  
 
Figure 5-27: The amount of permitted residential units in region 1 between 2010 
and 2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
As the Baft Shahr Consultant Company (2005, p. 21) reports, the tendency is to 
construct high-rise buildings in Region 1. Although the Tehran Comprehensive 
Plan (the first plan for Tehran) proposed maximum construction density of 282% 
for high-rise buildings in this region, studies of the Baft Shahr Consultant 
Company (2005) show that the construction density of high-rise buildings in this 
region exceeds that allowed by up to 500%.  
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Region 1’s average construction density has increased from 71.92% in 1990 to 
285% in 2001 (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 20). Most of the high-rise buildings are 
located in the southern and central parts of the region as a result of the 
destruction of inner city gardens (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 24). Various challenges 
are imposed on the region as a result of the increase in construction density. 
The Baft Shahr Consultant Company (2005, pp. 24- 39) recognises the 
following issues for Region 1, which could also be applied to the other regions:  
" Blockage of the visual corridors towards the mountain ranges. The 
lack of regulations on specifying the location and appearance of 
high-rise buildings has contributed to this issue. 
" Many of these high-rise buildings are located in narrow streets 
which have caused traffic problems. 
" High-rise developments have increased the capacity to attract a rise 
in the population while the service and infrastructure per capita 
have decreased in this region. 
" The proximity of the high-rise buildings have caused over 
shadowing, privacy issues and produced a dramatic change in the 
skyline  
The Baft Shar Consultant Company (2005, pp. 31-39) says that construction 
density limits of the previous plans of the region have been deliberately ignored 
because the municipality relies on the income coming from the construction 
density charge generated in this region. The granting of excess construction 
density has created an increase in the economic rent and the growth of 
speculative property development. CN5 directives and permits beyond the limits 
of previous plans helped to legalise this process (Baft Shahr, 2005, p. 40). 
Region 2 is under a lot of pressure to increase development as it enjoys the 
benefit of new infrastructures and land parcels are relatively large and cheap 
while the region is also well-connected to the centre of the city (Saravand, 2005, 
p. 1). As the consultant company responsible for the production of the plan of 
this region, Savarand (2005), says between 1993 and 2002, 12 million square 
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metres of building were permitted to be built in the region which resulted in 
massive construction activities causing inconvenience to the residents.  
The following three figures (Figures 5-28, 5-29 and 5-30) show the number of 
issued construction permits, floor areas and residential units of those permits 
between 2010 and 2014. In 2011 and 2012 these numbers have increased 
dramatically.  
 
Figure 5-28: The number of permits in Region 2 between 2010 and 2014. Based 
on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 5-29: The amount of permitted floor areas in Region 2 between 2010 and 
2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
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Figure 5-30: The amount of permitted residential units in Region 2 between 2010 
and 2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
As already mentioned, the region is physically and socially segregated. The size 
of land and housing units confirm this segregation. Smaller plots in the southern 
section of the region have intensified the use of the land and housing. In the 
northern section land and housing per capita are 40 per square metre and 55 
per square metre respectively while in the southern section these numbers are 
24 per square metre and 32 per square metre (Saravand, 2005, p. 2).  
Although the population density of the southern part of the region is higher than 
the northern part, construction density in the northern part is higher than the 
southern part. The tendency for building high-rise building in the northern 
section is higher than in the southern part. The average number of floors of 
buildings in the northern part are 3.23 floors while in the south this number is 
2.428 (Saravand, 2005).  
High demand for construction in the region has increased the income of the 
region’s municipality. 85% of this income was provided by the construction 
sector. From 1996 to 2001, the income of the region’s municipality grew by 
50%. Except in 1996, the income of the region’s municipality was more than its 
expenditure. The excess income was transferred to the central municipality. In 
                                                
28 These numbers are based on the data available in 2005. 
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the year 2001, approximately 11% of the total income of the Tehran Municipality 
was provided from Region 2 (Saravand, 2005). 
The number of construction permits issued in Region 3 is not as much as the 
other five regions considered in this research. This is mainly because this 
region is smaller than the other four regions. While Region 3 occupies 4.58% of 
the city Regions 1, 2, 4 and 5, respectively occupy 5.61%, 7.78%, 10.94% and 
8.23% of Tehran. Moreover, as mentioned above, two large sections of this 
region are non-residential areas (Sharan, 2005).  
The following three figures (Figures 5-31, 5-32 and 5-33) show the number of 
construction permits issued, the floor areas and the residential units of those 
permits between 2010 and 2014 in Region 3. In 2011, the amount of issued 
construction permits and permitted residential units was at its peak. However, 
the amount of permitted floor areas was at its peak in 2013.  
 
Figure 5-31: The number of permits in Region 3 between 2010 and 2014. Based 
on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
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Figure 5-32: The amount of permitted floor areas in Region 3 between 2010 and 
2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
 
Figure 5-33: The amount of permitted residential units in Region 3 between 2010 
and 2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
Region 3 accommodates many high-rise buildings. Two types of high-rise 
buildings are recognised in this region by the Sharan Consultant Company 
(2005), first the planned tower blocks built before the Revolution such as Eskan, 
Parc des Princes, Aftab, Iran Sokna and Garney. These are the first generation 
of high-rise constructions in Tehran. These tower blocks formed the structure of 
the region. The other type is the second generation of high-rise constructions 
built in small plots and narrow streets without planning considerations.  
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Region 3’s buildings’ height is more than Tehran’s average. The average 
number of floors of buildings in this region is three floors while Tehran’s average 
is 2.61 floors (Sharan, 2005). Although buildings in Region 3 are taller than 
Tehran’s average, the density of housing units per hectare, which is 64 housing 
units per hectare, is lower than Tehran’s average (Sharan, 2005). This implies 
that housing units are big in this region, which is a sign of wealth.  
The Sharan Consultant Company (2005) reports that the new constructions in 
the area at the time of their report have higher construction density, with more 
housing units and more ground coverage compared to the existing, older 
buildings. The Sharan Consultant Company (2005) observes a tendency in the 
region to sub-divide the large parcels and also increase the construction 
density. Besides that, many of the gardens of the region were converted into 
housing blocks. 
The following three figures (Figures 5-34, 5-35 and 5-36) show the amount of 
issued construction permits, floor areas and residential units of those permits 
between 2010 and 2014 in Region 4. In 2011, the amount of issued 
construction permits, permitted residential units and permitted floor areas was 
at its peak.  
 
Figure 5-34: The number of permits in Region 4 between 2010 and 2014. Based 
on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
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Figure 5-35: The amount of permitted floor areas in Region 4 between 2010 and 
2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
 
Figure 5-36: The amount of permitted residential units in Region 4 between 2010 
and 2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
The average construction density of the region is 104% with average ground 
coverage of 62% which shows the horizontal development of the region. 
However, it is hard to generalise the findings, as the region is quite 
heterogeneous (Arseh, 2006a). The Arseh Consultant Company (2006b) 
reports that some parts of the region’s structure have been changed as a result 
of the excess construction density that the municipality has sold to developers 
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which has reduced the feasibility of the plans of the region. However, the Arseh 
Consultant Company did not elaborate on this matter in their report.  
In Region 5, the Sharmand Consultant Company (2005, p. 11) reports that 
massive construction activities are happening as the region is new and vacant 
land is available. On average in 2001, 133 construction permits had been 
granted each month. 81% of these permits were to redevelop a site, 17% to 
construct buildings on vacant land and 2% were undefined (Sharmand, 2005, p. 
29).  
The following three figures (Figures 5-37, 5-38 and 5-39) show the number of 
issued construction permits, floor areas and residential units of those permits 
between 2010 and 2014 in Region 5.  
 
Figure 5-37: The number of permits in Region 5 between 2010 and 2014. Based 
on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
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Figure 5-38: The amount of permitted floor areas in Region 5 between 2010 and 
2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
 
Figure 5-39: The amount of permitted residential units in Region 5 between 2010 
and 2014. Based on the data of: (SCI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
Region 5’s development report, prepared by the Sharmand Consultant 
Company (2005), has not provided any information regarding the level of 
construction density in the region.  
These five regions have been under development pressure. This pressure 
reached its peak in 2011 when the number of granted permits was more than 
other years discussed here. The number of permits granted dropped in 2014. 
Later, in Chapters 6 and 7, the reasons behind this fluctuation will be explored. 
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Based on the reports provided by the consultant companies, and the plan of 
these regions, construction density limits have been compromised in most of 
these regions to generate income for the municipality.  
5-4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provides information about the number of construction permits and 
the floor area permitted in them, population growth, housing and land prices, 
and CN5’s decisions of 22 regions of Tehran. Based on the data, it was decided 
that five regions (Regions 1 to 5) would be the localities on which this research 
would focus to generate data.  
Analysing the data regarding the number of granted housing construction 
permits and the amount of floor areas to be built in those permits shows that 
between 2010 and 2014:  
" Regions 2, 4, 5, 8, 14 and 15 are the regions with the highest 
number of granted housing construction permits. 
" Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 22 are the regions with the largest 
amount of floor area granted to be built in those construction 
permits. 
Although the number of permits in Regions 1, 3 and 22 are not as high as 
Regions 8, 14 and 15, each permit allows the construction of a bigger building 
in width and/or height by exceeding the construction density limits. As a result, 
Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 22 are the regions under pressure for the development 
of buildings with higher construction density. Despite the fact that Region 22 is 
under pressure for the construction of high-rise buildings, the region will not be 
included in this research as it was annexed to Tehran recently and the story of 
its development is different.  
Based on the presented information, although the population density is low in 
Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, these regions have been experiencing population 
growth in recent years. The highest population growth per year between 1996 
and 2006 belonged to Regions 2 and 5 and then Regions 1, 3 and 4. 
Immigration from other regions of the city to these regions is the main 
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contributor to the population growth of these regions. Moreover, education and 
the income rate of residents of these five regions, with some exceptions in 
some parts of Regions 4, are higher than Tehran’s average.  
These five regions plus Region 6 are the most expensive regions of the city in 
which to buy or to rent a housing unit and in which to buy a piece of land: 
" Region 1 and then Regions 3, 2, 6, 5 and 4 are respectively the 
most expensive regions in which to buy a housing unit. 
" Region 3 and then Regions 1, 6, 2, 5 and 7 are the most expensive 
regions in which to buy a piece of land. 
" Regions 1, 3 and then Region 2 are the most expensive regions in 
which to rent a housing unit and after that Regions 4 and 5. 
These expensive regions of the city are desirable areas in which to live and for 
developers to invest. Although Region 6 is also expensive, it is under pressure 
for commercial development rather than residential development. That is why it 
is not included as a region of interest for this research. 
Apart from the reasons already mentioned, the number of issued permits that 
are in contrast with the plans is also higher in these five regions. In order, 
Regions 1, 5, 2, 4 and 3 are the regions with the highest amount of decisions 
made by CN5. More than 59% of CN5’s directives are for Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
5. This shows that construction beyond the limits of plans is higher in these five 
regions.  
In the next two chapters, Chapter 6 and 7, the data collected from the interviews 
carried out with developers, planners and other interviewees in these five 
regions will be presented and analysed to explore answers to the research 
questions.  
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6-1 INTRODUCTION  
Using secondary evidence, Chapters 4 and 5 presented background information 
about the building development process in Tehran and its 22 regions. This 
chapter and the subsequent one will elaborate further on what happens behind 
the scenes with a special focus on the excess construction density charge. Both 
chapters will present and analyse primary data collected in Tehran by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with both developers and planners. Most 
of the interviews took place in 2014 and 2015 with a few final ones conducted in 
2016. 
This chapter will begin by exploring Tehran municipality’s financing mechanism 
and then, in section 6-3, will focus on housing developers’ decisions. Section 6-
4, will discuss how Tehran municipality’s financing mechanism has affected the 
decisions of housing developers and this discussion will be continued further in 
Chapter 7.  
6-2 TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY’S FINANCE 
Tehran Municipality’s finance is a critical factor influencing the development of 
the city of Tehran. First Tehran Municipality’s budget will be discussed, then, 
concentration will be on the excess construction density charge.    
6-2-1 TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY’S BUDGET  
6-2-1-1 SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
As already clarified in Chapter 4, in 1983 the government at that time agreed 
that all of Iran’s municipalities should become financially independent from 
central government. However, that bill also stated that the government would 
prepare a plan to define the ways in which the municipality would generate 
income; this did not happen. Interviewee P21 describes the bill in its early 
stages: 
‘It was in Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s government that self-
sufficiency of the municipality was approved. That bill had two 
parts; firstly saying that from that date the municipalities should 
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manage the cities without receiving any funding from the 
government. In the second part it says that the government, 
meaning The Ministry of Interior and The Ministry of Roads and 
Urban Development, should prepare a bill to explain and define 
the sources of the income for the municipalities. The first part 
was implemented but, unfortunately, the second part has been 
ignored.’ (Interview-P21, 2015)  
P21 goes on to explain the reasons behind not paying attention to set sources 
of income for municipalities: 
‘Sadly, in Iran we do not pay attention to long-term planning 
which does not have tangible results for people in the short-
term [...].’ (Interview-P21, 2015) 
Cutting the financial aid from central government to the municipalities has 
resulted in some municipalities becoming increasingly independent which has 
reduced the government’s ability to question the municipalities’ conduct. P25 
observes: 
‘It (self-sufficiency of the municipalities) was a necessary move 
but it was not enough […]. The government could keep the 
municipality accountable while it still had some sort of financial 
dependence on the government.’ (Interview-P25, 2015)  
6-2-1-2 SOURCES OF INCOME 
In the absence of a well-researched and established framework to define its 
sources of income, the Tehran Municipality started to use a variety of ways to 
generate money. Income coming from the construction sector, known as 
development charges, has become the main source of income for the 
municipality. P2 provided the researcher with an unpublished report on the 
Tehran Municipality’s income sources and requested that the details of the 
people who prepared the report should be kept confidential. This report shows 
that in the years between 2002 and 2012 at least 75% of the Tehran 
Municipality’s income came from the development charges. The data of that 
report is summarised in the following table (Table 6-1) 
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Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Share*  86% 83% 80% 79% 84% 86% 87% 82% 79% 80% 75% 
* Share of the development charges in the total income 
Table 6-1: Share of the development charges in the total income of the Tehran 
Municipality between 2002 and 2012. Source: (Unpublished confidential 
document) 
P2 believes that relying on the construction industry for income raises a couple 
of issues:  
‘The dependency on the construction sector is not right for 
many reasons. Firstly, the city becomes addicted to the 
construction sector and an addict can’t appreciate its best 
interest […] and may sell anything; today it may sell a historic 
house for money and tomorrow it may destroy a garden. 
Secondly, this system creates rent (positional advantage), for 
example if I have good relations with the Mayor I can take 
advantage and ask for better deals […].’ (Interview-P2, 2015) 
The Tehran Municipality’s sources of income can be divided into the 
sustainable, which are reliable and predictable, and unsustainable sources. The 
income generated from construction activities are considered as unsustainable 
because the amount of construction activity in a year is not consistent and could 
vary a lot. In this regard P25 explains that: 
‘The municipality’s budget has various income codes, they did 
not categorise the income sources into sustainable and 
unsustainable but it is possible to identify which ones are 
unsustainable. Based on the codes, for example, charges on 
the construction density, changing function and omission of 
parking are unsustainable sources […] as they are not constant 
and might be less in one period and more in another period 
depending on the property market.’ (Interview-P25, 2015)  
An analysis of the municipality budget for the year 2015 was prepared by one of 
the municipality’s budget experts who wishes to remain anonymous but used to 
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work at the Budget Office of the Tehran Municipality; it shows that 70% of the 
income of the Tehran Municipality comes from unsustainable sources. Based 
on this report it means that of 17,460 billion proposed credits, almost 12,000 
billion, comes from unsustainable sources. The following table (Table 6-2) 
shows the contribution of these unsustainable sources to the budget of the 
Tehran Municipality in 2015.  
Unsustainable income sources Amount (billion 
toman) 
General charges on buildings and lands 1,389 
Parking omission charges 170 
Fines by Commission No 100 45 
Charges on the construction density and changing the 
function  
7,700 
Selling the municipal properties 2,079 
Receiving loans from banks 600 
Total 11,983 
Table 6-2: Unsustainable sources of income of the Tehran Municipality in 2015. 
Source: (Unpublished confidential document) 
Sustainable sources of income for the Tehran Municipality are VAT and 
property tax. However, the amount generated from these sources is limited. 
Based on the analysis mentioned above, in the year 2015, in total 3,200 billion 
toman of municipal income came from VAT, which is only 18% of its total 
income. This source of income has been introduced since 2007–2008 as a new 
source for the municipality and it is hoped to expand this source in future 
(Interview-P25, 2015). 
The income coming from property tax in year 2015 was even less than that from 
VAT. As P25 mentions: 
‘At the moment the property tax provides only 1 to 1.5% of 
Tehran Municipality’s income while in other countries 40 to 50% 
of the municipal income would come from property tax […].’  
(Interview-P25, 2015) 
The reasons why the property tax contribution is so limited in the municipal 
budget are the low rate of land and property taxes compared to their market 
value. There is no will to increase this tax despite the stress that experts put on 
the importance of it being a sustainable source of income for the municipality. 
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The resistance of the Tehran Municipality to increase property tax and reduce 
the income coming from construction is elaborated by P25:  
‘The municipality has got used to this system (to earn money 
from construction) […] in this way it has to deal with only 20 to 
50 thousand people who are involved in large construction and 
they are willing to give the municipality the money rather than 
dealing with the 3 million residents of Tehran. So, the 
municipality is not responsive to residents’ needs as they do 
not pay for the city and they do not feel they can question the 
municipality’s performance and say, for example, this project is 
not our priority.’ (Interview-P25, 2015)     
6-2-1-3 THE AMOUNT OF THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET 
A dramatic increase in the size of the annual budget of the Tehran Municipality 
has exacerbated its dependency on development charges. P2 talks about the 
increase in the amount of income for the Tehran Municipality: 
‘When Karbaschi became the Mayor of Tehran, the Tehran 
Municipality’s formal budget was 50 billion toman, when he left 
the municipality this amount had increased to 200 billion toman. 
Then Alviri became the Mayor and increased the budget to 550 
billion toman. After Alviri, Malek-madani proposed a budget of 
1,200 billion toman. Then Ahmadinejad increased the budget to 
2,300 billion toman. […] In the first term of Ghalibaf’s mayoral 
period he increased the budget to 8,000 billion toman and now 
the budget is 17,000 billion toman. Where is the source of this 
income? Mostly selling the regulations!’ (Interview-P2, 2015)  
The municipal budget should be approved by the city council each year. P21 
believes that approving a bigger budget for the municipality by the city council is 
wrong: 
‘Each year the city council approves a bigger budget for the 
municipality than the previous year, which is wrong. Approving 
a larger budget for the municipality means encouraging the 
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granting of illegal construction density, because there is no 
other source of generating money. This is not beneficial for the 
city. At the same time, when the municipality has a lot of money 
it proposes unimportant projects which are not a priority for the 
city.’ (Interview-P21, 2015) 
The municipality proposing unimportant projects, as mentioned by P21, is 
something that concerns experts. Regarding this P2 says: 
‘When the municipality has a lot of money it proposes less 
necessary projects, like adding a second level to the Sadr 
Highway.’ (Interview-P2, 2015) 
6-2-2 THE CONSTRUCTION DENSITY CHARGE 
6-2-2-1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTION DENSITY CHARGE 
FOR THE MUNICIPALITY  
The income generated from the construction density charge comes under the 
category of development charges. The following table (Table 6-3), has been 
prepared based on the report accessed at P2’s office and shows the share of 
the construction density charge as a percentage of the total income generated 
from all the development charges. This table shows that the construction 
density charge is an important component of the municipality’s annual budget.  
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Share* 
 
70% 73% 62% 76% 73% 75% 77% 77% 55% 45% 44% 
*Share of the construction density charge 
Table 6-3: Share of the construction density charge in the total development 
charges of Tehran Municipality’s income between 2002 and 2012. Source: 
(Unpublished confidential document) 
Although, based on the above table, the percentage of income coming from the 
construction density charge has fallen since 2010; the real amount of cash 
income from this source has been growing each year (Interview-P2, 2015). The 
reason behind the decrease of the portion of the construction density charge in 
total development charges is because of the growth or emergence of the other 
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categories of development charges, such as the emergence of a charge for 
private swimming pools (Interview-P2, 2015). Commenting on this, P2 says: 
‘The municipality’s income codes are not transparent. It is not 
presented in a way so that you can easily find out what’s going 
on. Look here, you might think that the share of the 
construction density charge is decreasing in recent years 
compared to 2009. But if you look closely you will see that other 
codes are growing or new codes are emerging which used to 
be put together […] for example a row is added as a private 
swimming pool construction charge! Which is mainly for 
construction happening in Region 1, in the other regions they 
do not have a private pool!’ (Interview-P2, 2015) 
6-2-2-2 THE ROOTS OF THE CONSTRUCTION DENSITY CHARGE 
In Chapter 4, section 4-5-2, the roots for the emergence of the construction 
density charge were discussed. However, to better understand this process, this 
section will review the subject further by interviewing planners on the subject.  
Despite the public belief that Karbaschi, Mayor of Tehran between 1989 and 
1998, introduced the construction density charge, P4 (Interview-P4, 2015) says 
that actually the Urban Planning and Architecture High Council’s Acts29 led the 
municipality towards generating income from construction density. In his own 
words P4 says:  
‘After the revolution, in the early years, nothing was immune 
from the attack of the new system, including the construction 
density which used to vary in different parts of the city based on 
the Tehran Comprehensive Plan. In some parts of the city we 
even had 600% construction density but after the revolution 
they made it 120% everywhere. As a result, the city expanded 
a lot. It was in 1991 that the High Council approved an act to 
control the expansion of the city and also to provide a way for 
municipalities to become self-sufficient. Based on this act, the 
                                                
29 For more information regarding these Acts refer to Chapter 4, section 4-5-2  
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construction density of Tehran and the other five metropolises 
of Iran were increased by up to 25%. Municipalities were 
permitted to charge applicants for the extra construction density 
in order to generate income and also to address the horizontal 
expansion of the city. Unfortunately, the municipalities actions 
began and continued to be based on unprofessional 
agreements rather than on a correct framework.’ (Interview-P4, 
2015) 
Expanding on this point, P8 says that it was not wrong to propose a 
densification programme for the city but the method was problematic:  
‘Cities should provide money for themselves. This was the right 
thing to do but the method was horrible […] based on 
Farmanfarmaiean’s plan (Tehran Comprehensive Plan), Tehran 
had the capacity to become denser as it was not dense 
enough. That plan determined which areas could become 
denser but when they started to define the construction density 
they left it to the open market and to the demand! That was the 
problem […].’ (Interview-P8, 2015) 
6-2-2-3 CONTROLLING THE CONSTRUCTION DENSITY 
From the early 1990s, the arbitrary granting of an excess of construction density 
to applicants started to concern experts in the field, both in the private and 
public sectors. As mentioned in Chapter 4, both Commission No. 5 and the 
Urban Planning and Architecture High Council tried to introduce directives and 
acts to control the granting of excessive construction density charges. 
Two interviewees who were involved in the process of the production of Acts to 
control the granting of excessive construction density gave their opinion of the 
process. 
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REGULATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTING BUILDINGS WITH SIX STOREYS OR 
MORE 
P4 who has a private consultant company and was very concerned about the 
consequences of arbitrarily granting of construction density to applicants, wrote 
a letter to the Mayor at the time, Karbaschi. He says: 
‘I wrote a letter to Mr. Karbaschi in 1995. I told him that it is 
right that we need to increase the construction density limits 
and as a result capture the increased value for the municipality. 
But the way that you are doing it is not right […] he replied to 
me sarcastically and said if you think you can do a better job, 
then come and do it. After that I made a contract to prepare a 
set of regulations for high-rise buildings.’ (Interview-P4, 2015) 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, this set of regulations was approved in 1999 in the 
High Council with the title of Regulations for Constructing Buildings with 6-
storeys or more in Tehran. However, the process of preparing these regulations 
put the preparation team under pressure. P4 elaborates on this: 
‘We were under pressure from two sides. On the one hand we 
were under pressure from the High Council and the experts 
who were pushing us towards a lower construction density and 
on the other hand from the municipality who wanted to have 
more density. We had to find the balance between these two.’ 
(Interview-P4, 2015) 
For a few years the regulations of this Act was the basis of action. However, 
because at the time of the approval the municipality deleted one of the 
proposed regulations which was about the physical shape of these buildings, 
most of the buildings constructed in this period ended up like a pyramid on top 
of a cube (Interview-P4, 2015). This final shape was considered as being a 
symbol of Freemasonry by Khaled Mashaal on his visit to Tehran and resulted 
in halting the implementation of the regulations by the municipality (Interview-
P4, 2015). 
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PRICING CONSTRUCTION DENSITY CHARGE 
The need for setting a method of deciding on the amount of the charge resulted 
in the preparation of a mathematical formula. P17 who is a Tehran Municipality 
employee and made this formula explains: 
‘Right after the deposition of Mr. Karbaschi, in one of the 
deputies’ meetings I said that it is necessary to have a formula 
to charge applicants for the excess construction density. As a 
result they assigned me to prepare this formula. At that time I 
was only 23 years old […]. The first formula was: 
A=2(D+P)(1+T) and was approved at the 30th meeting of the 
First Tehran City Council. In this formula: 
A is the amount of charge per square metre  
D is the material of the building structure (concrete structure: 
25,000 toman, metal structure: 20,000 toman) 
P is the transaction value of the property based on the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Finance’s booklet   
T is the price adjustment factor. The whole city was divided into 
five areas. For example, T for Regions 1, 3 and 6 is 1.25, for 
Regions 7, 12 and 13 T is 0.5 
[…] this was the first formula and became the basis of action for 
a while but it had a couple of errors. The first error was the T 
factor, because, in reality, regions are quite different and you 
can’t set the same T factor for Regions 1, 2 and 3, so the 
amount of T should not be the same. The second error was 
factor D: What is the difference between concrete structures 
and metal structures? We had to keep D fixed. The third error 
was the inversion that happened because of 1+T. Living in a 
dead-end street, 12 metres wide is more desirable than living in 
an 18-metre wide street which has a lot of traffic and pollution. 
Based on this formula the price of building on the 18-metre 
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wide street would become more expensive compared to that on 
the 12-metre wide dead-end street.’ (Interview-P17, 2015) 
To correct the errors of the first formula, a second formula was proposed. This 
second formula was: A=0.8[2(D+P)(1+T)]. In the formula 0.8 addresses the rate 
of inflation and D is fixed for all types of structures. The T factor in this version 
varied in each region but was fixed in one region. However, even in a region the 
property market and the quality of the built environment could vary a lot 
(Interview-P17, 2015). P17 gives an example: 
‘For example, the T factor for Region 2 was set at 2.5 but 
Region 2 is very big. Javid-Abad, which is behind Sharif 
University, is a hub for drug dealers in Region 2 whereas Kooy-
e Faraz in Saadat-Abad (in the north of Region 2) was unbuilt 
at the time but was still in Region 2 […] and, based on the price 
booklet of the ministry which was set in 1961[…], the price of a 
property in Javid-Abad was higher than Kooy-e Faraz as at that 
time Kooy-e Faraz was like a desert […]. But when you look 
you will see now the quality of Kooy-e Faraz which is on the 
side of the mountains is better than Javid-Abad. So, why is the 
construction density charge more in Javid-Abad?’ (Interview-
P17, 2015) 
To address the deficiencies of the second version of the formula, the final 
version which is: A=(7D+P)T was approved by the City Council in 2004. In this 
formula T factors varied and were determined for different areas in the regions. 
As a consequence of using this formula the amount to be paid for construction 
density is very high in expensive areas of the city (Interview-P17, 2015). P17 
explains: 
‘As a result of this formula, the construction density in northern 
areas got very expensive and in the southern areas got very 
cheap. This was because we wanted to move the wealth in the 
city towards the south but the formula was only used for two 
months. At that time, Ahmadinejad was the Mayor of Tehran. 
Stakeholders and beneficiaries put him under pressure to 
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cancel the directive! So, Ahmadinejad cancelled it!’ (Interview-
P17, 2015) 
Although the formula was halted for a while, it came back in use later and was 
developed further at the Office for Regulations, Supervision and Permit 
Issuance of the Tehran Municipality (Interview-P17, 2015). All attempts to 
arrange an interview with the manager of this office, or one of his colleagues, to 
get more updates on the development of this formula and its effect on the 
construction process were declined.  
However, as mentioned by P17 the stakeholders and beneficiaries who are 
mainly investors in the construction sector could affect the use of this formula 
and there was a resistance towards disciplining the process and the pricing of 
the construction density bonus. 
6-3 HOUSING DEVELOPERS 
Developers play a key role in the production process of new developments. 
However, information about their nature and their decision-making processes 
are very limited. As a result, in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried 
out to understand the housing developers’ characteristics and their decisions. 
This section presents the results of the interviews conducted. 
The first part of this section (Section 6-3-1) looks at the characteristics of 
housing developers in Tehran and tries to answer the following questions:  
" Who are the housing developers? 
" What is their background? 
" How long have they been in business? 
" How do they work and finance the construction process? 
The second part of this section (Section 6-3-2) elaborates on the decision-
making process of housing developers. It looks at: 
" The locations in which they prefer to work 
" Whether they prefer to move around or stay in one region 
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" When they get involved in construction activity 
" For whom do they build (who is the potential buyer) 
" What kind of building do they prefer to produce 
" How the extra construction density has been addressed in their 
decisions. 
It should be mentioned that the data presented in this section does not 
represent the characteristics and the decision-making mechanism for all of the 
developers working in Tehran, as this section is prepared based on the 
overview of a specific number of developers.  
6-3-1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPERS 
Table 6-4 below summarises the nature of work and the length of time that each 
of the interviewed developers has been active in the construction sector.  
Developers’ 
code 
Individual developer 
or small company 
Large development 
company 
Length of time in 
the business 
D1  √ __ Unknown  
D2  √ __ Unknown 
D3 √ __ Unknown 
D4 √ __ Unknown 
D5 √ √ 21 years  
D6 √ __ 2 years 
D7 √ __ 4 years 
D8 __ √ Unknown 
D9 __ √ Unknown 
D10 √ __ 24 years 
D11 √ __ 4–5 years 
D12 √ √ 9 years 
D13 √ __ 25 years 
D14 √ √ 23 years  
D15 __ √ Unknown 
Table 6-4: Interviewed developers 
6-3-1-1 WHO ARE THE HOUSING DEVELOPERS? 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, a developer in Tehran can be an individual 
developer (or group of individuals working in partnership), a small registered 
company or a large company. Research visits to Tehran in 2014, 2015 and 
2016 confirm this categorisation of developers. In this research, individual 
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developers and small registered companies are classed in the same category, 
as their decisions and the way they work are similar. 
All of the interviewed people confirmed that most of the housing developers in 
Tehran are individual developers and small companies who have access to 
capital to carry out the construction activity. As well as these individuals and 
small registered developers, there are large companies who construct large-
scale residential developments, mostly high-rise buildings and tower blocks. 
The government’s contribution in producing residential projects inside the city 
boundary of Tehran is very limited. All of the constructions for the Mehr Housing 
Plan in which the government does cooperate happen in the outskirts of Tehran 
such as Parand, Pardis and Roud-e Hen (Interview-D12, 2015).  
Without having official statistics, it is impossible to define the precise ratio of 
individual developers in housing construction. However, all the interviewees 
agreed that more than 70% of housing developers in Tehran are individual 
developers or small companies. For example, D12 says: 
‘I think 80% are individual developers. The government is 
mostly responsible for the Mehr Housing Plan which is taking 
place out of Tehran’s official boundary […] only 20% are big 
companies with banks behind them. These companies are 
private companies but they are under the supervision of banks.’ 
(Interview-D12, 2015) 
However, D12 mentions that the construction of commercial developments is 
mostly in the hands of large private development companies that have the 
backing of banks as the construction of a commercial building is beyond the 
financial ability of individual developers (Interview-D12, 2015). 
One of the reasons mentioned by interviewees regarding why individual 
developers are the main participants in housing construction in Tehran is the 
size of land parcels. As the land parcels are mostly small, a limited number of 
floors and housing units can be built, based on the construction regulations. 
This kind of construction is not big enough to make it profitable for a large 
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developer to get involved in the construction. D11 says that in regions in which 
he has been active: 
‘[…] the texture of these neighbourhoods is such that it is not 
suitable for mass development, land parcels are mostly 
between 200 and 300 m2 or maximum 400 m2 which is not 
large enough for the construction of a big compound. […] 
Mostly they suit an individual developer’s who have sufficient 
resources to build up the land.’ (Interview-D11, 2015) 
D10’s overview is the same. He says: 
‘[…] there is not much mass development happening inside the 
city boundaries […] although there might be a few investors 
who build luxury high-rise buildings, the common practice is the 
construction of 10, 20, 30 or maximum 40 units which can be 
done by individual developers. It is not like what happens in 
other countries where large companies are producing housing.’ 
(Interview-D10, 2015) 
In confirming D10’s overview, D13 (Interview-D13, 2015) who has worked in 
Regions 3, 4 and 5 says that his biggest project had 20 housing units and his 
smallest project had eight units. Also D14 (Interview-D14, 2015) says that he 
builds approximately 30 to 40 units of housing per year. This means that the 
constructions are mostly small in size.  
This small-scale production is in contrast with the quantity of housing that a 
large developer produces each year. D8 who works at a large development 
company called Sherkat-e Sarmayehgozari-ye Maskan says: 
‘In the years that the Mehr Housing Plan was on the table our 
company would produce approximately 5,000 housing units 
each year. And without the Mehr Housing Plan, we produce 
3,500 to 4,000 units each year.’ (Interview-D8, 2015) 
An individual developer is not required to register a company or have a specific 
speciality to initiate a construction project; as previously stated, anyone with 
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enough capital can enter the sector (Interview-D14, 2015). However, a large 
development company needs to have at least two qualified engineers on its 
board of directors (Interview-D14, 2015).  
An individual developer is usually also the investor in the project while a large-
property development company has external investors. Most of the large-
developers are connected to financially-powerful institutions like banks or 
governmental institutions (Interview-D5, 2014; Interview-D11, 2015; Interview-
D12, 2015). P22 elaborates on the affiliation of these companies with banks and 
governmental institutions: 
‘The majority of these private companies are in some way 
connected to the state. Mostly they are related to the 
Revolutionary Guards30 and foundations like Fifteen of Khordad 
Foundation who owns many of the tower blocks located in the 
north […] or social security organisations and pension 
organisations […] also all the banks are involved in real-estate, 
it is almost impossible for small companies and individual 
developers to get involved in the production of tower-blocks.’ 
(Interview-P22, 2015) 
For example, in Sherkat-e sarmayeh gozari-ye Maskan, Housing Bank (Bank-e 
Maskan) holds 51% of the company’s shares and is in fact the investor for 
development projects of the company (Interview-D8, 2015).  
These private but large companies are mostly involved with the construction of 
luxury high-rise building in the north of the city.  
6-3-1-2 THE DEVELOPERS’ BACKGROUND 
The interviewed developers’ educational and occupational backgrounds are 
diverse. For example, D6 is currently a university lecturer who works as a part-
time developer while D10 used to be a simple manual labourer in construction 
who gradually became a developer. Some of the interviewed developers are still 
active in their previous occupation, for example D1 is an engineer in a company 
while working in housing construction as his second job. Some others have left 
                                                
30 The full name of this organisation is Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution 
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their previous occupation and now are concentrating only on the housing 
construction sector.  
There is no educational requirement to become an individual developer. The 
only requirement to enter to the residential construction sector is to have 
enough available capital. D14 observes: 
‘In Iran, anybody who has the money can build a [residential] 
building; there is nowhere else in the world like this. If you have 
the money you can do it, you do not need to be an engineer, 
nor have a registered company.’ (Interview-D14, 2015)   
The interviewed developers had differing reasons for entering the housing 
construction industry. Some started to work as a developer by redeveloping 
their own family home which was old and had the potential to be redeveloped 
into multi-storey housing; the profit from this project kept them in the business. 
Others have been introduced to the industry by friends and colleagues or their 
previous job was somehow related to the construction industry. Another group 
includes those developers who were not content with their previous occupation 
or field of education and therefore were attracted to the housing construction 
industry.  
One of the interviewees in response to why she was attracted to the housing 
construction industry says: 
‘After graduation, I was wondering what I could do, I didn’t want 
to become an employee. My father said that he could put in 
some money to start this business (housing construction) […] I 
could not have lived the life I wanted to if I had become an 
employee.’  (Interview-D7, 2015) 
This quote also shows the desire to be self-employed rather than an employee, 
which was noticed in other interviews as well. 
D14 explains that at certain times housing construction is very profitable, for 
example at the time when selling extra construction density was very common 
and easy to get, people from other fields were attracted to housing construction 
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(Interview-D14, 2015). He says that doctors, dentists, merchants, traders and 
fast food restaurant owners are among those who joined the industry to benefit 
from the situation and make some profit.  
6-3-1-3 THE LENGTH OF TIME IN THE INDUSTRY 
The length of time that the interviewed developers have been active in the 
housing construction industry as developers varies from only six months, e.g. 
D12, to 25 years, e.g. D13. It is interesting that there was no one among the 
interviewees who has been active in the business for more than 25 years which 
is approximately concurrent with the time that the extra construction density has 
been available. As mentioned in Chapter 4, housing construction started to 
grow fast in the 1990s.  
D5 who has been in the business since 1995 says that in Tehran there are 
many developers who start to work in housing construction, grow quickly for a 
few years and, after collecting some benefits, they then stop their activity 
(Interview-D5, 2014). Interestingly, among the interviewed developers all, 
except D12 who has been working in the construction industry for nine years, 
have been in the industry for more than 20 years or for less than four years. 
This confirms D5’s observation  
6-3-1-4 HOW DOES A DEVELOPER WORK? 
A developer would begin by finding a suitable plot of land which potentially 
ensures a secure financial return. After getting the construction permit, 
commissioning the experts required and providing the finance, the construction 
process would begin. The responsibility of the developers will be over at the end 
of the construction period when units are sold. P2 comments: 
‘After the construction finishes, the developers have no after 
sale responsibility for the maintenance of the buildings. This 
affects the quality of the production as the responsibility of the 
developer is over after the construction.’ (Interview-P2, 2014) 
To carry out the construction, the individual developers should acquire a 
certified architect and a certified civil engineer to prepare and sign the plans 
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which should be submitted to the municipality in order to get the construction 
permit. After acquiring permission, one or more contractors are needed to carry 
out the construction work. Besides the contractors, four engineers including one 
architect, one civil engineer, one electric engineer and one mechanical engineer 
are required to supervise the construction process (Interview-D7, 2016).  
A large development company normally has all the required specialists in-house 
or it employs externally. For example, Sherkat-e Sarmayehgozari-ye Maskan 
has its own team of architects, engineers, contractors and even a selling team 
in-house (Interview-D8, 2015).  
Financing for a housing construction project depends on the size of the 
development, the required funding of the construction and the financial ability of 
the developer. The main finance provider of a project could be either the 
individual developer or a partnership that he/she forms with other individuals or 
companies. In building tower blocks and big projects, a team of financiers can 
be created: one might provide the land, one the main capital with others 
providing the rest of the capital (Interview-D15, 2015). In very rare cases, one 
person has been able to provide all the necessary funding for the construction 
of a high-rise building project (Interview-D15, 2015).  
The most common way of funding construction is going into partnership with the 
landowner. Almost all of the interviewed developers have used this method in 
their work. The price of the land is a very high proportion of the development’s 
total expenditure. This encourages the developers to enter into a partnership 
with the landowner to reduce the costs. Depending on the ratio of the land price 
to the total expenditure, the developer and the landowner share the profit. D7 
says: 
‘Mostly 60% of the built area will be for the landowner and 40% 
for the developer […] if the land is in an expensive area the 
landowner may even ask you for a pre-payment too.’ 
(Interview-D7, 2016) 
Besides forming a partnership to finance a construction project, another 
common practice is to pre-sell housing units before or during the process of 
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construction. Normally a few units will be sold to future occupiers of the flats or 
to investors who wish to sell off the flats at a higher price after the project is 
finished. In some cases the developer may pre-sell most of the units to fund a 
new project. Elaborating on such a situation, D12 talks about a 21-storey tower 
in Niyavaran, Region 1, where he was the construction manager: 
‘When I was working at Borj-avaran Company all the 68 flats of 
the tower were pre-sold immediately after the project began. 
The company bought other land with the money raised by pre-
selling those flats. This caused a severe delay in the 
completion of that tower block, as the money was not spent on 
it but was invested in another project.’ (Interview-D12, 2015) 
Another common method of financing a housing project is by borrowing money 
from banks. The amount of the loan depends on the size of the project and the 
number of flats in that project. Therefore, the developers of small projects are 
not interested in bank loans as the amount of the loan is insignificant compared 
to the expenditure and the interest rate is high. Describing this, D7 says:  
‘We do not use bank loans as banks’ interest fees are high […] 
and the amount they give as loan is not enough. For example, 
they give 20 to 30 million toman for each flat, which is almost 
nothing when you are constructing a project. For a five-storey 
building with five flats you will receive approximately 100 million 
toman which will only cover a week of your expenditure during 
the construction period.’ (Interview-D7, 2016) 
However, if the loan is for a big project, for example with 100 units, the amount 
of the loan could be considerable (Interview-D1, 2014). Moreover, large 
development companies can negotiate with banks and financial institutions to 
get loans with better conditions or they might even become partners with them 
in projects. For example, Borj-avaran Company, which is backed by Tosse-eh 
Credit Institute in one of its projects, got a 100-billion toman loan from Sina 
Bank by depositing the land’s deed as security (Interview-D12, 2015). 
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6-3-2 THE DEVELOPERS’ DECISIONS 
This section looks at reasons behind the decisions that developers make on 
where, when and what to build. Then, at the end, it explores the possible role of 
excess construction density on the decision-making process of the interviewed 
developers; developers try to make decisions that increase their profit by 
reducing risk and increasing returns.  
6-3-2-1 LOCATION 
The map below (Figure 6-1) shows where the interviewed developers were 
working at the time of the interview or used to work in the past. They all have 
justifications for the locations where they work or where they wish to work.  
 
Figure 6-1: Mapping locations where the interviewed developers are working or 
used to work  
The prime agenda of housing developers in Tehran is to maximise their profit 
margin. The location of the construction has a direct impact on that margin for a 
variety of reasons. The interviewed developers mention that the following 
reasons have affected their decision when selecting the location of the site they 
choose to develop or re-develop:  
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" Property market activity in that area (house price and a fast sell) 
" Their available funds  
" The availability of land 
" Demand 
" Knowledge of the area, its municipality and the estate agents. 
For the interviewed developers, the performance of the property market of an 
area plays an important part in their decisions. They mainly consider two 
aspects of the activity of the property market in an area: the selling price of a 
housing unit and the length of time it takes to sell a housing unit.  
The interviewed developers prefer to work in areas where the housing price is 
high. In this regard D6 says: 
‘I think that if someone has had the experience of developing, 
even if only once, they would know that the economic turnover 
would be more in areas where the house price is higher.’ 
(Interview-D6, 2014) 
Although the selling price of housing units is important for them, they must bear 
in mind that, in areas where housing units are too expensive (e.g. some parts of 
Region 1) more time might be needed to sell the flats. Depending on the 
developer’s risk management strategies, he/she might decide to work in an area 
where he/she can sell as expensively as possible and/or as soon as possible.  
For example, D14 mostly works in Region 2 but has also had experience of 
working in Regions 1 and 3. He prefers to work in Region 2 because of the 
quick sale of properties in this region. He says: 
‘[…] it (property in Region 2) is like cash money, the turnover in 
this region and also in Region 5 is very high in comparison with 
any of the other regions. The maximum waiting time to sell a 
property in these regions is only one month while in other 
regions it takes one or two seasons to sell what you have 
produced.’ (Interview-D14, 2015) 
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D14 believes that, compared to Regions 2 and 5, it is more difficult to sell a 
property in Region 1, as the supply there is more than the demand and the flats 
are too big and too expensive which makes them more difficult to sell 
(Interview-D14, 2015). However, there are certain developers (e.g. D15) who 
prefer to wait longer to sell but develop in Region 1. D15 explains: 
‘Because we have our brand and buyers know us, we are sure 
that we can sell all of the units. It might take time sometimes 
but it is worth it. We have long-term plans and we can afford to 
wait for the right buyer.’ (Interview-D15, 2015) 
For this kind of developer their reputation for working in a given area with a 
specific style for a particular market targets is quite important.  
Although the property market performance of an area is crucial for developers in 
deciding where to work, the funds available limits their decisions. Land price 
and other construction costs could make construction activity very expensive. In 
this regard D7 who works in Region 5 says: 
‘Here (in Region 5) prices are such that I can afford to 
construct; if I want to work in Regions 1 and 2 expenses, for 
example the price of land, are a lot more. In Region 5 costs are 
more acceptable but the profit is not as much as in expensive 
areas.’ (Interview-D7, 2015) 
D11 who is active in Regions 8, 13 and 14 says that he works in these areas 
mainly because he can meet the expenses there. However, he prefers to build 
in the northern regions where he finds it challenging to work. He says: 
‘Usually north of the city is better but the costs are higher there 
and consequently making partnership with the landowners is 
more difficult. The prices of flats are normally in the same range 
in the areas where I work but, in the north, prices can be 
different from one building to another based on the structure of 
the building or the brand of the developer […] for example, if 
you say that this building is built by x, this can affect the price of 
the units. This makes it difficult to form partnerships with the 
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landowner. It is definitely better to work in the north but it needs 
a big capital outlay and a strong team.’ (Interview-D11, 2015) 
D11’s account shows that competition between developers to establish their 
reputation in expensive areas is high. Moreover, the landowners of those 
specific areas are selective in choosing developers. These landowners are 
looking for developers who are perceived as unique as this could facilitate the 
selling process.  
The availability of land for development or a redevelopment opportunity is 
another factor which affects the decisions of developers on where to work. 
There are some areas which are not prime locations but, for various reasons, 
such as the increase in construction density, they have become interesting 
locations for some developers.  
For example, Hakimiyeh neighbourhood in Region 4 is not an expensive 
neighbourhood but is interesting for developers especially developers who are 
new in the business. D12 builds in this neighbourhood because there are many 
landowners in the area who are willing to redevelop their land as a result of the 
change in construction density limits in the area. At the same time there are 
some limited developers active in the area (Interview-D12, 2015). 
Besides the reasons mentioned above, interviewed developers said that 
knowledge of an area, its municipality and the estate agents also affects their 
decisions as to where to work. For example, D12 who used to work in a big 
construction company decided to form his own business and had worked as an 
individual developer for six months before the date of the interview. He started 
his first project in Region 4, Hakimiyeh neighbourhood because his friends were 
working in that area and they introduced him to potentially interested 
landowners (Interview-D12, 2015). 
The most important reasons that most of the interviewees mention regarding 
why they decide to work in a particular area are being, or becoming, familiar 
with the municipal bureaucracy of a region, having connections with the 
employees of that municipal region, familiarity with the area and knowing the 
estate agents. In this regard, D14 who works mostly in Region 2 says: 
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‘[…] having a good relationship with the municipality, knowing 
and trusting the municipal employees – all have a major 
contribution in the progress of your application. Also land 
parcels here are not such that everyone can invest in them 
easily; some of them have objections which need to be 
resolved, some of them have problems which make it difficult to 
get the construction permission or have issues with neighbours 
and neighbourhoods. When they know you and trust you in the 
municipality they take it easier on you, they accept your cheque 
as they know it will be cashed with no problem, or when you 
say I will bring the plan before a certain date they know you will 
or when you say I will correct the position of the windows in the 
plan they can trust you […].’ (Interview-D14, 2015) 
D2, D7 and D13 find connections with estate agents very important in working 
in an area as these estate agents connect the landowners and developers in 
the neighbourhood to form a partnership (Interview-D2, 2014; Interview-D7, 
2016; Interview-D13, 2015). D7 says: 
‘They (landowners) approach estate agents and express their 
interest in redevelopment of their plot, then the estate agent will 
contact the developers that they know well and with whom they 
are comfortable, to recommend them. Normally estate agents 
do not recommend a developer that they do not know.’ 
(Interview-D7, 2016)     
As mentioned above, a combination of various reasons shape the decision of 
the developers in where they decide to work. However, as D1 (Interview-D1, 
2014) says, the existence of infrastructures like public transportation and the 
proximity to an underground station is not an important factor for developers in 
deciding where to develop as they target car owners. 
6-3-2-2 MOVING OR STAYING IN A REGION 
Most of the interviewees who are individual developers prefer to stay in a 
neighbourhood rather than moving to different neighbourhoods. This is mainly 
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because of the connections they have made in that region with the municipality, 
estate agents and locals and also the knowledge they have gained in that 
locality through their work. However, large development companies and high-
rise builders are more likely to move around the profitable regions and work in 
different areas of the city if they find an opportunity there. 
In this regard, the interview with D5 is worth mentioning: 
‘Small developers who build, say, five-storey buildings with, for 
example, 10 flats, normally stay in a neighbourhood. For 
example, a person is working in Gisha (a southern part of 
Region 2) for 10 years or working in Narmak (partly in Region 4 
and partly in Region 8) for 10 years; they stay in those areas 
[…] they know good estate agents, who can sell their flats for a 
good market price or find them good and cheap land, they also 
know a trustworthy notary office in the area who charges them 
less when they sell a property and want to transfer the 
ownership to the buyer […]. These developers stay in a 
neighbourhood. 
But tower block builders may stay in a region or may move 
across the regions. For them finding a piece of land on which 
they can build a tower block or a big building is very important, 
so they don’t restrict themselves to one neighbourhood. Some 
of them stay in a region, for example, Region 2, and become 
high-rise builders only in that region which is a big region with 
almost 2 million inhabitants. The other type of high-rise builder 
moves around Regions 1, 2, 3 or 4. These are big investment 
companies usually with strong connections and power […]’ 
(Interview-D5, 2014)  
In confirming what D5 says regarding big investment companies, D8 says that 
the large development company that she works in, Sherkat-e Sarmayeh gozari-
ye Maskan, is active in many parts of the city and even the country (Interview-
D8, 2015).  
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Although small developers prefer to stay in an area because of the reasons 
already mentioned, they might change the location of their activities because of 
economic justifications (Interview-D6, 2014). As we see in Figure 6-1, most of 
the individual developers who have been in the business for a while have, at 
some point, changed the neighbourhood or the region in which they were 
working. However, when they move to another region they will then stay there 
for a while (Interview-D2, 2014). Although this is common practice among 
interviewed individual developers, there are some developers, such as D10, 
who says that he works in different parts of the city at the same time (Interview-
D10, 2015).  
6-3-2-3 DECIDING WHEN TO BUILD 
As housing construction is a business activity for the developers, they do not 
get involved in the production of housing unless they are confident that they can 
make enough profit. The performance of the property market, the costs of 
construction, the banks’ interest rates and the political stability of the country 
play a crucial role in a developer’s decision whether it is a good time to invest in 
housing or not. In this context D6 says: 
‘[…] We do a simple math; we calculate our total costs and 
returns to find out the size of our profit. Then we compare this 
profit to the banks’ interest rate. If the construction generates 
more profit for us than putting our money in the banks, then we 
do it.’ (Interview-D6, 2014)  
At the time of the interview, D7 preferred not to start a new project because the 
property market was stagnant and people who were buying for investment did 
not invest in the property market at that time. She says: 
‘It (housing construction) used to have 40% profit for us, but 
now, with the slow market and reduction of prices, it only gives 
30% profit which is almost equal to the bank interest! So, I 
prefer to do nothing and put my money in the bank and get the 
interest.’ (Interview-D7, 2015)      
D12 has the same view. He says: 
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‘Why would I get involved in a project and deal with the 
municipality, labourers, neighbours, contractors and engineers 
if the profit is not good enough? The profit of construction 
should be more than the bank interest. This means if the bank 
interest rate is 23%, construction should have at least 30% 
profit. Otherwise we won’t do it. […]’ (Interview-D12, 2015) 
The political stability of the country also affects the investment in housing 
construction. When the country is not in a stable condition, investment in landed 
properties will be reduced. D12 (Interview-D12, 2015) mentions that the result 
of Iran’s deal with P5+1, which was not reached at the time of the interview, 
would be very important for him in deciding whether to invest in construction or 
not. D8, in this regard, says: 
‘When Iran is not politically and economically stable, capital 
goes to small and movable things; such as foreign currencies, 
gold coins and cars, rather than property. In recent years, our 
international relations with the West and also the attractiveness 
of the markets in our neighbouring countries like Turkey and 
UAE and even Spain and Cyprus, attracted many investors to 
invest there rather than investing in Iran […].’ (Interview-D8, 
2015) 
With regard to Iran’s international relations and investment in housing, D10 
comments: 
‘If our nuclear energy issues (with the West) are resolved, we 
will certainly have more stability. And what will happen? The 
Dollar exchange rate will be reduced […] and people, instead of 
investing in purchasing luxury cars to sell at a profit when they 
are shipped here […] will probably invest more in housing.’ 
(Interview-D10, 2015) 
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6-3-2-4 WHAT TO BUILD 
The final physical shape and dimensions of flats, number of units in one building 
and the amount of communal space of a residential building are determined 
based on what is profitable for the developer, what is in demand and what is 
practical. To a smaller extent, personal taste and the background of the 
developers are also influential in the final product.  
For the developers, it is important to make as much use of the space as 
possible. In Tehran properties are priced and sold based on the price per 
square metre. As a result, it is important to increase the saleable space. D5 
gives an example: 
‘If a developer wants to construct a seven-storey building in 120 
m2 of a 200m2 land, without considering the communal spaces, 
820m2 can be built. How much of this 820m2 can be saleable? 
One architect might design it in a way to make 500m2 of 
saleable space the other one might make it to 550–600 m2. 
Each metre of this extra 50 or 100 m2 is profit for the developer. 
As a result, he puts pressure on the designer to achieve what is 
profitable for him […].’ (Interview-D5, 2014) 
Although D5 thinks that the developer puts pressure on the designer to 
maximise the saleable space, D8 says:  
‘This is not pressure. We can’t say that a developer puts 
pressure on the designer; this is an interactive and 
communicative process. It is the investor’s right to optimise the 
project and an architect should provide the best possible 
service for the client.’ (Interview-D8, 2015) 
Although increasing the saleable area is crucial for the developers’ financial 
gain, accommodating buyers’ demands is mentioned as another important 
factor by the interviewed developers in determining what to build. Depending on 
the region and the neighbourhood where the building is located, buyers’ and 
users’ requirements vary which needs to be taken into consideration. In high-
end northern neighbourhoods, luxury buildings with swimming pools and extra-
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allocated parking are in demand (Interview-D10, 2015) while in southern and 
poor areas flats are smaller with fewer facilities (Interview-D11, 2015). D10 
says: 
‘The kind of building that you will build depends on its location. 
If it is in a stylish area then you will construct a luxury building 
because it has the potential […] to be sold, for example, for 30 
million toman per square metre. You need to provide three or 
four parking places for each flat, spacious communal areas, a 
spa and a swimming pool, reception area, a space for a porter 
and […].’ (Interview-D10, 2015) 
In the prosperous northern areas where the property market is buoyant, 
developers compete against each other to attract potential buyers. As a result, 
the developers try to present themselves as the best or make a brand for 
themselves in order to attract the attention of the targeted buyers. D5 says: 
‘[…] as there are many vacant flats in the northern areas, the 
developers try innovative ways. For example, they may spend a 
lot to have an outstanding and expensive façade […] made by 
travertine stone, the use of high-quality windows […] they also 
work a lot on the plan of flats to have a very efficient layout 
[…].’ (Interview-D5, 2014) 
Besides increasing the saleable space and satisfying the demand, 
consideration of the construction regulations will affect the final outcome of the 
development. There are two ways that construction regulations could affect the 
decision of developers. Firstly, construction regulations set specific obligations 
which should be addressed to get the construction permit. For example, the 
area of the land and the width of the street impose restrictions on the 
construction density of a development. Based on Tehran’s plan in the areas 
where land parcels are smaller than a specific amount or the width of a street is 
narrower than a set width, it is not possible to build tall buildings (interview-D13, 
2015). In some cases these regulations have forced a large company to change 
its focus and consider the construction of smaller-scale buildings. For example, 
although Sherkat-e Sarmayeh Gozariye Maskan is a large development 
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company, at the moment they are working on smaller developments as access 
to large lands is limited in inner Tehran (Interview-D8, 2015).  
Secondly, by considering the construction regulations developers try to avoid 
extra expenditure. Although building to maximise the saleable space is a priority 
for the developers, at the same time they need to be careful about the 
construction regulations which might compromise their profit. D12’s example 
clarifies this point: 
‘[…] we made a contract with the landowner to build a six-
storey building with three flats on each floor. We started the 
process of getting the construction permission and they (the 
municipality) told us that in order to build three flats in six floors 
we need a second staircase. This is because of fire regulations. 
This is a new regulation. […] we did a calculation and we 
realised if we put the second staircase we would lose 140m2 
which means 600 million toman less profit. So, we decided to 
build two flats, in each of six floors. The area of each flat 
becomes 125m2 which is bigger and harder to sell but still 
better than loosing 140m2.’ (Interview-D12, 2015) 
D12 also explains that if the total area of the building is more than 2,000 m2 
then the developer needs to provide extra technical plans endorsed by the 
relevant authorities and that the contractor for the construction should be a 
registered company rather than an individual builder. These requirements cost 
both money and time for the developers and they will not decide to do this 
unless his/her calculations support the profitability of such a decision (Interview-
D12, 2015). 
D8 gives another example of why they might decide not to build the maximum 
amount they can build. She says that based on regulations if a development 
has more than 400 housing units they are required to provide an educational 
centre as well, which does not have added value for them. As a result, instead 
of building the maximum amount, which in one of her projects was 420, she 
decided to build 398 flats (Interview-D8, 2015). 
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6-3-2-5 EXTRA DENSITY AND THE DEVELOPERS’ DECISIONS 
The construction density limit of a land parcel contributes to the decision of 
developers as to whether or not to build on that land. As mentioned before, 
economic justifications play a major role in developers’ decisions. Due to rising 
land prices in Tehran, if the construction density of a land is less than a certain 
amount, which would differ in each case, it is not always economically justifiable 
for the developer to build on that land.  
D6 elaborates on the importance of the construction density limit on his 
decision: 
‘Normally, the maximum construction density of land is one of 
the very important parameters that you should consider when 
you want to build either for personal use or for business. Let me 
give an example. It has been two to three years since we have 
been thinking about redeveloping my father’s house which is 
now very old. But the construction density that they give to it is 
240%. When we did the maths we saw that it was not worth 
investing in redeveloping it […] because if we deposit our 
money in the bank we could get 20% profit which is the same 
as the profit that we could get by redeveloping that land. This is 
because they gave us a maximum construction density of 
240% which means four floors which does not have an 
economic justification. Because the land price will be divided 
into four, this makes each flat more expensive than the area’s 
average price and it will be hard to sell them […].’ (Interview-
D6, 2014) 
Most of the interviewed developers perceive extra construction density as a 
positive factor in their work and for the final users. However, they think 
increasing construction density without planning would have a negative effect 
for the city. D10 says:  
‘It is an advantage for me to build six storeys instead of four, for 
us as developers we could build with less costs if we build 
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buildings with more floors […] because the land cost is the 
same and we only have to pay the municipality for the extra 
construction density and pay for the construction of those extra 
floors […]. But if we can’t get extra construction density the 
housing will become more expensive […] when I build less, the 
final price for each flat will be higher and this causes inflation. 
In my opinion if they continue selling extra construction density 
it will be a win-win situation for all. The municipality benefits 
from it, the developer benefits and people could buy homes 
more cheaply.’ (Interview-D10, 2015)  
He continues: 
‘Selling construction density has been good for us and the 
municipality but not very desirable for the city as the city is 
getting more and more busy and polluted.’ (Interview-D10, 
2015) 
D11 has the same attitude toward extra construction density: 
‘Selling construction density has a positive effect on our work. It 
has created inflation but for us it was good and financially 
justifiable but I am not sure if it has been good for the city.’ 
(Interview-D11, 2015) 
As mentioned, developers mostly try to get as much extra construction density 
as possible. They try to maximise their profit by using each extra square metre 
that they can to construct (Interview-D1, 2014). For example, D13 says that he 
tries to increase the storeys of the buildings that he constructs from five floors to 
six or seven (Interview-D13, 2015). However, the arbitrary granting of extra 
construction density has been reduced recently as a result of the approval of 
Tehran’s new plan. Reacting to this, D10 says: 
‘At the moment, the selling of extra construction density is not 
as it was before. Until two years ago (2013) they used to sell 
construction density massively. But now, regulations are taken 
more seriously by the municipality. It is not like before when 
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they would give extra construction density even to a plot 
located in six-metre-wide passages […].’ (Interview-D10, 2015) 
The reduction in the granting of extra construction density has discouraged 
some developers and landowners in getting involved in the construction 
industry. D11 says:  
‘It is more than a year since selling construction density has 
been reduced […] this has affected the tendency to construct 
buildings. The more the construction density, the more there 
will be an economic justification for landowners and us to 
initiate a project. With less construction density, it would be 
hard to convince landowners and our partners to start a 
construction project.’ (Interview-D11, 2015) 
However, some of the interviewed developers believe that the execution of 
construction density restrictions imposed by Tehran’s plan cannot be carried out 
as it has affected the Tehran Municipality’s income. For example, D6 says: 
‘At the moment, restrictions of the Tehran’s plan for zones are 
loose again … as the Tehran Municipality’s main income is 
from selling construction density. When they started to 
implement the new plan, because of the restrictive regulations, 
the application for construction permits reduced a lot. The 
municipality had to relax some of the regulations again.’ 
(Interview-D6, 2014) 
Although it is common practice to try to increase the construction density as 
much as possible, there are situations where the developer would decide not to 
increase the construction density or even, not to use all of the permitted 
construction density. For example, in the projects with large land parcels the 
developer might not need to get extra construction density. D8 explains: 
‘In big parcels, normally our ground coverage is less than the 
permitted ground coverage of 60%. 60% of a big parcel is quite 
a lot. The meaning of 60% of 200 m2 is quite different from the 
meaning of 60% of 2000 m2. […] Besides that, in some cases if 
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we wanted to build extra floors by buying construction density it 
wouldn’t be profitable. For example, if we build more than 400 
units we have to provide an education centre too. In these 
cases we would try to finish off with 398 units rather than 
getting extra construction density to build 420 units […].’ 
(Interview-D8, 2015) 
In the cases when a developer wishes to construct a building exceeding the 
height restrictions of an area or on a particular plot of land, she/he should 
prepare a justification plan. Making the decision on whether to grant a 
construction permit to this kind of project is mostly beyond the region’s 
municipality responsibility. These projects will be referred to Commission No. 5 
to be approved. D14 shares his experience in this scenario: 
‘The average height is five to six floors in Region 2, depending 
on the area of the land and the width of the street […] but if the 
land is big and you can prepare a justification plan which 
complies with Tehran’s plan and has a technical justification, 
then you can submit it to Commission No. 5 to get a 
construction permit. We recently submitted one justification 
plan to the commission but it will take a while to receive their 
response […] we might need to wait for six months to a year.’ 
(Interview-D14, 2015) 
In some cases, developers prefer to get permission to build a development 
exceeding the height restrictions from the region’s municipality rather than 
submitting a justification plan to Commission No. 5. It is very difficult to get such 
permission from a region’s municipality now. Big investors who have the right 
connections and capital might be able to negotiate with the municipality to get 
this kind of permission. Among the interviewed developers only one of them 
explicitly talks about an example from his previous employer who got the permit 
from the region’s municipality: 
‘The land (located in Niyavaran) on which we built the building 
was one where we could have built a maximum of nine floors 
but we got permission for 21 floors. […] These big companies 
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can get permission for extra construction density easily but 
normal people like me can’t […] they can negotiate. For 
example, the developer gives a flat to the person responsible in 
exchange for five more floors […] But in some cases the project 
may stall, we had a project in Vanak and one in Zaafaraniyeh 
which were stopped; sometimes it gets beyond the region’s 
municipality control. It becomes a war between powers. In 
these cases, you may be forced to lose one floor. As long as it 
is in the hands of the region’s municipality it can be resolved 
amicably. […] but when Commission No. 100 gets involved it 
will get tricky [...] In the Zaafaraniyeh project a verdict was 
issued to lose a floor but I am not sure what has happened in 
the end […] I myself saw the verdict which said that one 
parking floor should be filled with concrete […].’ (Interview-D12, 
2015) 
This is not something that a regular developer can do. D2 (Interview-D2, 2014) 
says that a developer might be able to get away with some minor lawbreaking 
by paying the penalty to Commission No. 100 but building an extra floor is 
beyond the redline. 
6-4 THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE TEHRAN 
MUNICIPALITY AND HOUSING DEVELOPERS 
The following sections will discuss the nature of the relationship between the 
Tehran Municipality and the housing developers which has resulted in giving 
more power to the developers and them being able to negotiate their own idea 
of what is constructed in Tehran. The magnitude of that negotiating power is not 
the same for individual developers as for the large-scale development 
companies.  
6-4-1 THE FINANCIAL NEED OF THE MUNICIPALITY 
While for developers maximising profit is the prime goal, for the municipality 
increasing the amount of its income is one of its main priorities. As mentioned 
above, 75% of the municipality income comes from development charges. The 
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municipality is therefore dependant on the construction sector. As a result, the 
municipality tries to make development activity profitable for the developers so 
that it can generate income from those activities.  
Without receiving any financial assistance from the government, the 
municipality is under pressure to provide its own finances for the city. The 
implementation of large-scale projects like Tehran’s underground system and 
the renovation of the bus system is a major expense for the municipality 
(Interview-P21, 2015). With this in mind, P21 says: 
‘A big share of the Tehran Municipality’s budget is allocated to 
the construction of public transport and railways (tube system); 
the government should help the municipality in this regard […], 
previous governments did not help the municipality, the current 
government promised to help but because of the issues created 
by the previous government, like the international sanctions, 
this government has not been able to help yet. Also the 
reduction in the price of oil has put the government under 
pressure. We are not optimistic that this government, despite its 
promise, will be able to assist the municipality.’ (Interview-P21, 
2015) 
Apart from the high cost of large-scale projects imposed on the municipality, 
there are also projects being proposed by the municipality which are not 
priorities for the city (Interview-P2, 2014). Being Tehran’s Mayor is a good 
opportunity for him to prove his management capability to the residents of 
Tehran and justify persuading them to vote for him in a presidential election. 
Proposing and implementing projects like the expansion of the highway system 
of the city, e.g. making a second level for Sadr Highway, are not the city’s major 
priority but it provides good publicity for the Mayor (Interview-P21, 2015).  
To generate money for the city, the municipality needs the payments received 
from the developers and to achieve that the municipality has been 
compromising the implementation of Tehran’s plans. P24 describes the meeting 
he had in the 1990s with one of the finance deputies of the municipality which 
shows their attitude:  
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‘We produced a set of regulations for high-rise buildings. I 
wanted to meet the finance deputy of Tehran Municipality when 
Karbaschi was the Mayor, Mr. ****, to discuss the plan with him 
and in a way to get his unofficial approval. […] I asked him how 
I can make sure that if you are offered money you do not put 
the regulations in your drawer? He laughed and told me, ‘You 
don’t know how heavy is my responsibility; I have to earn a lot 
of money per day for the Tehran Municipality!’ (Interview-P24, 
2015)  
To build or re-develop land on more than two floors (120% of 60% of a land 
parcel) the developer must pay the construction density charge. This is a legal 
payment if the construction density is in line with Tehran’s plan. The problem is 
that the municipality grants extra construction density beyond the plan by 
negotiating with the investors (Interview-P17, 2015).  
Compromising the construction density regulations of the plan has been 
happening in certain areas of the city more than in other areas. Areas with a 
higher surplus in the housing construction investment have experienced the 
construction density regulations being dismissed more frequently (Interview-P2, 
2014). Agreeing with this, P19 says: 
‘In the areas where the price of land and real estate are high, 
ignoring the plans by the municipality to generate money is 
more probable.’ (Interview-P19, 2015)  
P25 explains that most of the municipality’s income comes from the northern 
and western regions of the city where housing and commercial construction are 
prosperous. He says: 
‘We have four regions that provide more than 60–70% of the 
municipality’s income. These are Regions 1, 3, north of 2 and 
22. […] Region 22 is a very fast developing region with big 
malls and housing developments. […] North of region 5 is not 
bad too but not as good as regions 1, 2, 3 and 22. […]. In 
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Region 4 only Pasdaran31 is good but in general Region 4 is the 
most populated region with many deprived areas which impose 
a lot of expenditure on the municipality.’ (Interview-P25, 2015)  
Although Tehran City Council has the legal authority to inspect the performance 
of the municipality, it has not been able to stop the Tehran Municipality from 
generating illegal income. The reason behind Tehran City Council’s inability to 
fully oversee the performance of the municipality is an issue for further 
investigation. However, P21 who was a member on Tehran City Council at the 
time of interview points out: 
‘The structure of the city council institution is such that in the 
case of any problem it will first give an official warning to the 
mayor, if the warning is not effective then the council can 
summon the mayor to the city council. If the summon is not 
effective then the council can plan to intrepellate the mayor. If 
we suppose that the city council is politically homogeneous, 
then the mayor can be deposed easily, which is not good for 
the city management. But if the city council is politically divided, 
like the forth council32, when I plan to interpellate, the council 
members who are on my side in terms of expertise but 
politically are on the mayor’s side would not vote to dismiss the 
mayor […].  It would be better to have a mechanism like the 
government and if we had a question on e.g. transportation 
then we can interpellate the transportation deputy of the 
municipality rather than the mayor.’ (Interview-P21, 2015)    
This highlights the varied factors that are influential in restraining the authority of 
the city council. 
6-4-2 THE POWER OF DEVELOPERS 
This section looks at the power of developers in Tehran to pursue their agenda 
even when this goes against existing plans and rules. This power was 
                                                
31 Pasdaran Street is located on the western side of Region 4 
32 In the Fourth Tehran City Council, 13 members were from The Reformist Party and 18 from 
The Principlists (Conservative) Party.  
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established and then institutionalised because the municipality is financially 
dependent on the construction sector and the charges received from the 
developers. Concerning this P2 says: 
‘As expenditure of the municipality is more than its sustainable 
income, investors are the ones who determine what will 
happen.’ (Interview-P2, 2015)  
Throughout the last 30 years of construction in Tehran, the scale of this power 
has changed. At some stages developers have had more power to get what 
they wanted, and at others their powers have been more confined. It is not 
possible to say exactly when they had more power and when they had less. The 
following situation shows the complexity of judging the power of the developers.  
During the 90s when the construction density bonus became widespread, 
almost everyone could get it but the bonus was mostly for one to two additional 
floors. However, in recent years only a limited number of developers can get 
additional construction density but they have received it to build towers that are 
five to ten floors more than the density regulation of an area. It is hard to define 
exactly in which of these two periods the developers had the most power in 
deciding about construction density.  
The size of an agent carrying out the development has a direct relationship with 
its bargaining power. Although approximately 70–80% of the developers in 
Tehran are small-sized development companies or individual developers, the 
rest who are large investors are in a strong position to make big deals and 
impose their own agendas. In respect of this P10 says: 
‘The influence of those 20% (developers of high-rise buildings) 
is much more than the other 80%. Those 80% can get 
permission for a maximum of two extra floors but the 20% 
shape the built environment in some areas because the 
municipality needs them and they need the municipality.’ 
(Interview-P10, 2015)  
To generate income the municipality deals with large-scale developers. P2 
says: 
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‘The mayor himself told me once that he is managing 
(providing) the city with money coming from only 25–30 
investors. This means that the money that the municipality 
receives from other sources is far less than the amount it is 
receiving from these 30 persons/institutions.’ (Interview-P2, 
2015)  
P25, who used to be in a position to closely observe the mechanism with which 
the municipality deals with the developers to generate money for the 
municipality, describes the complexity of the relationship between the 
municipality and the large-scale developers: 
‘There is a complex framework in which the municipality works. 
There is an economic rent. The large-scale players in the 
property market in Tehran are influencing the development 
process in two ways. On the one hand they are major 
contractors of the municipality and carry out municipal projects. 
On the other hand, as large-scale developers, they are the 
major source of income for the municipality. When they do 
something for the municipality they ask in return for special 
permissions. And the interesting thing is that they propose to 
the municipality what project it should carry out next. The 
municipal projects are not proposed as a result of being the 
priority of the community.’ (Interview-P25, 2015)  
It could be concluded that there is a bilateral relationship between big 
developers and the municipality. These large-scale development companies 
have access to resources which puts them in a strong negotiating position.  
Some of these large-scale developers are those building high-rise residential 
buildings in the northern regions and the others are those involved in the 
development of commercial malls and shopping centres which have recently 
become a fast growth area (Interview-P25, 2015). These developers are mostly 
connected to financial institutions. P25 says: 
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‘Most of the banks in Iran have a construction company 
associated with them. These construction companies search for 
gardens in Region 1, they change the land-use from garden to 
residential and then construct a 20–30 floor tower block. This is 
not something that ordinary developers can do. Zaafaraniyeh, 
Elahiyeh, Darband and Niyavaran are the areas in Region 1 
affected a lot from this process.’ (Interview-P25, 2015) 
The current government’s High Council has stopped (or delayed) the 
construction of a few of the buildings that gained permission in the framework 
mentioned. For example, the High Council stopped a tower block project in 
Region 2, Iran-Zamin Street as it was in conflict with the regulations (Interview-
P2, 2015). However, as P2 explains, it is not possible to terminate all of these 
sorts of projects: 
‘Before the current government, municipality made a 8,000 
billion deal with Ansar Bank and in return gave them permission 
for large-scale developments like the Atlas Mall projects; we 
were in a hard situation. On the one hand we could not accept 
it, on the other hand we could not stop it because terminating 
such a deal would bankrupt the municipality. However, we are 
trying not to let the municipality enter into such deals anymore.’ 
(Interview-P2, 2015) 
Big developers and investors prefer to carry out a construction project with high 
profit, mostly in the northern regions for more affluent residents. As a result of 
the power they have gained in providing for the municipality, they bend the rules 
and regulations as much as possible. P24 says that: 
‘As a planner, you can’t say that I decide that this parcel should 
be built on four floors, your will and power is nothing compared 
with the will and the power of investors and the market; that is 
why the construction density proposed by all the 22 consultant 
companies have been changed by the municipality.’ (Interview-
P24, 2015)  
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It should be mentioned that apart from the financial dependency of the 
municipality on private developers there are other factors empowering housing 
developers to achieve their agendas. In Iran there is a branch in the Judicial 
System of Iran, called Divan-e Edalat-e Edari, which emphasises the vested 
rights and ownership rights of individuals. In many cases the landowners who, 
for whatever reason, have been restricted from building on their land or have 
had restrictions put on their building, appeal to Divan-e Edalat-e Edari to protect 
their ownership rights (Interview-P31, 2016).  
6-5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented and analysed the primary data that was collected during 
the researcher’s field trip to Tehran. There are two major considerations in this 
chapter: firstly, how the Tehran Municipality generates income and secondly, 
how housing developers work. The ways in which the financial objectives of the 
Tehran Municipality were matched with housing developers’ agendas was 
highlighted. The next chapter will focus on how the common interests of the 
Tehran Municipality and those of the housing developers affect Tehran’s plan.  
To summarise; since 1983 the Tehran Municipality began to become self-
sufficient. As a result, new financing tools to charge new developments were 
devised. The excess construction density charge forms the majority of the 
development charges. Development charges in general, and excess 
construction density charge in particular, have generated a considerable 
amount of income for the Tehran Municipality. However, this financing 
mechanism resulted in the following consequences: 
" The Tehran Municipality is not accountable to the central 
government or to the residents because it does not receive money 
from the central government and the amount of tax that it receives 
from residents is negligible. 
" The Tehran Municipality has become financially dependent on the 
construction sector and the money it receives from developers. This 
source of income is unsustainable because the amount of 
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construction activities in a year is not predictable and can vary 
considerably. 
" The Tehran Municipality is under pressure to accommodate the 
economic interests of developers which has resulted in an increase 
in the bargaining power of developers. 
Offering excess construction density in the 1990s has boosted the construction 
sector and attracted many individuals to work as housing developers. Between 
70 and 80% of housing developers in Tehran are either individual developers or 
small construction companies. Only 20% of the housing developers in Tehran 
are large development companies who are interested in large-scale 
developments such as high-rise buildings. 
The prime agenda of housing developers in Tehran is to maximise their profit 
margin. To achieve this goal, the location of the development site plays a strong 
role in their development decisions. They prefer to develop in locations where:  
" The property market is active which means the housing price is high 
and they can sell properties reasonably fast. Depending on the 
developer’s risk management strategies, he/she might decide to 
work in an area where he/she can sell as expensively as possible 
and/or as soon as possible 
" They can afford the costs of construction. Land prices are very high 
in some areas which requires greater resources to initiate a 
construction project 
" They can compete with other developers working in that area 
" Suitable land supply or redevelopment opportunities exist 
" They have enough knowledge of the area, its municipality and its 
estate agents. 
Housing developers mostly prefer to continue to work in the same 
neighbourhood rather than moving around the city. The reasons behind this 
preference are the connections they have made in that region with the 
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municipality, estate agents and locals and also the local knowledge that they 
have attained from that area. However, large development companies might 
move between regions, as they need to find a suitable land parcel for the 
construction of a high-rise building.  
Housing developers decide to initiate a development project when the property 
market is performing well and also construction is more profitable than other 
investment methods. The physical shape of a construction would be affected by 
what the developer conceives as profitable, what is in demand by buyers and 
what is practical in terms of regulations.  
Due to rising land prices in Tehran, the construction density limit of a land 
parcel contributes to the decisions of developers. Extra construction density is 
perceived as a positive factor for housing developers to initiate a construction 
project. If the construction density of a land is less than a certain amount, which 
would differ in each case, it is not economically justifiable for the developer to 
build on that land.  
Housing developers mostly prefer to increase the construction density of the 
building that they want to construct. By doing so they can increase the saleable 
area of the building. However, individual developers and small construction 
companies are mostly able to increase the construction density for a maximum 
of just two more floors while large development companies would try to increase 
the construction density as much as possible and for as much profitable as 
possible.  
Large-scale development companies are in a better bargaining position with the 
municipality as they have access to resources and the municipality needs the 
charge that they pay to them. To accommodate developers’ interest, the Tehran 
Municipality has been compromising the implementation of the Tehran plan 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. Compromising the construction 
density regulations of the plan has been happening in certain areas of the city 
more than others. These are mostly the expensive areas in which the housing 
developers are most interested. As a result, most of the municipality’s income 
comes from those expensive northern and western regions of the city.  
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7-1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concentrates on what happens behind the scenes of the 
development process by using primary data collected in Tehran. In Chapter 6, 
by exploring the Tehran municipality’s financing mechanism and the decisions 
of housing developers, it was concluded that the financial objectives of the 
Tehran municipality are matched to the agendas of the housing developers. As 
a result, the Tehran Municipality has to accommodate developers’ interests 
when setting its financial plans. 
This chapter will focus on the implications that the Tehran Municipality’s 
financial dependency on developers have had on the urban planning system of 
Tehran. Then it will discuss that Tehran’s development is not happening based 
on plans as plans are under influence to accommodate financial needs of 
Tehran Municipality. The chapter will finish by discussing the spatial 
manifestations of the dynamic that exists between the Tehran Municipality’s 
financial needs, the developers’ interests and those of the planning system of 
Tehran. 
7-2 TEHRAN PLAN 
As explained in Chapter 4, the main document that directs the future 
development of Tehran is the Tehran Structural-Strategic (Comprehensive) 
Plan (TSS(C)P). This plan looks at the whole city and sets the main strategies 
and visions for the city (Interview-P22, 2015). This plan has a 1:10,000 zoning 
map of Tehran attached. The next level of the plan, which is in more detail, is 
the District Plan (DP) which is the basis for regions’ municipalities to grant 
construction permits to applicants. In the following sections the process of 
preparation, approving and implementation of these plans will be discussed. 
7-2-1 OCCIDENTAL INSPIRATIONS 
From the 1960s to the 1990s in Iran, planning documents used to be in the form 
of comprehensive and detailed plans. In the 1990s a new system was 
introduced and the comprehensive plan was replaced by a structural-strategic 
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plan and the detailed plans were replaced by District Plans (DPs), Area Action 
Plans (AAPs) and Thematic Plans (TPs). 
Urban planners in Iran found the linear system of comprehensive and detailed 
plans ineffective. P6 remembers that: 
‘Comprehensive and detailed plans used to be prepared based 
on the Geddes approach […]. This approach is a linear process 
and is in three steps; the first step is data collection, the next 
step is analysing the collected data and then the proposal is 
presented.’ (Interview-P6, 2015) 
P6 (Interview-P6, 2015) believes that the linear approach of comprehensive and 
detailed plans made them inflexible, rigid and unable to respond to complicated 
urban issues. 
As a result, a new system of structural-strategic planning was introduced. This 
system had a spiral approach and was a combination of British-style structure 
plans and US-style strategic planning (Interview-P6, 2015). P6 says that he 
learned about these methods of planning at the time that he was doing his 
Masters and later his PhD at the DPU at UCL (Interview-P6, 2015). He says: 
‘I thought that instead of preparing a structure plan or a 
strategic plan it was more effective to localise the ideas and 
combine the two methods. This is where the concept of 
structural-strategic plans emerged.’ (Interview-P6, 2015) 
The structural-strategic plan is based on defining four separate structures. 
These four are: the economic; social and cultural; environmental (ecosystem); 
and physical structures of the city. After defining them, a set of strategies would 
be presented to achieve the proposed structures (Interview-P6, 2015). 
In 2001, the structural-strategic system was adopted in the Architecture and 
Urbanism Department (AUD) of the Tehran Municipality in order to prepare a 
new plan for Tehran. However, P6 says that the prepared plan did not 
completely follow the method that he had proposed for various reasons such as 
the limited intellectual capacity of the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development 
    
CHAPTER 7 – PLANNING AND UNPLANNED DEVELOPMENT IN TEHRAN 
226 
 
(MRUD), the architectural background of the consultant companies in Iran and 
the lack of economic and social expertise in their teams (Interview-P6, 2015). 
7-2-2 THE PROCESS OF PREPARATION AND APPROVAL 
The process of preparation and approval of the new planning documents for 
Tehran can be described in three stages: the preparing and approving of a 
1:10000 plan, the preparing and approving of a 1:2000 plan and the updating 
phase. The following sections will look at these three stages. 
Accounts from as many interviewed planners as possible have been 
incorporated into the writing of the following sections but the reports of P17 
dominate. This is because he has been involved in the process of plan 
production and approval from the early stages to almost the end of the process 
and he has been aware of most of the events and details of the process. 
7-2-2-1 THE FIRST STAGE: 1:10,000 PLAN 
In 2001, the AUD of the Tehran Municipality appointed 22 consultant companies 
to prepare the structural-strategic plan of Tehran and the DPs for the 22 city 
districts. These were undertaken at the same time, producing drawings on a 
scale of 1:10000. A consultant company, ParsBoom Consulting Engineers, was 
appointed to facilitate the coordination of these 22 consultants so that they 
synthesised with each other as well as with the municipality and the government 
(Interview-P6, 2015; Interview-P17, 2015). 
In 2003, the Tehran Municipality, the MRUD (the government) and Islamic City 
Council of Tehran (ICCT)33 made a tripartite agreement to establish an inter-
sectoral institution to facilitate their collaboration. This body was called the 
Tehran Urban Planning Agency34 (Agency). Establishing this Agency 
coordinated the activities of all the parties involved (Interview-P17, 2015). 
In 2007, the Urban Planning and Architecture High Council (UPAHC)35 
approved the TSS(C)P. The UPAHC is the highest decision-making institution in 
                                                
33 Islamic City Council of Tehran, ICCT and city council are used interchangeably 
34 In Farsi: Nahad-e Barnameh-rizi Tose’eh Shahr-e Tehran. 
35 Urban Planning and Architecture High Council, UPAHC and High Council are used 
interchangeably  
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the field of urban planning and development and its decisions are often 
considered to be law (Interview-P2, 2014). Before the approval of the plan at 
High Council it had to go through other organisations and institutions and be 
approved. Firstly, ICCT had to approve it, then the Management and Planning 
Organisation of Tehran Province (a governmental institution), after that 
Commission No. 5 (CN5) in the Tehran Municipality, then the Technical 
Committee of UPAHC and finally the UPAHC (Interview-P17, 2015). 
During this lengthy process of approval, each of the involved organisations 
would have their say which resulted in alterations to the plan (Interview-P17, 
2015). P17 explains that: 
‘As we had not had the zoning method in our country before 
and it was a new concept […] its language and jargon were 
neither recognised nor familiar. As a result, the members of the 
commissions to whom we had to submit the plan for approval 
could not easily discuss and understand the plan. That’s why 
they were trying to impose alterations. The planning team was 
desperate to get the approval, so in many cases the alterations 
would be accepted just to hasten the process.’ (Interview-P17, 
2015) 
In addition to the fact that the responsible members mentioned were not familiar 
with the new plan’s terminology, P17 (Interview-P17, 2015) also mentions two 
other reasons which resulted in negative alterations to the plan at this stage. 
Firstly, there was the limited planning knowledge of the members of the 
committees which impeded the process and secondly, there was the negative 
attitude of these members towards the Tehran Municipality. He explains that: 
‘Unfortunately, we are facing a structural problem which is the 
irrelevant qualifications and lack of expertise of the 
representatives of the organisations who attend the planning 
committees and have the right to sign off the plans and 
documents. Usually their field of study is not architecture or 
urban planning. For example, the representative of the 
Department of Environment (in CN5) has a degree in 
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Mathematics; or the representative of the Ministry of Interior 
has a degree in Religious Studies […] how can they discuss 
urban issues? The other issue is their negative perception of 
the Tehran Municipality. They presume that the plan is 
prepared in a way to generate income for the municipality. As 
they don’t trust it they hesitate to sign documents and before 
signing they try to change the parts that they think have been 
added by the municipality to generate income. This process 
had negative implications for the plan.’ (Interview-P17, 2015) 
In 2008, the approved plan was presented to the Tehran Municipality and the 
Mayor passed it to all sections of the municipality. The Mayor then asked the 
AUD of the Tehran Municipality to prepare 1:2000 maps of the DPs (Interview-
P17, 2015). 
7-2-2-2 THE SECOND STAGE: 1:2000 DISTRICT PLANS 
This section looks at the preparation and approval process of the 1:2000 DPs 
which are the main planning documents used by the regions’ municipalities 
when considering construction applications. The process of preparing 1:2000 
plans from 1:10000 plans and elaborating construction codes became 
controversial and very lengthy. 
The first controversy was over who was to prepare the DPs. As P17 explains: 
‘Disagreement occurred between the AUD of the Tehran 
Municipality and the Tehran Urban Planning Agency over which 
of them should supervise and prepare the DPs […] the 
municipality really wanted to take over the responsibility.’ 
(Interview-P17, 2015) 
In the midst of this argument, the Agency was dismantled as the government 
arm of the tripartite agreement decided to leave the Agency. As P28 says: 
‘In 2010, the MRUD announced that we did not need to 
continue our collaboration with the Agency. The ICCT and the 
municipality did remain. Subsequently the city council withdrew 
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its collaboration and said that we did not need a specific 
research agency. So, the municipality decided to merge the 
Agency with the Tehran Urban Research & Planning Centre.’ 
(Interview-P28, 2015) 
The government justified its decision to leave the Agency by referring to the law 
saying that the preparation of the DPs is the responsibility of municipalities and 
should be approved by CN5. However, P17 believes that the reason behind the 
decision of the MRUD to leave was related to personal disagreements between 
the Deputy at that time and the then Head of the Agency (Interview-P17, 2015). 
In the absence of the Agency, the AUD of the Tehran Municipality took over the 
preparation process of the DPs. At the same time in 2009, after seven years of 
collaboration, the municipality did not renew its contracts with the 22 consultant 
companies (Interview-P26, 2015). As a result, only the synthesiser consultant 
company and the AUD of the Tehran Municipality collaborated in the 
preparation of the 1:2000 DPs (Interview-P26, 2015). 
The DPs were prepared in two phases. In the first phase, further details for 
zoning codes were prepared. Initially zoning codes consisted of two digits in the 
1:10000 plan, which were not sufficient for implementation. Three-digit codes 
were prepared based on those two-digit ones. For example, in the 1:10000 plan 
R12 was residential with medium density, to elaborate density limits. R12 
became two three-digit codes: R121 with 240% construction density (four floors) 
and R122 with 300% construction density (five floors). Regarding this P17 gives 
an example: 
‘For example, we had a G11 (city parks) zone. On the 1:10000 
plan we decided where should be a G111 (public parks) zone 
and where should be a G112 (special parks) zone.’ (Interview-
P17, 2015) 
After the approval of this phase in CN5, 1:2000 plans were prepared, consisting 
of 406 sheets of maps and 15 articles (conditions) which were submitted to the 
ICCT for approval (Interview-P17, 2015). In 2010, the ICCT approved the plan 
and 14 of the articles attached to it. The last article, which was about the 
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supervision of the implementation of the plan, was omitted (Interview-P17, 
2015). Although the plan was approved, it took 10 months for it to be received 
by the municipality because of what P17 describes as ‘an administrative error’ 
(Interview-P17, 2015). 
Based on the Urban Development and Redevelopment Act, the DPs needed to 
be approved by CN5. However, if there were any major contradictions with the 
TSS(C)P the contradicting parts should be again approved by the High Council. 
The contradictions of the DP were approved by the High Council and the final 
plan approved by CN5 on 24 February 2012 (Interview-P17, 2015). 
In April 2012, two months after the approval of CN5, the High Council of the 
time issued a directive with eight clauses. This directive affected the DPs 
dramatically (Interview-P17, 2015). The directive imposed the following changes 
to the plan: 
" R111 zones of the plan (villas and maximum two-floor residential 
buildings) converted to R112 zone in which a maximum of three-
floor residential buildings could be built 
" R112 and R121 zones (maximum three-floor and four-floor 
residential buildings respectively) converted to R122 in which a 
maximum of five-floor residential buildings could be built 
" R241 (green conservation residential area) zones with maximum 
construction density of 30% on a maximum of 15% ground 
coverage (maximum two-floor building) converted to a zone with a 
maximum construction density of 120% on 30% ground coverage 
(maximum four floors) 
" Converting the zone of lands owned by the MRUD from any other 
zones to zones R and M. 
As a result of this directive, the population of Tehran could be increased from 
one and a half to two million by upgrading R111, R112 and R121 zones and 
increasing the density of R241 zones (Interview-P21, 2015). Moreover, much 
    
CHAPTER 7 – PLANNING AND UNPLANNED DEVELOPMENT IN TEHRAN 
231 
 
land throughout the city owned by the Ministry and proposed as green space 
converted to zones R or M. With regard to this P17 says: 
‘It was ironic because it was proposed to change the G zone of 
all the land owned by the government to zones R or M. This is 
ridiculous because the MRUD owns a lot of land parcels in 
Region 22, which was supposed to become green spaces and 
parks, but were lost and went under construction by this 
directive!’ (Interview-P17, 2015) 
The decision to approve such a directive was imposed on the then High Council 
by the President at the time, Ahmadinejad (Interview-P2, 2014; Interview-P26, 
2015). In fact, the serving President was present at the meeting in which the 
High Council approved the directive with eight clauses (Interview-P21, 2015). 
This shows how important this directive was to the President. The directive was 
approved despite the objections of the attendees including the members of the 
city council. All details of this meeting were asked to be kept ‘off the record’ by 
one of the interviewees who was at that meeting. 
On the surface, it was said that this decision by the government was to increase 
the housing supply and reduce the price of the housing for all residents 
(Interview-P9, 2015). However, most of the interviewed planners believe that 
this decision had economic justification for the government. P2 says that 
Ahmadinejad intervened in the construction density because: 
‘Ahmadinejad’s government was experiencing negative 
economic growth. By stimulating the property market he wanted 
to conceal the inflation.’ (Interview-P2, 2014) 
P2 also stresses that in that period the MRUD was passive and accepted the 
order of the President (Interview-P2, 2014). P16 (Interview-P16, 2015) says that 
the property market and its contribution to the economy put Ahmadinejad under 
pressure to increase the construction density. With the change of Iran’s 
government in 2013, the newly appointed Head of the High Council tried to 
cancel some parts of the directive (Interview-P17, 2015). However, many had 
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already gained permission to construct buildings with higher construction 
density (Interview-P2, 2015). 
Finally, in June 2012, the plan was released and sent to all the departments of 
the municipality for implementation (Interview-P17, 2015). However, as will be 
discussed below, alterations to the plan continued in the implementation phase. 
7-2-2-3 THE THIRD STAGE: UPDATING 
When the plan was released on the municipality’s website and became the 
basis for the decisions on granting construction permits, its errors and 
deficiencies started to emerge. In respect of this P17 says: 
‘The plan was prepared in a virtual and unreal environment and 
when it was about to be implemented in the real world its 
practical errors showed up. Now it was necessary to deal with 
those errors.’ (Interview-P17, 2015) 
Most of the errors were due to the changes that had already taken place 
throughout the city while the plan was under preparation. The plan needed to be 
updated. P13 explains that: 
‘The large portion of the alterations happened because of the 
time gap between preparations for the plan being started and 
when it was approved for implementation. During those 10 
years the city changed like a living creature. Many of the 
parcels of land that the consultant companies considered 
should be reserved were already under construction as the 
owners had obtained construction permits based on the 
previous regulations.’ (Interview-P13, 2015)  
Moreover, there were misunderstandings about the zoning system; many of the 
parks and public spaces, which were located in zones R, M or S, were in 
danger of being developed for building projects. P17 explains this situation with 
an example: 
‘For example, there was a park in Shahrak-e Jandarmeri which 
had trees and benches and was proposed as green space but, 
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because in the zoning map it was in zone R122, the land 
owner, the Law Enforcement Force (NAJA), got a verdict from 
the judiciary to build a residential building there. We had to try 
hard to explain that zone R does not mean that all the lands are 
residential. To avoid these situations, we identified all the parks 
in zone R and substituted them with G111.’ (Interview-P17, 
2015) 
For the reasons mentioned, the municipality initiated the revisions of the plan 
with the purpose of updating it. However, some of the interviewed planners 
think that updating was merely an excuse for the municipality to make changes 
to the plan that would secure its income. P13 says about this: 
‘The municipality, to secure its income, which it thought would 
be reduced by half if the plan was implemented, imposed a 
great change to the plan in the first year […] it thought if the 
plan was implemented as it was, the municipality’s income 
would be reduced substantially and, as a result, its projects 
under construction couldn’t be finished because of financial 
difficulties […].’ (Interview-P13, 2015) 
So far, these updates have happened in three phases between 2012 and 2015. 
In the first wave of revisions, which happened in the first year of the 
implementation, massive changes were made to the zones in the plan. At this 
time, the AUD of the Tehran Municipality asked all of the 22 regions’ 
municipalities to form a committee called the Coordinating Council36 in which 
the errors and the parcels of land that should be fixed would be identified and 
reported to CM5 (Interview-P13, 2015). 
P13, who was one of the experts in this revision process, depicts this period as 
follows: 
‘The Coordinating Council’s responsibility was to revise the 
zones […] but the problem was that councils were working 
under the banner of a region’s municipality. To put it simply, the 
                                                
36 In Farsi: Shoray-e Hamahangi. 
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region’s municipalities did whatever they wanted. For example, 
if an applicant wanted to get a construction permit and his plot 
was in an unacceptable zone, the region’s municipality would 
tell him to write and request a change. Then they would send 
all of these requests to the central municipality to be sent to 
CN5. Or in other cases the region’s municipality would think it 
better to change a zone. Let me give an example, Damavand 
Street used to be S121 in the plan but the region’s Deputy 
asked to change the zone to M111. Interestingly, later when a 
new Deputy was appointed, they asked to return the zone to S 
again. The alteration was made based on individual wishes. 
The synthesiser consultant company could not look at all of 
these proposals. All the requests were submitted to CM5 and, 
as they could not look at all the changes in detail, because 
there were about 5,000 areas of land, they accepted and 
signed all the changes.’ (Interview-P13, 2015) 
The second phase of revisions happened in the second year of implementation. 
In this second year the alterations were limited. At this time the 11th government 
came to office and many changes occurred in the political sphere of the country. 
One of the influential political changes which affected the alteration process in a 
positive way, was the new composition of the High Council and CM5’s members 
(Interview-P16, 2015; Interview-P13, 2015). 
In the third phase, it was decided to prepare general directives based on the 
different categories of issues in the plan rather than by case-by-case 
alterations. The synthesiser consultant company and the municipality became 
responsible for the preparation of directives. The prepared directives could take 
effect straight away if the directive had no effect on the general orientation of 
the plan. However, if the directive affected the plan then it had to be approved 
by CN5 (Interview- P13, 2015; Interview-P17, 2015). At the time of collecting 
this data this phase was underway. 
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The main consequence of zone alteration in 6,000 parcels of the plan 
(Interview-P16, 2015) was the increase of the construction density of Tehran 
(Interview-P13, 2015), which will be looked at later in this chapter. 
7-2-3 THE PLAN AND THE CONSTRUCTION DENSITY  
In the following two sections, the process of deciding about the construction 
density limits and its implications on controlling construction density will be 
explored. 
7-2-3-1 CONSTRUCTION DENSITY IN THE PLAN 
From the beginning of the planning process to preparing the recent plan, 
controlling the construction density in different zones of the city was one of the 
most important topics. As P22 says: 
‘The construction density was the most fundamental, pivotal 
and urgent discussion in the preparation of the new plan.’ 
(Interview-P22, 2015)  
It was believed by the planning team that, in the plan, the construction density 
was used as a planning tool to harness growth. P22 says that: 
‘Using construction density as a tool to manage and arrange 
the city was attempted. In our opinion, the construction density 
should first have addressed the housing need of the residents, 
especially in deteriorated urban areas which needed to be 
renovated […]. And secondly, the construction density is a tool 
to organise the areas of the city and road networks. Previously 
only some parts of the city, such as Tehran-Pars, Narmak, 
Shahrak-e Gharb […] were organised based on this system. 
Now we are pushing the whole system towards this approach. 
However, there is a big difference between what is on paper 
and what is implemented in our society.’ (Interview-P22, 2015) 
Although the plan used the excess construction density to renovate deteriorated 
urban areas, its success is under question. P28 comments: 
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‘In many parts of the city, such as in deteriorated urban areas, 
the excess construction density could help the renovation of the 
area but the problem is that developers and investors are not 
interested in those parts of the city. They are interested in parts 
of the city which should be preserved such as Region 1 and 
then Regions 2 and 3 where gardens and many heritage sites 
are located. But now all of them are turning to sites with 
permission for high-rise buildings.’ (Interview-P28, 2015)  
Two considerations were recognised at the time of planning for zoning of the 
construction density. Firstly, in this plan the amount of construction density was 
based on the width of the streets and the size of the parcels. Secondly, the 
construction density of the plan varies based on the quality of the urban district. 
For example, organic urban areas have lower densities (e.g. zone R21) 
compared to High Streets (e.g. zone M11) (Interview-P22, 2015).  
The DP of Tehran has tables showing the amount of maximum construction 
density in different zones of the city. The table for zone R is presented here, in 
Table 7-1. In these regulations, there is a relationship between the construction 
density and the ratio of ground coverage. This means the lower the ratio of 
ground coverage, the taller a building can be (Interview-P22, 2015). 
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1-
digit 
code 
Main 
zones  
2-
digit 
code 
Zones  3-
digit 
code 
Sub-zones 
characteristics  
Max 
construction 
density 
Max 
floors  
Max 
ground 
coverage  
Min 
parcel 
size 
Min 
street 
width 
R111 Villas and 2-
storey 
residential 
120% 2 60% _ _ R11 Low-density 
Residential 
R112 3-storey 
residential 
180% 3 60% _ _ 
R121 4-storey 
residential 
240% 4 60% 200 8 R12 Medium-
density 
Residential R122 5-storey 
residential 
300% 5 60% 250 10 
 
 
 
R1 
G
eneral R
esidential 
R13 High-density 
Residential 
R131 6-storey 
residential 
360% 6 60% 300 12 
R211 2-storey 
residential 
100% 2 50% R21 Valuable 
rural 
residential R212 3-storey 
residential 
120% 3 40% 
 
_ 
 
_ 
R22 Valuable 
historic 
residential 
fabric 
R221 Valuable 
historic 
residential 
(variable 
storey) 
100% 2 50% _ _ 
R23 Valuable 
contemporary 
residential 
fabric 
R231 Valuable 
contemporary 
residential 
fabrics 
Fixation of the current situation based on previous 
plans 
R24 Valuable 
green 
residential 
fabric 
R241 Valuable green 
residential 
fabrics 
120% 4 30% _ _ 
R25 Special 
central 
residential 
R251 Central zones 
residential 
250% 5 50% 300 12 
R261 7-storey 
residential 
280% 7 40% 750 14 
R262 9-storey 
residential 
315% 9 35% 1000 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 
S
pecial R
esidential 
R26 Special urban 
axis zones 
residential 
R263 Special 
residential 
(high-rise with 
feasibility plan) 
600% 12 
and 
more 
30% 3000 20 
Table 7-1: Regulations for land-use and construction in zone R in Tehran’s 
District Plan  
7-2-3-2 SUCCESS IN CONTROLLING CONSTRUCTION DENSITY? 
Most of the interviewed planners believe that construction density came under 
stricter control with the approval and implementation of the TSS(C)P. Although 
some directives and acts such as the regulations for constructing high-rise 
buildings (six-storey and more) had been approved before, they did not succeed 
in controlling where and how the excess construction density should be granted. 
P21 says of this: 
‘Selling density to generate income for the municipality had 
happened without any solid regulation until 2012. It used to be 
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arbitrary. One Mayor would agree to give permission for up to 
seven floors, one wouldn’t. Without having any feasibility 
studies, they would agree on construction density in the 
Agreements Commission, without even consulting CN5. Since 
2012 and based on the plan, if they want to grant a higher 
construction density CN5 should agree to it.’ (Interview-P21, 
2015)  
At the moment, the construction density is permitted based on the approved 
zoning construction tables. P2 says that: 
‘At the moment, the municipality can’t give permission to build 
high-rise buildings in the areas except the high-rise zones 
which are determined in the plan.’ (Interview-P2, 2014)  
The approved plan reduced the number of arbitrary decisions of the municipality 
to less than 15% (Interview-P22, 2015). This means that approximately 85% of 
the permits are granted based on the plan and regulations. P22 describes the 
current situation: 
‘In 2014, approximately 30,000 construction permits were 
granted. 25,000 of these permits were granted by the electronic 
system at the City’s Electronic Service Offices, they got 
permission based on the plan […]. The second set of permits 
was for applicants applying for construction permits to construct 
six to 12 floors. These permits couldn’t be decided by these 
offices and should have been referred to the regions’ 
municipalities to make a decision for them. In this set of 
permits, the regions’ municipalities could make the decision 
without the involvement of CN5. 10 to 12% of the total 
construction permits were granted in this way for the 
construction of 10–11 floor buildings. Then there were 50 to 
100 permits given for high-rise buildings. 50% of these high-rise 
buildings permits were without any technical, environmental 
and traffic considerations, it meant the granting of 50 
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construction permits in total for the construction of high-rise 
buildings, which is irrational.’ (Interview-P22, 2015) 
The current High Council and ICCT are strict about the implementation of the 
plan and the performance of the municipality. This has also been influential in 
the reduction of the arbitrary activities of the municipality (Interview-P2, 2014; 
Interview-P21, 2015). However, the construction of buildings beyond regulations 
still happens. With regard to this, P22 says: 
‘However, there is a big difference between what is on paper 
and what is implemented in our society. Generating income to 
manage the city is one of the reasons […]. For example, in 
Jordan Street37 regulation does not allow construction higher 
than six to seven storeys but now you can find a 22-storey 
building under construction. […] They get permission from 
CN5.’ (Interview-P22, 2015) 
Despite the fact that the municipality is under pressure not to grant extra 
construction density beyond zoning limitations, many high-rise buildings are 
under construction at the moment which obtained permission ‘a few years back’ 
(Interview-P22, 2015). 
As a result of the approval of the new plan, the bargaining power of the 
developers has reduced. Interviewed developers mostly believe that approval of 
the DPs has changed the way they could negotiate with the municipality to get 
the permission they want. D10 says: 
‘I don’t know whether you are aware of it or not but they have a 
zoning plan for Tehran now, a detail plan has been put in place 
in the last one or two years. It is not like before when anyone 
could get permission for building extra floors in the name of 
selling density. Now land should have certain criteria to build a 
certain number of floors […] the Tehran Municipality has a 
certain definition for each land parcel […].’ (Interview-D10, 
2015) 
                                                
37 Jordan Street is the previous name of Nelson Mandela Boulevard which is an affluent district 
in northern Tehran. 
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Moreover, the establishment of the City’s Electronic Service Offices38 has 
reduced the direct contact between construction permit applicants and the local 
municipalities (Interview-D10, 2015). Now applicants should refer to these 
offices to register their applications and get permission, instead of going to the 
regions’ municipalities to acquire construction permits. These offices check the 
applicants’ requests by software to reduce human-related error. However, the 
Tehran Municipality does process the construction permits for high-rise 
developments and also construction beyond the regulations (Interview-P13, 
2015). 
Although the approval of the DPs has reduced the negotiating power of the 
developers in getting what they want in terms of excess construction density, as 
discussed below the plan itself has faced waves of increased construction 
density for financial reasons. 
7-3 THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE TEHRAN 
MUNICIPALITY AND THE HOUSING DEVELOPERS 
WHICH INFLUENCE THE PLAN 
This section focuses on how the TSS(C)P and DPs have been changed to meet 
the financial needs of the Tehran Municipality by accommodating property 
developers’ interests. 
Although the approval of the DPs has reduced the power of the developers to 
negotiate for what they want, there are concerns about the process of 
preparing, approving and modifying the TSS(C)P and DPs. The plan has 
experienced alterations and interventions that put into question whether its aim 
is to secure benefits for the city or increase the municipality’s income. P2 says: 
‘Now, although permits are granted based on the plan, during 
the process of preparation and approval of the plan some 
indefensible changes happened. Mostly by CN5’s interventions 
to secure the income of the municipality.’ (Interview-P2, 2014)  
The following sections will explore the process of alterations to the plan and the 
reasons behind them during the preparation, approval and amendment phases. 
                                                
38 In Farsi: Dafater-e Khadamat-e Electroniki-ye Shahr. 
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7-3-1 THE PLAN DISCONNECTED WITH REALITY 
As described above, the TSS(C)P and DPs were first prepared in 1:10000 scale 
by consultant companies, under the supervision of the Tehran Urban Planning 
Agency. Although the plan at this stage went through various organisations for 
approval and experienced alterations, these were mostly meant to secure 
benefits for the public and the city. However, ignoring economic forces in 
preparation of the 1:10000 phase put this plan in a vulnerable position. 
At this stage consultant companies prepared the plan based on technical 
considerations such as the capacity of the road networks and public amenities 
in an area rather than based on socio-economic considerations (Interview-P24, 
2015). P24 believes that this is one of the main issues for the planning system 
in Iran. He says: 
‘The big issue of planning is that we tend to tackle issues of the 
city as engineering issues rather than looking at them as socio-
economic issues. […] We prepared an engineering plan by 
doing the maths and saying that we need x amount of services 
rather than looking at socio-economic contexts.’ (Interview-P24, 
2015) 
The planning team of consultant companies do not see themselves as what 
Adams and Tiesdell (2010) call market actors who play a role in affecting the 
market. They rather see themselves as technocrats. That is why in many cases 
they are surprised by how the market works ‘on the ground’. P20 reflects:  
‘We are not businessmen and we do not know how they 
(investors) calculate and make decisions.’ (Interview-P20, 
2015)  
P16 believes that the lack of a proper understanding of the mechanisms of real 
estate by the consultant companies in preparation of the initial plan is the main 
reason behind its later alterations. He says: 
‘An academic obsession with the relationship between the 
width of passages and the height of buildings has resulted in 
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the production of a plan which does not care about real forces, 
such as the real estate market in the city.’ (Interview-P16, 
2015)  
The initial plan (1:10000 plan) was prepared in a sphere that was disconnected 
from the reality of the dynamics that exist between the municipality and the 
housing developers. This unrealistic plan paved the way for the later 
amendments of the plan. 
7-3-2 THE TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY PREPARING 1:2000 PLAN 
As mentioned before, the process of production of 1:2000 plan was directed in a 
way to give authority to the Tehran Municipality. They used this opportunity to 
impose their financial aspirations on the plan. The AUD of the Tehran 
Municipality became the organisation responsible for preparing the 1:2000 DPs. 
At the same time, the Tehran Urban Planning Agency was dismantled and later 
the 22 consultant companies were dismissed (only the synthesiser consultant 
company was kept). 
It was supposed to provide a 1:2000 plan based on the 1:10000 plan. However, 
some major changes happened during production. P2 says: 
‘The detailed plan has contradictions with the comprehensive 
plan. They were supposed to produce 1:2000 maps based on 
the 1:10000 maps of the comprehensive plan but they changed 
the plans. In the name of providing more details for the plan, 
they changed the plan. This is corruption. The government of 
the time was busy with the Mehr Housing Plan and didn’t react 
to these transformations. For example, Region 22 was not 
supposed to have this amount of buildings and shopping malls.’ 
(Interview-P2, 2015)  
The government of the time (Ahmadinejad’s Government) and its High Council, 
instead of stopping the alterations, assisted the municipality by approving an 
eight-clause directive, which was discussed in section 7-2-2-2, to increase the 
construction density of the city. As mentioned before, P16 (Interview-P16, 2015) 
says that the real estate and its contribution to the economy put the President of 
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the time under pressure to increase the construction density. The Tehran 
Municipality, whose income would be raised by this, supported this directive 
(Interview-P13, 2015). 
P11 believes that, for the municipality, it was important to encourage the 
developers to invest in the construction sector. That is why the plan was 
prepared in such a way as to consider the financial profits of developers. He 
says: 
‘The DPs should have been based on the comprehensive plan 
only with more details. But this plan was prepared based on 
money! It was planned in such a way as to generate money for 
the municipality and has substantial contradictions with our 
ecosystem. Based on this plan, gardens of the city will be 
destroyed […] and will be turned into high-rise buildings which 
puts our water sources at risk because of the foundations 
required for these tower blocks.’ (Interview-P11, 2015)  
The preparation of the 1:2000 DPs by the Tehran Municipality without any 
supervision facilitated the path for the municipality to impose its financial 
benefits onto the plan. The High Council’s directive was also detrimental to the 
plan. 
7-3-3 TIME GAP 
Between approving the 1:10000 plans and the 1:2000 DPs, there was a time 
gap of five years (Interview-P21, 2015). This gap was not only due to a lengthy 
planning process. As P29 and P30 say, the plan was ready in 2010 but it was 
not sent for implementation. They say that: 
‘The plan was ready in 2010 but the municipality intentionally 
delayed the process. The municipality was aware of the 
consequences of implementing the new plan; the municipality 
knew that its income would be decreased […] the municipality 
was looking for a way to solve this problem and at the same 
time granted as many construction permits as possible. Many 
developers got their construction permits at that time. Many of 
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the buildings under construction at the present time got 
permission at that time.’ (Interview-P29 & P30, 2015)  
During the time that DPs (1:2000 plans) were under preparation, many of the 
developers and landowners became aware of the future construction density of 
their parcels (or the parcels in which they were interested) if the DP got 
approval. As the construction density is very important to developers, they 
rushed to get construction permits based on previous regulations before the 
approval of the new plan. P21 describes that period: 
‘In 2010, the Mayor passed the draft of the DPs, which had low 
density39 to regions’ municipalities. People involved in the 
construction industry got information about the plan. In such 
situations people manage to find a way to get information. They 
found out that, if the plan was implemented, in many areas they 
could build with less construction density. For example, they 
found out that in a parcel where previously they could build an 
eight or nine-storey building they would only be able to build a 
six-storey one. This resulted in them rushing to get construction 
permits before the approval of the new plan […]. Even one 
extra floor could change their profit margin dramatically. […] 
People were queuing in front of the regions’ municipalities to 
get construction permits. This meant that before the approval of 
the detail plan, studies of the consultants’ companies became 
irrelevant as some of the zones, like R241 zone40, already had 
the permits to build at higher densities.’ (Interview-P21, 2015)  
The number of construction permits issued each year (Chapter 5 section 5-2-2-
1) shows that the peak was reached in 2011. P21 points out that: 
‘If you look at the statistics of the construction permits in 2010, 
2011, 2012 and even 2013 and part of 2014 you will notice the 
increase in the number of permits, the increase in the floor area 
                                                
39 At this time the High Council’s directive has not yet been approved and the 1:2000 plan was 
being prepared based on the 1:10000 plan. 
40 R241 is a low-density residential zone which was proposed to protect inner city gardens. 
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permitted and the increased revenue that the municipality 
generated in those years. Many of these permits are not under 
construction yet. The municipality’s income grew a lot in those 
years which was mostly spent on large-scale developments […] 
like highways – but at what expense?’ (Interview-P21, 2015)  
Many high-rise buildings under construction got permission during the time that 
the plan was in preparation but have not been sent to be implemented 
(Interview-P22, 2015). 
During the five years of the ‘preparing’ and ‘approving’ of the 1:2000 plan, 
construction permits were issued to the municipality’s benefit. P21, who 
observed these years, says: 
‘During this time, the municipality had a planning committee to 
discuss each construction permit. To ensure that the applicant 
was determined to get the construction permit, the planning 
committee would ask the applicant to transfer an amount of A41 
multiplied by the area of land. For example, if the land was 500 
m2 and A of the area was 200,000 Toman, the municipality 
would ask the applicant to transfer 100 million Toman to the 
municipality’s account in advance. Then the committee would 
send the application to the Adaptation Commission42 of CN5. 
This Adaptation Commission was supposed to check the 
application against the detailed plan which was under 
preparation to see whether the application was in line with the 
plan or not. It would be interesting to know exactly what they 
were doing. If the application was in line with generating 
revenue for the municipality and the zones of the District Plan, 
they would give the permit. If the application was in line with 
generating revenue for the municipality but was not in line with 
the new DP but was in line with the previous regulations then 
they would grant the permit based on previous regulations. The 
                                                
41 A is a fixed amount set for each region. 
42 In Farsi: Comiteh-ye Tatbigh. 
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municipality’s performance was quite simply based on its 
income not on protecting the objectives of the District Plan.’ 
(Interview-P21, 2015)  
As a result of the permits granted during these gap years, before the 
dissemination of the 1:2000 plan, it was already outdated and many zones had 
already changed. This five-year gap was an opportunity for the developers to 
get permissions and the municipality to generate revenue before the 
implementation of the new zoning plan. 
7-3-4 AMENDMENTS 
As mentioned previously, for various reasons it was decided to amend the plan 
after its approval and during the implementation phase. These amendments 
happened in three phases and resulted in massive changes in the zones of the 
plan without consulting the High Council and in some cases CN5. 
Although some modifications were unavoidable, the municipality used the 
opportunity to satisfy its financial plans. P21’s account shows how and to what 
extent the municipality’s income could affect the plan: 
‘This (amending the errors) became an excuse for the 
municipality to generate income. This was a way for the 
municipality to change the zones. The region’s municipalities 
were under pressure to generate income so they changed the 
zones of large parcels of land to zones which were more 
profitable for the municipality. […] The regions’ Mayors were 
trying to chase big investors and encourage them to invest on 
those big parcels to increase the income for the municipality.’ 
(Interview-P21, 2015) 
For the municipality, making construction appealing to the developers by 
changing the plan was the most important thing. There are cases that show that 
the modification of the plans was more concerned with the market rather than 
the benefit of the city. D4 says: 
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‘[…] The Tehran Municipality, to ensure its income, changed 
parts of the plan. In the initial plan, the amount of revenue 
generated in some areas was reduced. This is because the 
plan reduced the tendency of us as developers to work in those 
areas. […].’ (Interview-D4, 2014) 
He continues: 
‘Here, creating profit for the developers has led the municipality 
to consider the requirements of the property market. For 
example, areas defined as garden (green zone) in the plan 
were changed to residential zone or any other zone for which 
there was a demand. The municipality changed the zone of 
these lands to satisfy the property market and ensure its 
income. In fact, this is its way of generating revenue. I myself 
witnessed this.’ (Interview-D4, 2014) 
In a more specific example, D4 talks about a modification in the DP of an area 
to ensure that developers would construct there: 
‘An example is Vanak Square. Initially in the District Plan, it was 
zoned as a mixed-use zone […]. But its construction density 
was less than a residential zone. At the moment, the healthcare 
industry is concentrated around Vanak Square. Therefore, the 
demand for commercial or office uses are insignificant there 
while demand for residential building is high, as doctors can 
have their clinics in residential buildings. Therefore, to build a 
medical centre, which has a pharmacy and doctors’ 
consultation units, a residential construction permit is enough. 
When the DP was approved, the demand for construction 
permits in that zone reduced because there was no demand for 
commercial building for the streets branching off Valiasr Street 
around Vanak Square. But there was demand for residential 
construction which was not economically justifiable because of 
the limited residential construction density. Therefore, the 
municipality went back one step and increased the density of 
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residential buildings to increase the developers’ interest in 
applying for construction permits in that area.’ (Interview-D4, 
2014) 
Although developers have no direct contribution in the process of planning, their 
interest has affected the preparation and implementation of plans. In this 
respect, P26 says: 
‘Housing developers in the private sector do not have direct 
influence on the preparation of the TSS(C)P and DPs but there 
is a general fact that has been influencing the construction 
density of zones: capital return and the economic benefits of 
developers […].’ (Interview-P26, 2015)  
7-3-5 THE GARDEN-TOWER DIRECTIVE 
Besides the alterations and interventions imposed on the plan to secure the 
municipality’s income, there is another influential directive that has affected the 
construction density of gardens and should be considered here. This directive is 
known as the ‘Garden-Tower’43 which was approved by the second ICCT in 
2004 before the approval of the TSS(C)P in 2007. This directive has affected 
the construction density of parcels which were registered as gardens in their 
title deed. 
Based on the Garden-Tower Directive, gardens can be built with maximum 
ground coverage of 30% instead of the normal 60% but in the same 
construction density as approved for that area. This means that if the 
construction density of a zone is 300%, on regular land a five-floor building on 
60% of the land can be built. However, in a garden a ten-floor building can be 
built on 30% of the garden. Previously, gardens could be built up only on a 
maximum of 10% of the ground with the construction density of maximum 20% 
which means two floors.  
The context for approving such a directive was to ‘protect’ the gardens of the 
city. Many owners of inner city gardens were attempting to dry out their 
                                                
43 In Farsi: Mosavabeh-ye Borj Bagh. 
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gardens, so they could claim that their land was not a garden anymore and they 
could apply for a normal construction permit. When Ahmadinajad was the 
Mayor of Tehran he proposed this directive to the city council and the directive 
was prepared in the city council. P2 explains that the protection of the gardens 
was a cover for the municipality and that the main reason was to facilitate 
construction in the gardens. He explains: 
‘When Ahmadinejad was the Mayor he said that the gardens 
should be protected because we can’t buy them and the 
owners, to be able to construct gardens, dry out the trees. But, 
in fact, he was looking for a way to legalise the construction of 
the gardens. Then, in the city council, Mr. Chamran became the 
theorist of the Tower-Garden Directive. It was said that with this 
directive we can protect 70% of the gardens and at the same 
time the right of the owner to benefit from construction will be 
protected. The idea was interesting but now you have to see 
what has happened to the gardens of Tehran. On the surface, 
you see that ground coverage is 30% of the area but under the 
ground up to 100% coverage has happened! Now we have to 
ask where is the garden?’ (Interview-P2, 2015)  
With 100% coverage under the ground as mentioned by P2, many gardens lost 
their trees. P11 says: 
‘What does 100% coverage underground parking mean? All the 
roots of the trees went into cement and the construction 
excavation has dried out most of the trees on the site!’ 
(Interview-P11, 2015) 
As a result of the implementation of this directive more than 4,000 hectares of 
Tehran’s gardens were transformed into high-rise buildings (Interview-P2, 
2015). P21 mainly blames the municipality who implemented the directive in 
such a way as to have such a result. He says: 
‘The city council prepared and approved the Tower-Garden 
Directive with a positive intention […] but the regions’ 
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municipalities in their appendix of revenue, gave permission for 
40 to 50% of ground coverage instead of 30% or gave 
permission to construct parking under the ground […] which 
resulted in losing the trees. A few trees were planted to make 
up for the lost trees and then the region’s municipality issued 
the end of construction certificates. I have to add that 
supervision over the performance of the municipality was very 
weak at that time too.’ (Interview-P21, 2015)  
At the beginning of the implementation of this directive, developers and 
landowners were concerned about their profits but later they found ways to 
maximise their profits such as constructing underground. P4 elaborates on the 
reaction of the investors to this directive: 
‘At the beginning the investors and landowners disagreed with 
the implementation of this directive. Some of them had strong 
connections with the municipality and could get good permits if 
this directive was not in place. I talked to some of them and 
convinced them to build garden-tower. Later one of them came 
to me and said that his profit was much more than with the 
other constructions. He could sell the flats quite expensively as 
living in a garden-tower became fashionable among rich 
people.’ (Interview-P4, 2015)  
Garden-Tower became a good selling factor in the property market. 
Most of the gardens in Tehran are in Region 1 and then Regions 2 and 3 where 
they witnessed the major transformation of the green landscape and the 
emergence of tower blocks (Interview-P21, 2015). P22 (Interview-P22, 2015) 
says that this directive contradicts what was planned in the plan. He says: 
‘We considered the gardens in R241 zone should have a 
maximum of four floors but the directive of the city council is the 
basis of actual practice and they can normally build 10 floors.’ 
(Interview-P22, 2015)  
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7-4 THE DEVELOPMENT PATTERN 
As discussed in Chapter 6 and earlier in this chapter, the Tehran Municipality 
needs the payments received from the developers to generate income for the 
city. This has resulted in the increase in developers’ power in the construction of 
buildings which are profitable for them but are not in line with the urban plans of 
Tehran. As a result, the production, approval and implementation of Tehran’s 
plans have been affected to accommodate developers’ economic gains. All 
these forces have resulted in a spontaneous growth of buildings with higher 
construction density in expensive areas of the city which are of interest to 
developers. 
7-4-1 SPONTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT 
Spontaneous development, in this research, refers to a kind of development 
which is not based on urban planning documents and is market driven. Despite 
various meanings associated with ‘spontaneous’ in urban studies (e.g. 
spontaneous settlements, spontaneous growth), in this research the word is 
used to show unpredicted and unplanned emergence of buildings exceeding 
height restrictions in certain parts of the city. Here ‘spontaneous development’ 
dose not mean informal development. The word ‘spontaneous’ is chosen for this 
kind of development as it was noticed that a couple of interviewees use this 
word (in Farsi: roshd-e khodroo) to describe the development of high-rise 
buildings in Tehran. This kind of development is happening in the development 
and re-development of residential parcels of land in some areas of Tehran. As 
P7 mentions: 
‘In Tehran only 40% of constructions are based on plans, 60% 
of constructions are based on the economics of property.’ 
(Interview-P7, 2015) 
Although Tehran has had planning regulations before and a zoning plan now, in 
some areas spontaneous growth is happening. P19 says: 
‘Unfortunately, our planning system is very weak. There are 
directives and regulations set by the High Council and 
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extensive studies done by experts on development plans but 
the municipalities ignore them. As a result, a kind of 
spontaneous growth is happening which satisfies the tendency 
of investors to gain profit and the municipality to generate 
income. These two working together and hand in hand have 
created this sort of development.’ (Interview-P19, 2015)  
As P19 mentions, the financial need of the municipality has resulted in allowing 
developers to lead the direction of the development of the city. With regard to 
this P7 says:  
‘The combination of what the municipality wants and what the 
investors want has shaped the city. As long as developers 
demand, the municipality provides, if they don’t demand any 
more then the municipality would give up.’ (Interview-P7, 2015) 
Also, P29 says: 
‘The city is developing in such a way as to enable the 
municipality to fund its expenditure on the one hand and on the 
other hand satisfy individuals. The municipality needs money to 
do things that make people notice the change.’ (Interview-P29, 
2015)  
The financial dependency of the Tehran Municipality on developers and the 
amount they pay for excess construction density charge has led the municipality 
to compromise the construction density limits of plans. P24 explains:  
‘Construction density in Tehran is not only decided by urban 
planners; it is not only an experts’ issue. Capital and the market 
affect it a lot […] 22 consultant companies’ plans can become 
nothing if the interest of the capital is under threat.’ (Interview-
P24, 2015) 
Tehran’s plans could not harness the market-led development of the city in 
terms of construction density. Even in some areas this spontaneous growth is 
happening faster than the provision of infrastructure. In this regard P7 says: 
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‘[…] In Tehran the rate of development is usually ahead of 
infrastructure provision. It is not like other places where 
infrastructure should be provided first and then the 
development take place […], in Tehran they carry out the 
construction first and then the responsible institutions provide 
the required services and infrastructures.’ (Interview-P7, 2015)  
As mentioned before, 20% of housing developers who are big development 
companies and are affiliated with financial, pension or insurance institutions 
could push the construction density limits as the fee that the Tehran Municipality 
receives from them is considerable. P10 says: 
‘The influence of those 20% (developers of high-rise buildings) 
is much more than the 80%. The 80% can get the permission 
for a maximum of two extra floors but the 20% shape the built 
environment in some areas because the municipality needs 
them and they need the municipality.’ (Interview-P10, 2015)  
This specific kind of developer searches for suitable sites to construct high-rise 
buildings in profitable areas of the city. 
7-4-2 THE LOCATION OF SPONTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT 
Expensive areas of the city are under more pressure to be built with higher 
construction density. Developers are looking for areas where they can increase 
their profit margin. As elaborated in Chapter 6, if the developers have access to 
sufficient capital they prefer to work in the northern regions of the city. 
The Tehran Municipality, which needs to generate income, is interested in 
granting more construction density where there is a demand, which means the 
northern regions. With reference to this P31 says:  
‘In the northern regions the interests of the municipality and 
developers are in line. Below Enghelab’s axis (the southern half 
of the city) there is not much interest in constructing; these 
regions are not like the northern ones for the developers. The 
municipality can’t generate much income from these southern 
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regions either. So, wealthy people are in the northern regions, 
they are interested in investing in real estate and housing which 
means that they are looking for more construction density, the 
municipality is interested in selling excess construction density 
as their income would grow. So, the municipality’s and 
investors’ interests are in one direction which results in granting 
higher construction density in the northern regions.’ (Interview-
P31, 2016) 
CN5’s directives to permit construction of high-rise buildings (12 floors and 
more) confirm that most of the high-rise buildings granted are to be constructed 
in these northern regions. Based on an unpublished study which was completed 
by the High Council’s research team and was accessed at P2’s office, from 156 
directives of CN5 in 2012, 2013 and 2014, 94 of them (65%) were for high-rise 
buildings. From this, 94 directives, 36 construction permits were granted for the 
construction of high-rise buildings in Region 1; 14 for Region 2; 18 for Region 3; 
six for Region 4; and four for Region 5. 
The above-mentioned figures show that the tendency for the construction of 
high-rise buildings which are at the extreme cases of excess construction 
density is more in the northern regions and especially in Region 1. Big 
developers, as P25 (Interview-P25, 2015) describes, look for land parcels 
mainly in Region 1 to construct high-rise buildings. In more detail he says: 
‘Big developers who are related to governmental institutions or 
banks […] try to find a garden in Region 1 […] and then will turn 
it to a high-rise building. This is what has been happening for 
the last 10 to 15 years. Normal people can’t buy a garden, 
especially in Zaafaraniyeh, Elahiyeh, Darband and Niyavaran. 
Big developers buy up the gardens and then they build a 20 or 
30-floor tower blocks.’ (Interview-P25, 2015)  
P20, who was involved with the preparation of Region 1’s District Plan, says:  
‘Investors in Region 1 are semi-governmental bodies who just 
want to generate money for their institutions. These investors 
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have the large areas which used to be lands of the royalty and 
monarchy during the Shah’s time. After the revolution, these 
lands were confiscated […] and were given to these institutions 
[…] or later were bought by big investors. Sometimes the 
municipality is happy to pay them A amount and buy the garden 
from them and turn it to a public park but the investors want to 
build a tower block and raise 10A.’ (Interview-P20, 2015)  
P29 and P30 who are working at the consultancy company which prepared 
Region 4’s DP say: 
‘In Region 4 you can see only a few cases go to CN5 for 
special densities, this happens a lot in Region 1 as the income 
of the municipality is mostly from this region […] only in some 
areas of Region 4 where the price of land is high will this kind of 
proposal be submitted.’ (Interview-P29 & 30, 2015)  
These northern regions are also the ones which experienced most of the 
alterations in their zones to increase construction density during and after the 
production of the DPs. P31 who was involved in the preparation of a report for 
the High Council to show how much the zones of the TSS(C)P have been 
changed by the Tehran Municipality provided the researcher with a diagram 
(Figure 7-1). This diagram shows that Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 21 and 22 have 
experienced a lot of zone changes after the approval of the TSS(C)P. 
 
Figure 7-1: Comparison of the zone changes between the 22 regions of Tehran 
(vertical axis shows changed areas in hectare). Source: (Unpublished 
confidential document) 
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P31 explains: 
‘As you see, the zones of Regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have 
changed a lot. We should leave aside the spike of the 
diagram’s bar in Regions 18, 21 and 22 because the first two 
are industrial regions and the change in their zones were to 
free up preserved land for industrial uses and the story of 
Region 22, as you may know, is very different. I should mention 
that in Region 4, like Region 21, many of the changed zones 
are related to freeing up preserved land […]. The construction 
density of the northern regions increased as the municipality 
knew that these are the regions where it could generate money, 
not in the southern regions.’ (Interview-P31, 2016) 
As discussed in this section, those areas of the city where developers are more 
interested have experienced more demand for construction with more excess 
construction density and, in extreme cases, the construction of high-rise 
buildings. The Tehran Municipality’s income is mostly coming from these areas. 
Also, these regions experienced more alterations in their zones throughout the 
planning process. Market-oriented development rather than planned 
development is taking place in these regions. 
7-4-3 SPATIAL MANIFESTATIONS 
This kind of spontaneous and market-led development of taller buildings has 
had some spatial manifestations in the city. Disorder to the landscape’s skyline, 
the reconstruction of younger, but low-rise, buildings, the conversion of gardens 
to high-rise buildings and the disintegration of the urban fabric are some of 
these spatial manifestations which will be looked at in this section. 
The landscape of Tehran manifests this spontaneous market-led growth and the 
tendency of developers to construct high-rise buildings. P25 says: 
‘Giving permission for building tower blocks is based on a case-
by-case basis without having a general urban design 
framework. This has affected the landscape of the city. A weird 
and disorderly skyline is the result.’ (Interview-P25, 2015) 
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Figure 7-2 shows a part of Regions 3 and 1 of Tehran with a haphazard 
landscape. In this picture, high-rise buildings are juxtaposed with low-rise 
buildings which creates an unorganised view. The more one moves away from 
the northern and expensive regions towards the southern regions of Tehran the 
more consistency in urban fabric is expected. This is due to the profitability of 
the construction of high-rise buildings in the northern regions of the city.   
 
Figure 7-2: An example of Tehran’s unorganised landscape. Source: (Photo of 
Tehran’s landscape, n.d.) 
Besides the disorganised landscape, the other consequence of the 
spontaneous development is the re-construction of buildings that are still in 
good condition. Low-rise buildings are re-constructed because they have the 
potential for being rebuilt with a higher construction density. P5 says: 
‘Excess construction density has resulted in the death of young 
buildings whose life is not yet over. These buildings are victims 
of their construction potential and the possibility of acquiring 
excess construction density.’ (Interview-P5, 2015)  
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P9 who works at a consultant company prepared the DP for Region 2 gives an 
example in this regard: 
‘In Region 2 most of the two-three storey buildings which are 
now in four and five-floor zones are under pressure to be 
reconstructed.’ (Interview-P9, 2015)  
This reconstruction of young buildings is a waste of resources and is not 
sustainable. P25 says: 
‘This is a misuse of our resources. For example, there are 
buildings going through reconstruction to have two or three 
more floors. Although the buildings are still stable and are only 
15 years old, they are being rebuilt […] the city is a big 
construction site […] which has affected the quality of life in 
Tehran.’ (Interview-P25, 2015)  
Moreover, many of the inner-city gardens have been destroyed to construct 
high-rise buildings. The Garden-Tower Directive has facilitated the conversion 
of these gardens. As most of the gardens in Tehran are in Region 1 and then in 
Regions 2 and 3, this is where the major transformation of the green landscape 
has been witnessed along with the emergence of tower blocks (Interview-P21, 
2015). P15 who works in Region 1’s Municipality says: 
‘The regulations for gardens helped the developers to destroy 
Region 1 and its gardens. Developers build four floors under 
the ground which means it is not possible for a garden to 
remain!’ (Interview-P15, 2015)  
P23 also says: 
‘In Region 2 many gardens in Saadat-Abad and Tarasht have 
been turned into tower blocks.’ (Interview-P23, 2015)  
Figure 7-3 shows an inner-city garden located in Region 1 (Zaferaniyeh 
neighbourhood) which is under redevelopment to be replaced by a ‘garden-
tower’ with 11 floors. This house used to be a villa accommodating Queen 
Touran, third wife of Reza Shah before Iran’s revolution. After the revolution, the 
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house was confiscated by the government and then granted to Imam Khomeini 
Relief Foundation44. As Arial photos of the area shows, the garden’s trees were 
dried out deliberately (Khabaronline, 2016b). In 2015 the garden was granted a 
construction permit to be redeveloped based on the regulations of Garde-Tower 
Directive (memari.online, 2016).  
The house is located in R122 zone, which is a residential zone with medium 
density of maximum 300% in 60% of the land (maximum five floors). As the land 
of this house is almost 5,000 m2 (memari.online, 2016) regulations allow 
construction of two additional floors, which means seven floors in total. 
However, as the parcel is registered as a garden the applicant applied for a 
garden-tower permit of 12 residential floors on 30% of land with four 
underground floors for parking and other services45.  
Figure 7-3: Touran’s House during destruction. Source: (Khabaronline, 2016b) 
7-5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses the preparation, approval and implementation of the 
TSS(C)P and how the DPs have been affected to accommodate property 
                                                
44 In Farsi: Komiteh-ye Emdad-e Emam Khomeini 
 
45 Information regarding the number of floors is collected during a site visit in 2016 
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developers’ interest in order to meet the financial needs of the Tehran 
Municipality. As a result, in some areas of the city spontaneous development of 
buildings with excess construction density is happening, which has some spatial 
manifestations.  
As discussed above, in the first stage of the preparation of Tehran’s plan the 
following parties had directly collaborated with the Tehran Municipality: 
" 22 consultant companies 
" A synthesiser consultant company 
" Tehran Urban Planning Agency Tehran (inter-sectoral institution 
between the Tehran Municipality, the MRUD and ICCT). 
However, later most of these bodies were dismissed and only the Tehran 
Municipality and the synthesiser consultant company remained to produce the 
second stage of the plans (1:2000 DPs). As a result, the municipality gained 
more control over the production of the DPs. 
It took five years to approve the 1:2000 DPs. During this lengthy process, the 
following events influenced the plan: 
" The intervention of the High Council of the time which resulted in 
the increase in the construction density of some zones 
" Many of the developers and landowners became aware of the 
future construction density of their parcels of land and rushed to get 
construction permits based on previous regulations before the 
approval of the new plan. 
As a result of the permits granted during these five years, before the 
dissemination of the 1:2000 plan it was already outdated as many zones had 
already changed. It was necessary to update the plan after its approval. 
However, in many cases updating was an excuse for the municipality to make 
changes in the plan to secure its income, especially in the first year after the 
approval of the DPs. 
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Although controlling the construction density was an important topic from the 
beginning of the planning process, alterations imposed on the plan reduced the 
effectiveness of construction density as a planning tool to control growth. 
However, the approval of the DPs has reduced the negotiating power of the 
developers in getting what they want in terms of excess construction density. 
Besides alterations and interventions imposed on the plan which affected the 
construction density of zones, the Garden-Tower Directive affected the 
construction density of inner-city gardens. This directive facilitated construction 
on inner-city gardens and generated a lot of money for the municipality. As a 
result of the implementation of this directive more than 4,000 hectares of 
Tehran’s gardens were transformed into high-rise buildings. 
All the above-mentioned factors have resulted in a spontaneous growth of 
buildings with higher construction density in the expensive areas of the city 
which are of interest to the developers. Spontaneous development here refers 
to a kind of development which is not based on urban planning documents and 
is market driven. 
Spontaneous development happens mostly in the northern regions of the city. 
These are the regions in which developers with strong financial resources prefer 
to work and, as a result, the municipality can generate income from them in 
these regions. Consequently, these regions experienced more alterations in 
their zones throughout the planning process. Also CN5’s directives to permit the 
construction of high-rise buildings are mostly for these regions. Market-oriented 
development rather than planned development is happening in these regions. 
This kind of spontaneous and market-led development has had some spatial 
manifestations in the city; a disordered landscape skyline, the reconstruction of 
young but low-rise buildings, the conversion of gardens to high-rise buildings 
and the disintegrated urban fabric are some of the consequences. 
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8-1 INTRODUCTION 
By using empirical evidence from Tehran, this thesis has looked at how the 
excess construction density charge, which is a revenue-raising tool used by the 
Tehran Municipality, has influenced the urban planning system of Tehran 
through its effects on the development process and its impact on the 
development of the city. This final chapter, besides summarising the findings of 
the study, reviews the broader contribution of the thesis and proposes some 
avenues for future research.       
This concluding chapter first presents the main findings of the research in terms 
of conceptual, methodological and empirical contributions. Then it addresses 
the proposed research questions and revisits the proposition considered in the 
early stages of this thesis. It then considers some aspects that have arisen as a 
result of the research that were not predicted at the beginning of the process. 
The research has uncovered other areas for further study which are presented 
at the end. 
8-2 MAIN FINDINGS 
This research found that in Tehran, the excess construction density charge has 
assisted the Tehran Municipality to achieve financial independence from central 
government and has helped it to have some degree of autonomy. However, this 
has made the municipality dependent on the construction sector and its agents, 
such as housing developers. Moreover, planning objectives have been 
undermined by the Tehran Municipality in an attempt to achieve its own 
financial goals. Besides empirical findings which are summarised in section 8-2-
3 of this chapter, this thesis offers some conceptual and methodological 
contributions which are discussed below.  
8-2-1 CONCEPTUAL FINDINGS  
This section links the findings presented in Chapters 6 and 7 to the literature 
reviewed and the overall theoretical framing of the research.  
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As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, structure-agency institutional model of 
development process was chosen as a theoretical framework for this research 
to explore the dynamics between structure and agency in the development 
process. The reviewed literature suggests that the development process would 
be affected by structure (broader social, economic and political structures) in 
which the development is happening. Findings presented in Chapter 6 confirm 
that housing developers’ decisions in Tehran are framed by social, economic 
and political structures. For example, it was discussed how economic structures 
(e.g. market activity), political structures (e.g. Iran’s international relations) and 
social structures (e.g. buyers’ demand) have been affecting the involvement of 
the developers in the development process. 
Also it is discussed in the literature review that not only agents’ activities are 
framed by the broader social, economic and political structures, but their 
activities shape the structure too. As argued by Tiesdell and Allmendinger 
(2005, p. 57), ‘agency is not hopelessly determined by structure’ but ‘over time 
agents change structure’. Findings presented in Chapters 6 and 7 show that 
how activities of development agents (in this case housing developers) affected 
the planning system of the city and pushed the system to increase the 
construction density of some zones. Even though in some cases these agents 
are not aware of their role in shaping structure, the analysis of this thesis shows 
that their interests had affected the regulatory framework of the city.   
In addition to providing empirical evidence to confirm that there is a dynamic 
relationship between structures and agents, this research showed that this 
dynamic reinforces a particular model of development for the city. It would be 
problematic to ascribe this particular model of development either to structure or 
to agency. It is the product of the both. In the case of Tehran, in chapter 7, it 
was discussed how buildings exceeding construction density limits (in extreme 
cases tower blocks) emerged in specific part of the city which can not be 
ascribed either to planning or to the market as it is the product of the dynamic 
between the two. Focusing on this wider implication of the dynamic between 
structure and agency is where this research has an original contribution to the 
planning studies.  
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Besides the above-mentioned contribution, this research reflects on the 
reviewed literature in choosing its case study in Tehran. As mentioned, there is 
a noticeable shortage of studies of cities on a global scale in which all the cities 
are considered as important sites for generating theories. Urban theories are 
biased towards certain global cities as if only these cities have the potential to 
generate theories. ‘Ordinary cities’ or ‘off the map places’ (Robinson, 2003, 
2006) are systematically being ignored. As Robinson (2003, p. 275) highlights 
this ‘asymmetrical ignorance’ should be addressed. Being aware of this 
‘asymmetrical ignorance’, the thesis focused on studying Tehran which is 
almost invisible in urban theory in spite of its potentials. The financial autonomy 
of municipalities and local governments which is in the process of happening in 
some of the ‘global cities’ (e.g. London) has been in place in Tehran for more 
than three decades. As a result, Tehran offers useful insights on the 
implications of this process on urban planning and the development process 
which are discussed in this thesis.    
The other contribution of this thesis is on the discussion of the implications of 
the interactions between urban planning and the market. As municipalities are 
increasingly relying on the financial resources of private property developers 
and investors to provide for the cities, the reviewed literature suggests that the 
cities are moving towards a more flexible and negotiable planning system which 
could accommodate market needs (Jou et al., 2012; Tasan-Kok, 2012). Some 
planning cultures explicitly incorporate and address this flexibility in their 
planning process (e.g. Britain’s planning system). However, this research 
discovered that even the planning cultures with rigid and top-down planning 
systems (e.g. Iran’s planning system) which do not officially recognise and 
address this matter, in practice need to be flexible to support the market. As a 
result moving towards symbiotic planning system is becoming a common 
practise in all kinds of planning cultures (either bottom-up or top-down planning 
cultures).   
Despite the academic belief that municipalities who are not financially 
dependent on central governments could produce and implement plans that 
benefit the locality without central government’s influence (e.g. Friedmann, 
2005; Pourzal, 2008), this study shows that this is not necessarily true; 
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financially-independent municipalities could decide about their future without 
central government guidance. However, this research showed that although the 
municipality would be financially independent from central government, it would 
be dependent on the capital provided by developers and investors. As a result, 
it cannot produce and implement plans that benefit the locality without 
considering interests of those financial providers. In the case of Tehran, this 
thesis shows how the financial dependence of the Tehran Municipality to 
housing developers resulted in revision and changes in the plans to 
accommodate the market needs.  
8-2-2 METHODOLOGICAL FINDINGS  
There are few methodological contributions that this thesis offers which were 
not in the scope of its original design but emerged as the research progressed. 
These methodological contributions shed light on how to carry out research in a 
politicised and sensitive environment. Moreover, it suggests that considering 
and reflecting on factors which are not the primary avenue of generating data 
(e.g. impression management of the interviewees) could provide useful material 
for the research.  
During the primary data collection phase (interviewing stakeholders and key 
informants in Tehran) of the research, the researcher encountered some 
challenging power struggles with a number of the interviewees. The social 
identity of the researcher (e.g. gender and age), the sensitivity of the subject 
and the social identity of the interviewees (e.g. institutional position) must have 
contributed to this power struggle. Critical methodological literature addresses 
the existence of power relations during interviews (e.g. Elwood & Martin, 2000). 
It is argued that interviews are like any other social interactions in which power 
dynamics forms a particular relationship between the researcher and the 
interviewee.  
The researcher experienced some challenging power dynamics not only during 
the interviews but also prior to them when negotiating to arrange interviews. 
There were some key interviewees (e.g. employees of Tehran Municipality) who 
refrained from participating in the research, often without explaining why. In 
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order to mitigate the challenges of power struggle before and at the time of 
interviews, the following practical strategies were used:  
" Asking a mutual contact to introduce the researcher to the potential 
interviewee prior to the interview greatly facilitated the arrangement 
and balanced the power struggle at the time of the actual interview 
as another dimension was added to the dynamic. 
" Contacting former employees who used to work in the same role, or 
close to that role, in the cases where a key informant refrained to 
participate in the study, helped the researcher to have access to 
otherwise missed information. 
Besides addressing power relations in the process of interview, this research 
considered Briggs’ (2003) and Moore’s (2015) proposition of the importance of 
translating those power relations in the data analysis. Bearing in mind that what 
is not told or emphasised by the interviewees or how they frame their answers 
helped the researcher to understand what areas of tension need to be 
considered while discussing planning and urban development trajectories. 
Acknowledging the impression management (Goffman, 1959) of the 
interviewees also affected the data analysis of this research. Studying the 
impression management of the interviewees on how they take position against 
or align with a concept helped the researcher to understand the stance of the 
interviewee. It was found that it is necessary to be careful when the views of 
some interviewees (in this research: some municipality’s employees) are 
interpreted to answer the research question. Moreover, the site of the interview 
embodies layers of meaning (Elwood & Martin, 2000) which this research found 
could add to the depth of the interpretation of the collected data during the 
interview. For example, in shared working spaces, interviewees could not talk 
freely and this could be considered at the time of the data analysis.    
8-2-3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
Although urban planning literature acknowledges that planning agendas are 
compromised to address the economic needs of the market there is a lack of 
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empirical studies to delineate this matter. In most of the cases the argument is 
left at the conceptual level without in-depth empirical evidences to back it up. 
This research aimed to contribute to filling this gap by studying Tehran, as its 
municipality has been financially independent for more than 30 years. Three 
main empirical finding are generated from this research. The first one 
addresses the relationship that exists between the Tehran Municipality’s 
financing system and the housing developers. The second focuses on the 
implications that mutual interest has on the planning system of Tehran. The last 
explores the use of the city’s space and its urban design which are the result of 
the dynamic that exists in some parts of the city between the Tehran 
Municipality, housing developers and the urban planning system of Tehran. 
8-2-3-1 THE DYNAMIC BETWEEN THE MUNICIPALITY’S FINANCING 
MECHANISM AND HOUSING DEVELOPERS 
The relationship between the structure and agencies in the process of spatially 
organising the city of Tehran is complex. In general, structure is what drives the 
development process. Structure could be a local government’s rule and in this 
case is the Tehran Municipality’s financing system. This research has found that 
some alteration in structure would result in changes in the agencies’ 
performance. This means that changes in the Tehran Municipality’s financing 
system have affected the decisions of housing developers who are working 
within that structure. The following diagram (Figure 8-1) summarises this 
finding. The fiscal decentralisation of the Tehran Municipality resulted in the 
adoption of the excess construction density charge and this affected the 
relationship between the Tehran Municipality and developers. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1:  A change in structure results in changes to the agencies’ 
performance 
Change in the Tehran 
Municipality’s financing 
system 
Affects decisions of housing 
developers 
 
 [Change in structure] 
 [Change in agencies’ 
performance] 
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The Tehran Municipality needs developers in order to generate income. 75% of 
the municipality’s income comes from development charges and 70% of the 
construction charge has come from the construction density charge. The 
financial dependence of the Tehran Municipality on developers led to it giving 
more power to the developers and allowed them to construct, in some cases, 
what they wanted in certain parts of Tehran. 
It is legal for the municipality to generate income from construction density 
based on the zoning plan. However, the municipality granted extra construction 
density beyond that indicated in the plan after negotiations with the developers. 
Compromising the construction density limits of the plan has happened in 
certain areas of the city more than in others; areas with higher land prices and 
more investment opportunities are under more pressure to allow development 
with a construction density higher than the limits of the plan. The higher the 
price of the land, the more chance that the construction density would be 
exceeded beyond the limits of the plan. 
The negotiating power of the developers varied depending on the financial 
needs of the Tehran municipality. When the municipality needed more money, 
the negotiations would be easier for the developers. Also, the financial status of 
the developers would affect their negotiating power. Large development 
companies with strong financial positions were in a better position in negotiating 
with the municipality compared with individual developers with limited 
resources. In some cases, these large development companies have a bilateral 
relationship with the Tehran Municipality as they also implement the 
municipality’s large-scale developments. 
8-2-3-2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING 
The dynamic between the Tehran Municipality and the housing developers has 
had implications for the urban planning system of Tehran (Figure 8-2). The 
production, approval and implementation of the Tehran Structural-Strategic 
(Comprehensive) Plan and the District Plans has been affected to meet the 
financial needs of the Tehran Municipality by accommodating the interests of 
the housing developers. 
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Figure 8-2: The dynamics between the Tehran Municipality and the housing 
developers influencing the plan 
The preparation of the 1:10000 Tehran Structural-Strategic (Comprehensive) 
Plan and the District Plans happened in a top-down manner and disconnected 
from the reality of the dynamic that existed between the Tehran Municipality and 
the housing developers. The implementation of the prepared and approved plan 
would have reduced the income of the municipality because the approved 
construction density limits of the income-generating areas would have 
discouraged housing developers from becoming involved in construction 
projects in those areas. 
During the production of the 1:2000 district plans, the Tehran Urban Planning 
Agency was dismantled and the 22 consultant companies were dismissed. The 
Tehran Municipality and the synthesiser consultant company became 
responsible for the preparation of the 1:2000 District Plans. This was an 
opportunity for the Tehran Municipality to impose its financial aspirations on the 
plan by changing some zones. In addition, the High Council at that time 
approved an eight-clause directive which increased the construction density of 
some zones. 
It took five years to prepare the 1:2000 district plans. During this time many 
beneficiaries became aware of the future construction density of zones. As the 
construction density would be reduced in many areas where the developers had 
interest, they rushed to get construction permits based on the procedures that 
Implications for planning 
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had existed before the approval of the new plan. The statistics presented in the 
thesis show the increase in the number of construction permits granted during 
these years. Many high-rise buildings (12-floors and more) gained planning 
permission at that time. As a result, before the 1:2000 plan could be approved it 
was already obsolete as many zones had already changed. This five-year gap 
became an opportunity for the developers to get permission and the 
municipality to generate revenue before the new zoning plan was introduced. 
Even after the approval of the 1:2000 district plans, which was already affected 
by market trends, more alterations were imposed on the plan, especially during 
the first year of its implementation. At this stage, some modifications were 
unavoidable; however, the municipality took this opportunity to satisfy its 
financial ambitions by further changing some zones.  
Besides the alterations and interventions imposed on the plan, the ‘Garden-
Tower’ Directive, is one more example of the developers’ interests becoming 
the priority for generating income for the municipality. Before the approval of 
this directive, the construction density of inner city gardens was limited to 120%. 
However, based on this directive, inner city gardens could be built on with the 
same construction density of the zone in which they were located (mostly R122 
with a construction density of 300%) but with 30% ground coverage instead of 
60% (instead of five floors on 60% of the land, gardens could be built on with 
buildings of 10 floors on 30% of the land). This directive generated a lot of 
money for the municipality but more than 4,000 hectares of Tehran’s gardens 
were transformed into high-rise buildings. 
8-2-3-3 SPATIAL MANIFESTATIONS 
The relationship between the Tehran Municipality and the housing developers 
and the implications that this dynamic has had on the urban planning system 
have had spatial consequences in some parts of Tehran (Figure 8-3). 
Development in Tehran has not always happened according to the plans; the 
financial need of the municipality has resulted in allowing developers to lead the 
direction of the development of some parts of the city. The outcome of this 
process is the spontaneous emergence of buildings exceeding the construction 
density limits in expensive areas of the city. 
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Figure 8-3: The spatial manifestations as a result of the existing dynamic 
between the Tehran Municipality, housing developers and the planning system 
The housing developers with strong financial resources prefer to work in 
expensive areas which are mostly located in the northern regions. These 
regions have experienced unplanned development of buildings exceeding the 
construction density limits. As a result, these are the regions that have 
generated income for the Tehran Municipality. Consequently, alterations in the 
construction density of zones during and after the planning process have 
happened there. Commission No. 5’s directives to permit the construction of 
high-rise buildings are also mostly for the same neighbourhoods. 
The market-led development of these regions has had some spatial and 
physical impact on the city. The skylines of these areas are mostly disordered 
and an agglomeration of tower blocks in some areas affected the landscape. 
Young but low-rise buildings located in areas with a strong market are under 
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pressure of redevelopment. Most inner city gardens are under threat to be 
replaced by high-rise buildings. The urban fabric of these neighbourhoods is 
disintegrated and spatial development is incongruous. 
8-3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the aim of this research was to investigate the 
impact of the municipal financing method of charging developers in exchange 
for granting excess construction density on the development process and the 
planning system of Tehran. Three research questions and possible hypotheses 
were considered for this study. In the following sections those research 
questions will be answered and the initial hypotheses will be tested. 
8-3-1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESPONDING TO THEM 
The first research question asked how the construction density charge affected 
the decisions of housing developers in Tehran. Research showed that raising 
the bar of the construction density limits in the 1990s attracted many individuals 
and corporate investors to the housing construction industry. Due to the high 
land price in Tehran, if the permitted construction density of a land was less 
than a certain amount, which differed in each case, it was not economically 
justifiable for the developer to build on that land. Relaxing the limits of 
construction density made it profitable to construct residential buildings for sale. 
Housing developers prefer to increase the construction density of their plot as 
much as is profitable. However, individual developers and small construction 
companies could mostly increase the construction density a maximum of two 
more floors while large development companies would try to increase the 
construction density as much as they could and create as much profit as 
possible. It should be mentioned that after the approval of the District Plans of 
regions it was less likely that housing developers could exceed the limits of the 
construction density of these zones. However, as the District Plans went 
through alterations and an imposition of directives, the construction densities of 
their zones were already increased to keep the housing developers interested in 
construction. 
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Even though, the construction density of a plot was important for developers, 
the location of the land also played a role in their decision. It was important for 
them to build in locations where: 
" The property market was active (housing prices were high and they 
could sell properties reasonably fast) 
" They could afford the costs of construction 
" They could compete with other developers working in that area 
" Suitable land supply or redevelopment opportunities existed 
" They had enough knowledge of the area, its municipality and estate 
agents. 
If a developer met the required financial conditions, they preferred to carry out 
construction work in the northern regions in general and more specifically in 
Regions 1, the northern section of Region 2, Region 3, a very small portion of 
the western edge of Region 4 and some parts of Region 5. 
Besides the construction density and location, there were other factors that 
encouraged or discouraged a developer getting involved with the construction of 
housing development such as:  
" The general performance of the property market of Tehran 
" The costs of construction 
" The profitability of other investment methods, e.g. bank interest 
rates 
" The political stability of the country. 
The physical shape of a construction would be affected by what the developer 
conceived as profitable, what was in demand by buyers and what was practical 
in terms of regulations. Most, but not all, developers tried to increase the 
saleable floor area as much as possible. Based on the regulations and the 
buyers’ demands, developers could not or did not increase the construction 
density more than a certain amount, which varied case by case. Moreover, the 
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shape and size of the land dictated the limitations on what it was possible to 
build. 
The second research question was: how, as a result of using the construction 
density charge tool, have the decisions of housing developers shaped the city of 
Tehran. To some extent, the decisions of the housing developers have shaped 
certain parts of Tehran. As the Tehran Municipality needs the money generated 
from the construction density charge, it has been flexible with developers in 
giving them permission to construct buildings beyond the construction density 
limits of the plans. The demand to exceed construction density limits in some 
northern regions of Tehran, which are expensive areas, was more than in the 
rest of the city. These are the areas where large development companies with 
strong financial positions preferred to construct high-rise buildings. As a result, 
the city has witnessed a spontaneous and market-led growth of buildings with 
higher construction density (and in extreme cases high-rise buildings) in 
expensive areas of the city. 
The power of developers in leading the market-led growth of buildings with 
excess construction density has changed during the three decades that the 
construction density charge has been used. Before the approval of new 
planning documents for the city, negotiation with the local municipality was 
easier for the developers as regulations were loose and scrutiny over what was 
permitted was limited. During this time, the City Council was a new 
establishment and did not have all the tools to inspect the municipality’s 
performance. Also, the government was not concerned with what was 
happening in the municipalities either.  
After the approval and implementation of the plan, the construction density of 
construction permits were mostly issued based on the plan. However, during 
the preparation and amendment phases the plan had been changed to 
accommodate market trends so it is hard to say whether, after the 
implementation of the new plan, market-led growth has been harnessed by the 
plan. 
The third research question asked: How, in turn, this market-led growth has 
affected the way the city is planned. Market-led growth has affected the urban 
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planning system of the city. The profitability of investment in the property market 
by all kind of investors ranging from individual developers to corporate investors 
such as insurance companies, banks and pensions organisations put the urban 
planning system of Tehran under great pressure. The history of planning efforts 
to harness the market shows that the planning system could not stand in the 
way of capital investment. The financial relationships between the Tehran 
Municipality and the developers worsened the situation. 
Developers do not make a direct contribution in the production phase of urban 
plans and plans are made in a top-down manner. However, their interests have 
been incorporated in the plan at different stages because the municipality needs 
to keep the developers interested in construction. As a result, the plan has 
experienced alterations and interventions during both the production and the 
implementation phases to secure the benefit of both the developers’ and the 
municipality’s incomes. 
During the preparation phase of the 1:2000 plan, the municipality managed to 
control the situation by appointing the Architecture and Urbanism Department of 
Tehran Municipality to prepare the 1:2000 District Plans and dismissing the 22 
consultant companies. Meanwhile, in the five-year time gap between approving 
the 1:10000 plan and the 1:2000 plan, the municipality issued an incredible 
amount of construction permits in many cases without complying with the rules. 
Many of the high-rise buildings got their construction permits during this time. 
After the approval of the District Plans the construction density of many zones 
was changed by the municipality, especially in the year after the approval, to 
incorporate the interests of developers. 
8-3-2 TESTING THE INITIAL HYPOTHESES 
Initially this thesis proposed a hypothesis that the city is not managed by official 
plans but by responding to spontaneous growth, which is partially the result of 
the application of the excess construction density charge. Although Tehran has 
a Structural-Strategic (Comprehensive) Plan and District Plans for each region, 
the city has grown and been managed spontaneously rather than in a planned 
way. The following points should be considered regarding this statement:  
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" It is inaccurate to say that all of Tehran is not managed by official 
plans but by responding to spontaneous growth because there are 
some projects carried out in Tehran which are based on plans, such 
as Tehran’s underground system or the expansion of the highways 
network.  
" It is more accurate to say that housing construction in some areas 
of Tehran is happening spontaneously and is market-led.  
This research’s proposition consisted of three parts. Firstly, that the construction 
density bonus had created a market that did not exist before, or was not of a 
considerable size. By adopting the excess construction density charge, the 
tendency to build higher than the official plans permitted increased the 
economic benefit of developers and the Tehran Municipality. The construction 
industry became very profitable and attracted many individuals from other 
professions to invest and work in this sector. Prime locations became under 
more pressure for construction. As a result, the spatial development of some 
parts of the city was handed over to the vagaries of the interests of the housing 
developers. 
This first part of the proposition is correct, as the research has proved that the 
housing construction industry was boosted after relaxing the construction 
density limits and that construction became not only economically justified but 
very profitable, especially in the expensive areas of the city. The second part of 
this proposition pointed out that the decisions of the housing developers 
affected the spatial order of the city. Market trends have shaped the city of 
Tehran to a great extent. In many parts of the city, the spatial development has 
been shaped by the developers’ ability and interest in buying the right to build 
more densely in the areas that they thought would be more profitable. The 
financial dependence of the Tehran Municipality on the construction sector 
boosted the power of the developers to mostly construct whatever benefitted 
them economically. 
The last part of the proposition suggested that market-led growth has affected 
the way the city is planned. The plans are not driving the growth. They have 
been adjusted to meet the requirements of spontaneous growth. The density 
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bonus strategy to finance the municipality’s expenditures has changed the 
logical relationship between plans and developers. Instead of the expected 
effect of plans on developers’ decisions, the developers’ agendas have directed 
the plans. The more recent planning documents of the city are being affected to 
accommodate the interests of developers and enable the Tehran Municipality to 
generate income from their construction activities. 
8-4 OTHER FINDINGS 
Some findings obtained during the collection of the data and its analysis were 
not predicted when the research questions were formulated. These findings are 
equally important in order to better understand the development process in 
Tehran. It became evident that other organisations were responsible in the 
Tehran Municipality’s reliance on the developers to generate income. 
Although at the beginning of this research it was supposed that the financial 
relationship of the Tehran Municipality and the developers was the most 
important reason behind ignoring the planning documents, through the research 
it became apparent that central government, its High Council, the City Council 
and consultant companies have all assisted, in various intentional or 
unintentional ways, in creating this wrongful mechanism. 
The government is culpable as it cut its financial aids to the municipalities 
without providing any plan. By law the government had to prepare a plan 
defining the ways that the municipality could generate income; this was never 
prepared. Moreover, by approving two acts in 198746 and 199147, the High 
Council provided the legal basis for granting extra construction density in 
exchange for a fee payable to the Tehran Municipality. This is despite the public 
belief that Tehran’s Mayor, Karbaschi, introduced the construction density 
charge. 
The closure of the Tehran Urban Planning Agency by the government was 
another decision made during the preparation of the District Plans which 
affected the preparation process. By so doing, the government left responsibility 
                                                
46 Zoning and Defining Construction Density and Land-use Act 
47 Increasing Density and High-Rise Building Act 
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for the preparation of the District Plans to the municipality, who welcomed this 
decision. By adding a directive with eight clauses to the regulations of the 
district plans in April 2012, the government and its High Council affected the 
construction density of District Plans in favour of the real estate market and the 
municipality. 
The City Council’s performance should also be criticised. Preparing and 
approving the Garden-Tower Directive without sufficient research resulted in the 
destruction of many gardens located in the northern regions of Tehran. 
Moreover, the City Council, by approving to increase the municipal budget each 
year, supported the municipality in abusing the planning system in order to 
generate increased income. 
The consultant companies who prepared the plans also contributed to this 
process. These consultant companies are mostly run by architecture graduates. 
The lack of a proper understanding of the mechanisms of real estate by these 
consultant companies resulted in the preparation of plans which ignored the 
social and economic complexities existing in Tehran, showing in particular a 
lack of understanding of the relationship that existed between the Tehran 
Municipality and the housing developers and how that affected the success of 
the plans that they produced. Their unrealistic plans paved the way for later 
amendments of the plan. 
8-5 MAIN AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The discoveries made by this thesis have not only produced its own conclusions 
but have created further avenues for exploration. 
8-5-1 THE RELATIONSHIP OF LARGE HOUSING 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES AND THE TEHRAN 
MUNICIPALITY 
In this research, the focus was on the decisions of the housing developers in 
general and the effect of the excess construction density charge on their 
decisions. As the majority of the housing developers in Tehran are either 
individual developers or small construction companies, most of the interviews 
were carried out with them. However, the results of this research show that, 
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despite the fact that large development companies are in a minority in the 
production of housing in Tehran, their power to pursue their own agendas has 
had far more impact than those in the majority. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, these large development companies are in a strong 
financial position because of their affiliation with banks, insurance companies 
and pensions organisations. These agents have a bilateral relationship with the 
Tehran Municipality; on the one hand they are contractors of large-scale 
development schemes of the Tehran Municipality and on the other hand they 
are active in the construction of high-rise buildings in the northern regions of 
Tehran. Understanding this relationship is essential in order to be able to better 
understand the dynamic that exists between this type of developer and the 
Tehran Municipality. 
Additional research in this area could help to gain a better understanding of the 
details of the interplay between these large development companies and the 
region’s municipality or the Tehran Municipality. Case studies of this research 
could include a few high-rise buildings which are already constructed or under 
construction. To understand the current dynamics, it is better to include case 
studies in which construction permits were granted in the last five years. 
This proposed research could investigate: 
" The decisions of developers, investors and landowners of these 
projects 
" The strategies acquired to get construction permits and excess 
construction density 
" The relations with the region’s municipality 
" The details of dealing with Commission No. 5 if the developer had 
to get commission’s approval 
" The details of dealing with Commission No. 100 in cases where the 
developer was fined for breaking the law. 
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It should be mentioned that carrying out research on this topic could be 
problematic as neither the Tehran Municipality nor these developers are likely to 
be willing to participate in such a study. However, it would be possible to 
acquire strategies following the example of the ones used in this research to 
generate relevant data on the matter. For example, contacting and interviewing 
ex-employees who are either retired now or have moved to another 
organisation and have information on the topic could be a possible approach. 
Being introduced by someone that the interviewee trusts also could make it 
easier to negotiate an interview.  
8-5-2 THE FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY 
Looking at the commercial development process and its relationship with 
municipality funding is also a potential field for research. This research focused 
on housing developers and the financial dependency of the Tehran Municipality 
on them. However, during the collection of data in Tehran, both personal 
observations and the results of interviews revealed that the construction of 
commercial developments, such as hypermarkets and shopping malls, are 
growing very quickly in Tehran. 
As highlighted in a few of the interviews, large housing development companies 
and commercial development companies are the main providers of income for 
the Tehran Municipality. Although the quantity of housing construction in Tehran 
is far more than the construction of commercial complexes, the funds generated 
from issuing a construction permit for a shopping centre are proportionally 
greater. In addition, in the charges received by the Tehran Municipality to grant 
permission for construction of a commercial development there are other 
mechanisms in place. In the following paragraph, an example of one of these 
mechanisms will be briefly elaborated. 
One of the interviewees mentioned that, the Tehran Municipality granted a 
construction permit for a commercial building called Atlas Mall in Region 1 in 
return for its debt to Ansar Bank, who was the major investor in Atlas Mall. This 
permit was granted despite the planning regulation of the area and it became a 
subject of controversy in the media and among the public. However, as the 
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financial value of the project was 8,000 billion Rial, the High Council could not 
stop the project because the Tehran Municipality would then have become 
bankrupt. This case shows the complex relationships between the Tehran 
Municipality with some financial institutions. 
Research could also focus on the dynamics that exist between the Tehran 
Municipality and the developers of the commercial developments. It would be 
interesting to investigate: 
" The aspirations of these investment companies 
" The nature of their relationship with the Tehran Municipality 
" The strategies that they acquired to pursue their agendas. 
An approach using cases studies could be employed to carry out this research. 
Large-scale commercial developments, such as the Iran Mall and the Atlas Mall, 
could both be case studies for this research. Likewise, collecting data for this 
research could be problematic.  
This thesis, in investigating the relationship between developers and planners in 
Tehran, has provided a prototype methodology that could be used in additional 
investigations. The methods that focused on the particularities of Tehran 
Municipality's construction density charges can become a rationale for a 
succession of future studies.
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APPENDIX 1 
EXAMPLES OF INTERVIEW GUIDELINES 
1.  A guideline to interview developers 
1- Time and place of the interview: 
2- Name of the respondent and his/her company name: 
3- Educational and occupational background of the respondent: 
4- Nature of the respondent’s work (e.g. individual developer, construction 
firm, development company):  
5- How long have you been in the business of housing construction?  
6- Why did you decide to become a developer? And what has kept you in 
the business?  
7- Which parts of Tehran do you work? Or used to work? Why? 
8- Where do you prefer to work? Why? 
9- What is your target market? 
10- What are the things that you consider before initiating a development 
project?  
11- How do you acquire construction permit from the municipality?   
12- What are the necessary resources for you to start the construction? 
(Land, labour, finance) 
13- How do you provide these resources?   
Land (buying from the land owner, partnership with the owner) 
Labour (contractor, architects, fixed construction team) 
Finance (bank loan, pre-sell) 
14- Is the potential construction density (FAR) of a land important for you? 
Why? 
15- Have your decisions (where to build, how to build…) been affected by the 
amount of excess construction density that you can get?  
16- How could you increase the construction density of your projects? 
17- Has the new plan of the city affected the way that you work?  
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2. A guideline to interview planners 
1- Time and place of the interview: 
2- Name of the respondent: 
3- Working in public sector or private sector:  
4- Name of the office or firm of the respondent: 
5- Position of the respondent in that firm: 
6- Have you been involved in preparing plans for Tehran? If yes, what was 
your role? 
7-  What is the role of the construction density in planning process and 
zoning system? 
8- How have financial tools of the Tehran Municipality affected the planning 
system and the planning objectives? 
9- Do you think excess construction density charge has affected the 
concentration of high-rise buildings in certain parts of Tehran?  
10- Has excess construction density charge affected the development 
process? In what ways? 
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APPENDIX 2 
NAMES OF THE INTERVIEWEES 
1. Mr Sohrab Mashhoudi  
2. Mr Majid Paksaz 
3. Dr Mohsen Habibi 
4. Mr Naser Nikou-Sheresht 
5. Dr Pirouz Hanachi  
6. Dr Hamid Majedi  
7. Mr Mohammad Haghani 
8. Mr Farhad Soltani-Azad  
9. Dr Eskandar Mokhtari  
10. Mr Kavianfar  
11. Mr Milani 
12. Mr Mohammad Salari  
13. Mr Mohammadzadeh  
14. Mr Ghoseyri  
15. Mr Ahmadi  
16. Dr Mehrandish  
17. Dr Masoud Shafigh  
18. Mr Hamidreza Kakhi 
19. Mr Akbari  
20. Mr Moosavi  
21. Mr Poorsadegh  
22. Mr Bahram Farivar-Sadri  
23. Mr Amir Khalaj 
24. Mrs Asadi  
25. Mr Noorzadeh  
26. Dr Mehdi Moieni  
27. Mr Ahmad Saeidniya 
28. Mrs Golabi  
29. Mr Shahrokhabadi  
30. Maskan Bozorg Atiyeh 
(company)  
31. Mr Mohsen Yousefi  
32. Mr Habib-allah Taherkhani  
33. Mrs Mahdokht Hamedi 
34. Dr Alireza Mirhabibi  
35. Mrs Kiaei  
36. Mr Farokh Zonouzi  
37. Mrs Hodsani  
38. Mr Khodabakhshi 
39. Dr Fariborz Dolatabadi  
40. Mr Rezafar 
41.  Mr Behkam  
42. Mr Ebrahimi  
43. Mr Khoshnoudiyan  
44. Mr Saeid Asooyar  
45. Mr Hoshyarkhah  
46. Mr Javadi 
47. Mrs Mahsa Hojat
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